People First Party (PFP) Chairman James Soong (宋楚瑜) represented President Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) as a special envoy at the APEC Economic Leaders’ Meeting in Lima, Peru, late last month. The most important question about Taiwan’s participation in the meeting is not whether Soong met Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) or how long such a meeting went on, the really significant point is that Taiwan has once again embarrassingly defined its official status at an international event within the framework of “a city in China.”
This little niche is hard to get out of. Like the enchanted golden hoop on the Monkey King’s head in Journey to the West, it can only get tighter and tighter.
During the two days of formal meetings, Soong’s title was that of the representative of “Chinese Taipei.” These were the words displayed on the nameplate on his table and in the official records of the meeting. There was no mention of “Taiwan,” or its national title, the Republic of China (ROC).
The English words “Chinese Taipei” can only be interpreted as meaning “China’s Taipei,” while the Chinese term using the word Zhonghua (中華, Chinese) instead of Zhongguo (中國, China) is no more than a fig leaf that Taiwan’s officialdom has been using for many years to hoodwink the Taiwanese public. That choice of words might fool some Taiwanese, but it serves no use abroad.
Since the 1980s, “Chinese Taipei” has become what sociologists call a “key.” “Keys” and “keying” are a central concept in framing theory that has to do with the uses and functions of words and phrases. Once a word or phrase has been allocated for a certain purpose, in the way that “Chinese Taipei” has been accepted by countries around the world and by Taiwan itself, it comes to have a framing effect in language.
Related discourse and literature will come to revolve around this key, and it provides a means of rationalizing the repetition of the same theme in the development of any further text.
The sad thing is that Taiwanese media, no matter where they stand on the political spectrum, from left to right, have all been making a big song and dance about whether Soong met Xi and treating it as a measure of a possible thaw in cross-strait relations.
Meanwhile, they overlook the deep wound that the “Chinese Taipei” label inflicts on Taiwan at such events, as well as its long-term effects.
It does not matter whether Soong and Xi met for one or 10 minutes, or how many times they met, any such meeting could only be an illusion and achieve very little.
In Xi’s eyes, Soong’s role at the APEC summit was probably no different from that of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Chief Executive Leung Chun-ying (梁振英) — both being local representatives from within China’s sphere of political influence.
At least Leung could circulate among the national leaders with the title of Hong Kong chief executive.
However, Soong was in a much more lowly position, but still had to force a smile. After the summit, he bragged about his supposed achievement and was evidently mighty pleased with himself.
The title “Chinese Taipei” is neither fish nor fowl. The origin of this peculiar formula can be traced to the shortsighted notion that “gentlemen will not stand together with thieves” proposed by then-president Chiang Kai-shek (蔣介石) during the Cold War years from 1950 onward, and to the harsh reality of international affairs.
As the People’s Republic of China’s status rose in the international community, it eventually drove the ROC into a tight corner, to the extent that we cannot even use Taiwan as an alternative title.
From 1979 onward, many governmental and non-governmental organizations and events around the world, such as the World Health Assembly held in May this year and the Summer Universiade, which is due to be held in Taipei in August next year, force Taiwan to use the title “Chinese Taipei,” which is no more than a self-numbing and self-comforting mantra.
Over the past few decades, Taiwan has had little room to maneuver on the international scene. It has to a large extent brought this upon itself, especially as it remains caught in its own trap with regard to how it defines itself.
Every time Taiwan takes part in an international conference under the title “Chinese Taipei,” it once again highlights the subordinate relation implicit in the phrase and deepens the impression that Taiwan is a local government of China.
When former president Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) accepted an invitation to attend a conference in Malaysia last month, apart from bringing humiliation upon himself, he made it obvious that despite his eight years in power, he has never been a president in China’s eyes.
The damage that “Chinese Taipei” has done in the international community is that Taiwan is seen as “China’s Taipei,” and since one kingdom cannot have two kings, how could Ma expect to share the title of president with Xi?
Soong’s attendance at the APEC summit as the representative of “Chinese Taipei” only serves to accept once again the key that Taiwan is China’s Taipei and openly tell other countries that Taiwan is part of China. Other than that, it means nothing.
The only way for Taiwan to escape this unwanted categorization in the international community is to dispense with the “Chinese Taipei” title and start afresh. Even if that means being in limbo for a while, at least that would be more dignified than the current state of affairs.
To paraphrase Chinese philosopher Mencius (孟子), a state must despise itself before others will despise it.
If Taiwan goes on being “China’s Taipei,” what else can it do but dance to someone else’s tune?
Chang Tsan-kuo is a visiting professor at National Chengchi University’s College of Communication.
Translated by Julian Clegg
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