Wearing a hoodie emblazoned with an oversize US dollar bill, Zhao Yixiang (趙亦祥) sells a US brand of skateboards for a living and admires much about the US, including its raucous rap music and tradition of unfettered expression.
“America is a country full of free speech,” he said at his store in downtown Beijing. “You can say what you want, go where you want, choose your own lifestyle. I admire that a lot. But on territorial and military issues, we’re pretty far apart.”
“I think a lot of people in my generation think like that,” Zhao, 26, said. “We really like American culture, but we also like to have a government that doesn’t show weakness abroad.”
Illustration: Constance Chou
As Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) wrapped up a visit to the US with a speech at the UN on Monday, young Chinese citizens like Zhao present a quandary for US policymakers, who hope their country’s vast cultural reach offers a beachhead into making opinion here more receptive, if not sympathetic, toward the US.
In some ways, US cultural influence reaches into China deeper than ever. Despite censorship, restrictions on cultural imports and heavy Internet barriers, US television, films, music and technology are widely and avidly consumed.
During his visit, Xi nodded to that influence, citing US authors, the popular television series House of Cards and several Hollywood movies, as well as meeting with prominent business leaders from Silicon Valley.
Yet studies and surveys show that many Chinese citizens, including the young, remain wary of the US and hostile to Washington’s foreign intentions, especially when China’s territorial claims and rising influence are at stake. China is not unique in that regard, but its increasing prominence makes the contrast between cultural attraction and political distrust especially stark.
“Even when you have cultural soft power and cultural attractiveness, that doesn’t mean that people identify with or support your policies,” said Xie Tao (謝濤), a professor at the Beijing Foreign Studies University who studies public opinion and Chinese-US relations.
Among his students, he said: “You can sense that the undergraduates identify with American culture — its higher education, basketball, so on, but when you discuss American policy, many people — many of the same people — are highly critical.”
People were subjected to Chinese news coverage of Xi’s US visit that smothered audiences with images and accounts of the leader as a strong, poised statesman, winning the respect of US President Barack Obama, US tech executives and ordinary Americans.
“Chinese state visits to the United States are primarily domestic choreography for the Chinese public,” Xie said. “This state visit, with the reception by President Obama and the US media attention, is to show that he has international stature, and deserves and receives respect.”
The promotional drive for Xi sometimes went to fanciful extremes.
State news media likened the trip to then-Chinese paramount leader Deng Xiaoping’s (鄧小平) in 1979, which helped re-establish diplomatic relations. Foreign students were recruited into offering dewy-eyed praise for Xi in an online video. The newspaper China Daily claimed that a survey found that nearly 80 percent of US youth were interested in his visit.
It was too much for some Chinese, even those usually inured to high-pitched propaganda.
“A state visit to America is a major event,” said Mary Li, an English-language student at a Beijing university, who asked not to use her Chinese name to avoid getting into trouble at school. “But we know the United States doesn’t revolve around China. The pope was there, too, wasn’t he?”
However, opinion surveys indicate that many Chinese back their government’s views on international relations, even if they admire other aspects of US life.
Research by the Pew Research Center and other institutions indicates that admiration for US enterprise, and even some US values, is often mixed with wariness, especially of the government’s intentions abroad. (The surveys show that many Americans reciprocate.)
In the latest survey, based on polling this year, 67 percent of Chinese respondents said that their country would replace, or has already replaced, the US as the world’s leading superpower. (In Western countries, many respondents agreed.) A majority, 54 percent, of Chinese said the US was seeking to prevent China from becoming as powerful as itself.
“When you’re the big boss, you’re certainly going to try to keep us down,” said Dong Jianyan (董建言), a software programmer in his 20s. “But when it comes to our interests, we need to be strong. For example, on territorial issues, we need to be very firm.”
Distrust toward the intentions of the US persists, despite the popularity of US entertainment. Over the past month, the eighth season of The Big Bang Theory has drawn more than 45 million views on Sohu.com, an online viewing service.
Furious 7, a US action film, has been the most popular movie at the Chinese box office so far this year, narrowly beating Monster Hunt, a Chinese animated adventure, according to government estimates.
Such exposure might have some effect, at least on the young.
In the Pew survey, 59 percent of Chinese respondents ages 18 to 29 had a favorable view of the US, compared with 45 percent of those ages 30 to 49 and only 29 percent of those 50 or older.
“We’re too interdependent economically now to have major conflict, but political tensions are unavoidable,” said Susan Deng, 31, an office manager who said she visited the US for the first time this year.
She asked to use her English name so she could speak more candidly about politics.
“I’m very in tune with American values — the openness and individualism, unlike our collectivism,” she said. “But in geopolitics, each country will have its own position, and that won’t change.”
Peter Hays Gries, a professor at the University of Oklahoma who studies the political psychology of China-US relations, said an analysis of opinion surveys indicated that many Chinese people “are socialized through the educational system to mistrust the world.”
Chinese youth, he said, were “susceptible to arguments that Western countries don’t really care about human rights and democracy, but simply use these issues as ways to further insult and humiliate China.”
Li Yonghong (李永宏), 28, who is a technician in northwestern Beijing, said his views on the US were not the product of indoctrination.
“They’re certainly trying to contain us — that’s how big powers treat each other,” he said.
His enjoyment of US films and smartphones would not dilute his view, he said.
“Actually, this iPhone was made in China,” he said, taking one from his pocket. “On the big issues, China is usually right. That’s a fact.”
Mia Li contributed research
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