The meeting between President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) and Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) in Singapore on Nov. 7, touted by the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) as a historic milestone, has provoked widespread discontent among the public, who feel that Ma might be guilty of treason because he surprised everybody by announcing the meeting only after it was leaked and made all the arrangements behind closed doors.
During the televised exchange between Ma and his Chinese counterpart, which was followed by media outlets from around the globe, Ma took the initiative to acknowledge the “one China” principle proposed by China. Hence, the “one China, different interpretations” concept within the fictional “1992 consensus” became a “one China” self-proclamation in a clear attempt at ending Taiwan’s future, which is already in doubt due to the Constitution of the Republic of China (ROC).
At present, there are four schools of thought on cross-strait relations among the public.
The first is the deep-blue faction, consisting of those who are most desperate for unification. They think that ROC territory not only consists of Taiwan, but also covers the entirety of “mainland China,” including Mongolia, over which Beijing has no authority. This faction does not rule out unification under the “one country, two systems” model, which is acceptable to Xi.
The second group supports gradual unification. Their stance changes along with the KMT’s ideology. Former president Lee Teng-hui’s (李登輝) “special state-to-state relations” was later changed by the KMT into “one China, different interpretations,” but today, the party is leaning strongly toward Xi’s Chinese Communist Party (CCP).
When KMT Chairman Eric Chu (朱立倫) met with Xi in Shanghai at the KMT-CCP cross-strait forum in May, he echoed Xi’s claim that both sides of the Taiwan Strait belong to “one China.” Some staunch light-blue supporters are now also gradually coming to accept this, originally deep-blue, idea that the ROC can be abandoned, and this lies at the core of the KMT’s transformation into a copy of the New Party.
The third group agrees with the current stance of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), which upholds the idea of the ROC on Taiwan. This is a slightly different interpretation of Lee’s “special state-to-state relations,” which is not in agreement with the current ROC Constitution, which divides the ROC into the “mainland area” and the “free area.”
In her new book, DPP Chairperson Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) suggests that cross-strait relations should be developed within the constitutional framework of the ROC, but this concept is very problematic, because it is trapped within the ROC constitutional framework which has “eventual unification” as its ultimate objective. The future debate on cross-strait relations will be caught up in the fight between the pro-unification faction’s “one China, two constitutions,” former premier Frank Hsieh’s (謝長廷) “two constitutions, different interpretations” and the like, all of which fall within the confinement of the “one China” framework.
Consequently, under the ROC Constitution, Taiwan’s highest leader is the president of the ROC. However, supporters of the fourth school of thought do not accept what they see as the long-term occupation of Taiwan by the temporary government of the ROC and demand the normalization of Taiwan, the removal of the KMT’s influence in Taiwan and the eradication of the ROC.
Although the DPP still preserves its Taiwan Independence Clause and although its Resolution on Taiwan’s Future also calls for avoiding the use of the term “ROC” as far as possible, the party is now halfheartedly beginning to defend the ROC. As far as supporters in this group are concerned, the DPP’s attempt to legalize the illegitimate presence of the ROC on Taiwan to escape the “one China” framework will only result in two Chinas. Unless China under the CCP’s rule dissolves, this situation will hardly be acceptable to the international community. Hence, in the long run, it leads nowhere.
Currently in the Sino-Taiwan relationship, the KMT is becoming more and more like the New Party, while the DPP is becoming more and more like the KMT. Perhaps this will help the DPP garner more votes from swing voters and even light-blue supporters who do not think that the Ma-Xi meeting was a good idea.
However, if the DPP cannot reach beyond the ROC constitutional framework, which was imposed on Taiwanese by the KMT in the past, in the long term, the DPP will be just as pliable to the CCP as the KMT was in connection to the arrangement of the Ma-Xi meeting.
Taiwanese political parties, both old and new, which oppose Chinese annexation should seize the opportunity to win the hearts of pro-independence voters as the DPP slides toward the middle ground.
Since the KMT is despised by the public for acquiescing to the CCP and therefore has weaker influence, these parties should take the responsibility of holding the DPP accountable as the party continues to become more and more like the KMT.
Moreover, these parties should strive to free this beautiful island from the constitutional imprisonment of the ROC.
Leung Man-to is a political science professor at National Cheng Kung University.
Translated by Ethan Zhan
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