Chinese State Councilor Yang Jiechi (楊潔篪) this month paid his first, rather unusual, visit to Tokyo, where he met with Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. Yang stressed that strategic and mutually beneficial relations between the two sides would be improved. Talks are also to be arranged between Abe and Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平), Chinese Premier Li Keqiang (李克強) and others regarding Japan’s return as one of five non-permanent members of the UN Security Council.
Before that, the US announced that its Third Fleet is to move into the western Pacific, with four aircraft carriers and almost 100 battleships entering East Asian waters. The US said its ships would cruise through the South China Sea, while India invited Japan to join the US in its Exercise Malabar naval drill. Japan’s Diet passed new security bills last month, paving the way for collective self-defense. These developments have left China startled and disturbed and are an unexpected blow to China in the struggle over the “first island chain.”
Last year, China started talking about celebrating in 2049 the centennial of its founding, terming it “the rise of a maritime strong power.” However, it forgot that big trees catch strong winds. As it was putting down roots, it never expected that the US would acquiesce to Japan’s changing of its security law, allowing Tokyo to share responsibility for protecting peace and security in the Pacific.
Even Peking University Ocean Strategy Research Center researcher Hu Bo (胡波) says China was a latecomer in developing maritime power. The current era of advanced information and Internet technology is different from the past. China is also being affected by international maritime regulatory mechanisms such as the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, international maritime law and exclusive economic zones, as well as public opinion in the form of international academic criticism, condemning China’s South China Sea incursions as illegal. This makes it more difficult for China to assert its predominance by sheer brute force.
It may take a decade to build an army, but it takes a century to build a navy. For example, the US began to build its navy in the late 19th century, but only became a world naval power in the 1920s. The UK, Japan, Russia and some other countries cultivated their navies long term to become successful. Although these countries suffered setbacks in World War II, they had a solid foundation.
The Web site Global Firepower List ranks Japan ninth in its global military power list. Thus, Japan can sail full-steam ahead, and in time its security bills will help it become an impressive power. The era of Japan as a toothless tiger is over and this is one of the main issues that worries China.
Beijing’s strategy for establishing itself as a strong maritime power before 2049 generally relies on a trident of concepts.
First, the concept of a stable north. That is, appropriately handling border demarcation and reef ownership issues with North Korea and South Korea in the Yellow Sea and the northern region of the East China Sea.
Second, peace in the South China Sea, by appropriately handling the South China Sea dispute and actively building a framework for peace in East Asia.
Third, contend for power in the east to ensure a smooth marine eastern passage to the Pacific Ocean, defend sovereignty over the Diaoyutai Islands (釣魚台) (which Taiwan also claims) and ensure that Taiwan and China are unified. Specifically, when it comes to the strategy of contending for strength in the East China Sea, China has made deployments for taking military action it deems necessary once the power gap between China and the US and Japan narrows.
However, no matter how clever it is, mistakes are unavoidable. Beijing has frequently resorted to nationalism to push back against Japan as it settles old scores, but it has ignored the vagaries of the international situation. In particular, when it comes to the terror balance maintained by nuclear deterrence, the slightest misstep could lead to all-out, indiscriminate disaster. This is something no one wants to see — not even dictators want to govern a pile of rubble.
In his book The Inertia of History: China and the World in the Next Ten Years (歷史的慣性,未來十年的中國與世界) Tsinghua University professor Yan Xuetong (閻學通) reminds the Beijing leadership that peace is of the utmost importance.
He predicts that by 2023 the US and China will be the two global superpowers. China’s economic strength might match that of the US, but it would be hard for it to match the US in either military power or at a cultural level.
As the US is rebalancing toward the Asia-Pacific, its dependence on Japan will deepen. No wonder Chinese political, legal and maritime academics like Hu Bo think that before 2049, the “status quo” between Taiwan and China will remain, and cross-strait economic and cultural relations are the only relations that will tend toward unification.
However, the example of Japan passing its security bills — an unexpected shock to China — shows that in a rapidly changing world, nothing is impossible, but maintaining peace and stability is in the interest of all parties, and something that everyone wants to see.
Lu I-ming is the former publisher and president of the Taiwan Shin Sheng Daily News.
Translated by Clare Lear
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