Despite widespread concerns in Beijing and among the international community over President Tsai Ing-wen’s (蔡英文) position on cross-strait relations, the content of her inaugural address turned out to be more or less just what everyone had expected.
In Tsai’s speech — which she drafted — she carefully selected terms that would not provoke Beijing, but did not mention “one China” or alter her position that she would “respect the historical fact” of the 1992 talks to an acknowledgement of the so-called “1992 consensus” as Beijing had hoped.
Although Beijing had taken a tough attitude prior to Tsai’s inauguration, anyone with a little common sense would have known that Tsai would not accept the “one China” principle or the “1992 consensus,” because the two principles, although non-negotiable according to Beijing, are not in line with mainstream Taiwanese public opinion; and Tsai — as a democratically elected president — cannot ignore public opinion.
After Tsai’s speech, China’s Taiwan Affairs Office (國台辦) was reportedly unhappy, but they were reserved in their criticism, simply describing her speech as “an incomplete test paper.”
While it remains unclear which side won the first round of the battle between Beijing and Tsai, at least Beijing’s warning that any challenge to the “1992 consensus” would “trigger an earthquake and topple mountains” — a euphemism for political upheaval — proved to be just bravado. Tsai stood her ground in her inaugural address — and while she is in office — whether for four years or eight — Beijing is unlikely to again talk of political upheaval.
Obviously, Beijing could not wait until Tsai’s inauguration to impose a series of “sanctions” against Taiwan. From the Kenya deportations and the Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) meeting in Brussels to the World Health Assembly (WHA) invitation stressing the “one China” principle, it is clear Beijing plans to give Tsai a hard time. However, these moves have had limited effect and did not cause an upheaval.
To “trigger an earthquake and topple mountains” implies an upheaval that ends in violent destruction. There are two possible means at China’s disposal for achieving that.
It could launch a war against Taiwan — or push relations across the Taiwan Strait to the brink of war — or it could impose economic sanctions on Taiwan to pressurize the Tsai administration into submission.
However, with sufficient understanding of Beijing’s political calculations, and the domestic and international pressures on Taiwan and China, it is easy to see that there will be no political upheaval.
First, bringing about unification between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait has never been a priority for China. In fact, Beijing’s one and only priority has been to maintain the stability of its own regime. Unless taking over Taiwan were as effortless as “retrieving” Hong Kong in 1997, China is unlikely to attack Taiwan militarily. Doing so would simply be too costly, as it would risk China’s stability: Not only would it sink the nation’s GDP, it could also trigger a civil war and cause the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to collapse.
Second, although the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is far more powerful than Taiwan’s armed forces, the nation’s military is still ranked as the 13th most powerful in the world and its strength should not be underestimated. If there was a war, the collateral damage would forever traumatize Taiwanese and cause an irreconcilable rift between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait. In addition, even if China were to successfully occupy Taiwan, it is doubtful whether Beijing would be able to maintain control over Taiwan after the nation has enjoyed a democratic system for decades.
Finally, should Taiwan’s government agencies fall under the control of Chinese officials, how many Taiwanese officials would be willing to take orders from them?
As for China’s other option, besieging and imposing economic sanctions on Taiwan — that is no easy task either. Disregarding technical issues such as how large a naval force Beijing would need to besiege Taiwan, there are also the economic ramifications to be considered. Taiwan and China are both members of the WTO, which means that China must follow the rules of the international economic system. In addition, the two sides have developed highly interdependent economies. Trade with China now accounts for 40 percent of Taiwan’s international trade. Isolating Taiwan economically would inevitably hurt China’s economy.
Taiwan’s democratically elected president has public opinion behind her. Of the four democratically elected presidents of the past 20 years, Tsai is the most reliable and discreet. Should China invade — or impose economic sanctions on Taiwan — it would be going back on its own word that it was “pinning its hopes on the people of Taiwan.”
Without a good cause for occupying Taiwan, Beijing would be condemned by the international community and subjected to economic sanctions and it would be internationally isolated to an even greater extent than it was following the Tiannanmen Square Massacre in 1989.
For these reasons, Beijing’s talk of political upheaval has only prompted the Tsai administration to handle cross-strait relations more carefully and made it more likely to avoid amending the Constitution despite the document’s Sinocentric framework. However, it is worth noting that Taiwan still faces many challenges. Beijing has great control over Taiwan’s participation in international organizations and can easily make Taiwan lose more of its remaining 22 diplomatic allies. It will not be long until Beijing begins to put more pressure on Taiwan through other means.
While Beijing does have plenty of other means it could use against Taiwan, it also fears a backlash among Taiwanese. If it wants to punish Tsai’s administration for not accepting the “1992 consensus,” but avoid provoking the public, Beijing must be careful when imposing sanctions on Taiwan. Otherwise, in such a delicate situation, it could easily go too far and instead become Tsai’s most significant benefactor by helping her administration muster more sympathy and support from the public.
In other words, there will be no political upheaval, but Tsai’s administration must not begin congratulating itself, and instead must remain humble and vigilant, because without the “1992 consensus,” there will be long-term uncertainty and channels for cross-strait exchanges, such as contacts between China’s Taiwan Affairs Office and Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council, or between the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits and the Straits Exchange Foundation, might be closed down.
The test for Tsai’s administration is whether it can field pressure from Beijing while carrying out domestic political reforms to consolidate democracy and safeguard Taiwan’s autonomy, dignity and values.
John Lim is an associate research fellow at Academia Sinica’s Institute of Modern History.
Translated by Tu Yu-an
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