Until recently, most people assumed that China approved of former president Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) for having followed a path toward eventual unification throughout his eight years in office. However, in light of recent events, that assumption might have to be reconsidered.
The first incident to consider is that before Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) Chairwoman Hung Hsiu-chu (洪秀柱) went to China to meet Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) in his role as Chinese Communist Party (CCP) general secretary, several senior KMT figures, including Ma and former vice president Wu Den-yih (吳敦義), urged Hung to talk about “one China, different interpretations” when she was face to face with him.
However, she did not heed their advice, leading to a high-profile dispute between Hung and the other KMT leaders.
When Hung met Xi, she used the formula of “seeking agreement on the one China principle, while shelving the different interpretations of one China.”
After Xi signaled his approval of Hung’s suggestion, Ma and Wu had nothing more to say.
The second incident occurred when Ma went to speak at an event in Malaysia. Ma’s title of “former president” was disregarded and someone changed the title of his speech.
Ma called a news conference to hit back at the Chinese embassy, accusing it of counterproductive interference that would be bad for cross-strait relations.
On this occasion, the KMT leadership displayed a remarkable lack of concern and did not utter a word in support of Ma.
The third incident came when the China Review news agency published an interview with Yu Keli (余克禮), former director of the China Academy of Social Sciences’ Taiwan Research Institute.
Yu accused Ma of only having his own interests at heart in Malaysia and said that his actions went against the ultimate aim of unification and caused considerable harm to political relations across the Taiwan Strait.
In view of the context in which it took place, the humiliation that Ma suffered in Malaysia was probably not a case of counterproductive interference by the Chinese embassy, but rather one of China revealing new ground rules for its handling of Taiwan affairs, while also drawing preliminary conclusions about Ma’s rights and wrongs with regard to cross-strait relations.
Speaking in Malaysia, Ma said that over the past eight years he had made the greatest efforts of any politician in Taiwan to improve cross-strait relations.
He said that for the past eight years in Taiwan he had been the target of endless accusations of getting too close to China and selling out Taiwan, so he did not know why he was now experiencing such indignity.
He said he could not understand what message the Chinese actions were supposed to convey.
The China Review interview seems to furnish indirect answers from Beijing.
Ma brought the humiliation upon himself and even though it is hard to bear, it should be a lesson for those who have one foot on either side of the Taiwan Strait.
When Ma was in office, China turned a blind eye to his “one China, different interpretations” for the sake of using him to hoodwink Taiwanese. However, clear-sighted people could tell that Beijing was also pretending.
The China Review interview showed that China no longer needs to turn a blind eye.
Yu is quoted as saying that during his time in office Ma clung stubbornly to his “three noes” — “no unification, no independence and no use of force” — along with the “one China, different interpretations” formula, and has continued to do so even after leaving office.
Yu also said that Ma has followed a policy of “no politics — only economy” and “no culture — only economy.”
Yu’s criticisms reveal how unhappy China is regarding Ma’s performance.
It can be inferred that the Chinese authorities were unhappy with Ma’s suggestion that Hung should talk about “one China, different interpretations” at her meeting with Xi. Hung did not follow Ma’s rules and instead came up with the idea of “seeking agreement on the one China principle, while shelving different interpretations of one China.”
She proposed this formula with no regard for mainstream public opinion in Taiwan and also spoke out in defense of retired generals who have capitulated to Beijing.
In view of Hung’s actions, China’s leaders have decided to recognize her as the authentic KMT. Evidently Beijing has decided to ditch Ma and support Hung instead. Will the “old blue men” dare to challenge this latest move?
Ma frequently says, with a tone of self-satisfaction, that President Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) is carrying on his “status quo.”
Little does he realize that China’s leaders find this point hard to swallow.
In the China Review interview, Yu said that from objective and factual points of view Ma has rationalized and legitimized the Democratic Progressive Party’s (DPP) separatist demands and made them fixed and long-term policies.
Yu said that from when Ma’s KMT controlled both the executive and the legislature to today, when it controls neither, Ma has never let go of “one China, different interpretations” and the “three noes.”
If Yu finds this so unacceptable, one can imagine how frustrated China’s leaders feel about Ma.
Actually, none of this is what Ma really wants. After all, has he not been pursuing unification all along? Ma’s problem is that he does at least have to compete in elections, which requires making concessions to mainstream public opinion.
After the Sunflower movement of 2014, which set off a wave of people power, Ma did not dare get into any head-on clashes with the public. With an absolute majority of public opinion in favor of Taiwan’s independence as being the “status quo,” Ma had to be cautious about putting his desire for unification into practice. It was also unavoidable that eight years of accumulated adjustments would diverge from China’s overall aims.
In view of this, maybe China despaired of Ma’s unsatisfactory performance, and maybe Ma resents China’s lack of understanding and sympathy.
However, it also highlights what is precious about the nation’s democracy. As long as the government obeys the ground rule that sovereignty lies with the people, it cannot take Taiwan down a road that ends up in China.
Now Beijing seems to have noticed that this game is not going anywhere, so it might start playing its cards according to new rules. It might do some rewriting of the script that puts Hung’s KMT in a supporting role. Now that the elections are over and the DPP is in government, the KMT no longer needs to worry about being seen to agree with the CCP. On the contrary, “seeking agreement on the one China principle,” not mentioning the existence of the Republic of China and recognizing the People’s Republic of China as legitimate are the KMT’s new dogmas.
In China’s view and according to its broad definition of separatism, Ma’s “one China, different interpretations” and Tsai’s promise to preserve the “status quo” are both separatist positions. Ma’s downgrading in Malaysia and Hong Kong’s seizure of Singaporean armored vehicles on a ship from Taiwan can be seen as attempts by Beijing to further isolate Taiwan from the international community, and especially to obstruct the Tsai administration’s “new southbound policy.”
With an eye on the CCP’s 19th National Congress next year, it looks as though Xi is going to go on playing hardball, not to mention the way China keeps impoverishing Taiwan’s economy.
Pointing an accusing finger at Tsai, China has appointed the advocates of “one China, same interpretation” to further its ultimate goal. If that is indeed so, the “different interpretations” faction will have to stand aside.
Translated by Julian Clegg
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