While former vice president Wu Den-yih’s (吳敦義) recent application for a three-day visit to the US next month has not attracted as much media and public attention as former president Ma Ying-jeou’s (馬英九) denied request to make a one-day visit to Hong Kong in June, Wu’s move reeks of ulterior motives.
In less than one month after he completed his criticism-dogged eight-year presidential term, Ma early in June submitted an application to the Presidential Office for a one-day trip to the special administrative region of China.
Although the reason for Ma’s trip seemed reasonable and justifiable — delivering a speech to a group of aspiring journalists on cross-strait relations — it did not make the trip any less politically sensitive. It was particularly so given Ma’s unsubtle affection toward China and the planned trip being so soon after the end of his presidence.
Not surprisingly, the Presidential Office turned down Ma’s application in accordance with the Classified National Security Information Protection Act (國家機密保護法), citing national security concerns and the highly sensitive nature of the planned destination.
According to Article 26 of the act, someone “who may exercise the original classification authority ... handle classified information within the scope of official duty ... retire or resign from official position or has handled the transfer of some classified information to another agency within three years” should obtain prior approval before leaving the nation.
Ma was quick to make a fuss over the denial of his application, resorting to ridicule and sarcasm targeting President Tsai Ing-wen’s (蔡英文) administration, which is why Wu’s request for overseas travel to the US filed two months afterward appears to be an attempt to test the waters by the former head of state.
First, as Wu’s planned destination is not somewhere that would be deemed politically sensitive, such as China, Hong Kong or Macau, and is instead one of Taiwan’s closest allies — especially in the mind of the Democratic Progressive Party — it makes it less likely, or more difficult, for the office to turn down Wu’s application.
Second, the former vice president’s US trip is scheduled for Sept. 23 to Sept. 25, about four months after his vice presidency came to an end, which means the classified information he and Ma had access to while in office would have become less relevant.
If the Presidential Office does approve Wu’s trip, it would suggest that Ma is allowed to go to any place in the world he pleases as long as it is not China or somewhere with special ties with the communist nation.
It might also indicate that the Tsai administration no longer sees Ma as much of a danger to the government’s protection of classified information and that he would become even less so as time passes.
Even if the office rejects Wu’s application, the grounds for rejection would nevertheless provide Ma with some insight into how to draw up a travel plan that stands a greater likelihood of approval.
Either way, the Presidential Office is advised not to take Wu’s US application lightly and regard it only as a single case, because any decision it makes on the case could be used against the Tsai administration by Ma, who could be a flight risk given the many lawsuits he is facing.
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