Unprecedented election results on Jan. 16 have produced unprecedented options for president-elect Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) in domestic politics, international trade and cross-strait relations with China.
For the third time, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) won the presidency, with Tsai winning 56 percent of the popular vote over Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) candidate Eric Chu (朱立倫) with 31 percent.
However, for the first time, the DPP also won a majority in the Legislative Yuan. While media focused on the presidential contest, the DPP’s control of the legislature is likely to have a greater impact on both domestic political activities and cross-strait relations with China.
In her first post-election remarks, Tsai said: “Our democratic system, national identity and international space must be respected.”
This view was supported by her repeated statements during her election campaign that she would maintain the “status quo” of cross-strait relations.
The election was not seen as a popular referendum on Taiwanese independence, but rather on growing cross-strait economic integration with China — integration that could, in the future, lead to political integration.
While continuing cross-strait “peace and stability” based on consultations and exchanges over the previous two decades, Tsai has said that cross-strait relations would be “consistent, predictable and sustainable” after her inauguration. It is to be based on the “two pillars” of the democratic Republic of China (ROC) Constitution and the public will of Taiwanese.
Under the new ROC government, the DPP’s 68-seat majority has control of the 113-seat legislature for the first time, while the KMT has been relegated to a minority of 35 seats. The new, young-leaning New Power Party (NPP) has five seats, pushing the People First Party to fourth-party status with three seats. Independents hold two seats.
This new Legislative Yuan party breakdown is important for a number of political reasons. First, newly elected Legislative Speaker Su Jia-chyuan (蘇嘉全) has already said there are a series of reforms under consideration for boosting public participation and transparency in the legislature.
Another issue is passing cross-strait agreement oversight legislation. According to DPP Secretary-General Joseph Wu (吳釗燮), the passing of such oversight legislation is to be a “top priority” for the DPP-led legislature during its first 100 days. Such legislation was a major demand of Sunflower movement protesters in 2014, when they occupied the Legislative Yuan’s main chamber to block passage of the controversial cross-strait service trade agreement (CSSTA) with China. The agreement would have opened up the nation’s service industries to Chinese investment and businesses. The protesters said that agreements like the CSSTA deal had been done without public oversight or input.
Some political observers have suggested that DPP legislators, in coalition with the NPP, could achieve a super majority needed to amend existing legislation. However, to change the Constitution would require a three-quarters legislative vote. Taiwan also has a national referendum law that permits questions of national importance to be put directly to its citizens — and which has been used in the past.
Internally, the DPP legislative caucus must ensure party solidarity to push through its proposed legislative initiatives. One area that is likely to be a minefield is legislation that calls for a declaration of a “Republic of Taiwan.” While ROC-Taiwan conducts all the functions of a sovereign state, there are many in the DPP who want a public “declaration of independence.” While this would be difficult without changes to the Constitution, such a declaration would certainly elicit a strong response from China.
Taiwan is basically an export economy that has increasingly been integrated into China’s economy — with an estimated US$1.3 billion in Taiwanese investment in Chinese manufacturing and as part of supply-chain exports worldwide. However, as China’s economy has slowed down, so has Taiwan’s.
One way to increase Taiwan’s international market is through membership in international trade and regulatory agreements — or at least by revising Taiwan’s own regulatory and administrative structures to ensure that its exports are not restricted in those markets. The KMT government under President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) eased restrictions on more than 860 laws and regulations to achieve greater trade liberalization — and fast-tracked implementation of the new free economic pilot zones in the nation to boost supply-chain exports.
There are three major international trading blocs being formed in the Asia-Pacific Region: the US-led Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP); the China-led Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP); and the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC). Each of these groupings — with some overlapping country memberships — seeks to enhance regional businesses, trade and economies, with different degrees of economic integration. To push Taiwan’s inclusion in such trading blocs, Tsai has already announced plans to set up a dedicated Cabinet office to handle international trade negotiations.
“Stable and transparent” cross-strait relations between the democratic ROC-Taiwan and the communist People’s Republic of China are complex. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) government in Beijing claims sovereignty over Taiwan and refuses to renounce the use of force to back its claim, despite China and Taiwan’s increased economic integration.
Since it was founded in 1949, the CCP government has insisted that the “Taiwan issue” is an internal affair under the “one China” principle. Between 2008 and this year, the KMT government under Ma supported the so-called “1992 consensus” that accepted that there was “one China,” with each side of the Taiwan Strait having its own interpretation of what “China” means. This CCP-KMT rapprochement eased tensions and set the stage for more than 20 agreements on cross-strait regulatory interactions, trade, air flights and tourism, among others.
In November last year, Ma and Chinese President Xi Jin-ping’s (習近平) historic handshake in Singapore symbolized the easing of tensions after more than five decades of hostility. For Tsai, it is important to maintain this reduced level of tension.
However, a number of issues are likely to arise in the coming months and years. First, within the DPP, there would continue to be discourse for a “declaration of independence” for Taiwan. This would likely require a change to the Constitution, which states that China and Taiwan belong to “one China.” Tsai must decide if and when she is to make an official policy statement on this issue — bearing in mind that Taiwan exercises sovereign powers over the nation and its adjacent areas. She has said that this issue must take into account the will of Taiwanese.
Next, with the DPP holding a legislative majority, the proposed oversight legislation on cross-strait agreements is likely to be passed. What is in question is whether such legislative overview would be retroactive to the already signed agreements.
Third, Tsai is likely to reduce Taiwan’s excessive economic dependence on China through widening its global market and developing new economic partnerships with Pacific Rim nations. However, there have been reports that Taiwanese businesspeople based in China fear economic relations could be harmed under the DPP.
Fourth, how would Beijing react? To date, statements issued by China have implicitly and explicitly said the Taiwan issue is an internal one and warned against calls for independence.
Beijing continues to refuse to renounce the use of force against Taiwan — including an estimated 1,200 short and medium-range missiles aimed at Taiwan. It also has other means of pressuring Taiwan, such as reducing tourist numbers, restricting investments and holding military exercises near the Taiwan Strait.
Last, Taiwan under Tsai would still rely upon the US for defense support, including the purchase of high-tech weaponry under the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act.
For Taiwan, there are a number of issues — domestic, international and cross-strait — that could create a rocky path ahead for Tsai and her DPP government.
Robert D’A. Henderson is a retired professor of international relations.
Abridged and reprinted with permission of the Publisher of the Diplomat & International Canada (Ottawa).
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