The significance of Hoklo
Reading Eric Huang’s response (letter, Aug. 2, page 8) to the editorial (“Time to ditch the Hoklo playacting,” July 30, page 8) concerning the use of Hoklo [commonly known as Taiwanese], by Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) presidential candidate Hung Hsiu-chu (洪秀柱), I wondered if he had even read the piece. It never sought to “criticize language choices or seek to stigmatize a [presidential] candidate based on the dialect region where the candidate’s parents were born.” Indeed, it said: “Hoklo should not be used by members of the public as a label to automatically assume whether one identifies with Taiwan or not.” Rather, the editorial clearly used the specific example of Hung to make a wider, and perfectly valid point about KMT candidates in general using Taiwanese in election campaigns.
It might well have been an unjust criticism of Hung personally, but unfortunately Huang neglected to mention the public occasions outside of electoral campaigns at which Hung has addressed an audience in Taiwanese. Even had he done so, it would not have detracted from the wider point the editorial was making, of course.
Instead, it is genuinely startling that Huang apparently cannot see the political significance of anyone using Taiwanese while campaigning for the KMT, to the degree that I very much doubt the sincerity of his complaint. Less than 40 years ago, well within the lifetimes of many voters, speaking Taiwanese was punishable in schools. I am acquainted with many Taiwanese for whom what would otherwise be their mother tongue is a rough second language to Mandarin, as a direct result of a decades-long KMT language policy.
It is this history to which the editorial was directed. Contrary to Huang’s suggestion, it does in fact raise substantive issues in any Taiwanese election: The sincerity of politicians seeking election, as well as the perennial, and equally substantive, issues relating to language and Taiwanese identity — the subtleties of which the very editorial Huang criticizes touches upon when it says: “A person who speaks Hoklo does not necessarily identify with Taiwan more, just as a Chinese descendant who does not speak Hoklo would not necessarily identify with China more.” To further accuse the Taipei Times of acting like “self-appointed dialect police,” and in the light of the KMT’s track record, does perhaps allow me to return a favor and acquaint Huang with an English idiom, however: The pot calling the kettle black.
Paul Clements
Taipei
Who owns the Diaoyutais?
On July 23, former president Lee Teng-hui (李登輝) attended a press conference in Tokyo. When asked which nation has sovereignty over the the Diaoyutai Islands (釣魚台) — known as the Senkaku Islands in Japan — he said they belong to Japan. His remarks were met with vituperative criticism in Taiwan.
The Presidential Office slammed Lee for humiliating the nation and forfeiting its sovereignty. KMT Chairman Eric Chu (朱立倫) said the Constitution and the KMT’s manifesto clearly state that the Diaoyutais and other islands in the South China Sea are inherent Republic of China (ROC) territory, so Lee’s remarks were unacceptable.
KMT presidential candidate Hung Hsiu-chu (洪秀柱) said they belong to the ROC.
New Party Chairman Yok Mu-ming (郁慕明) filed charges against Lee, accusing him of treason and asking him to go back to Japan. Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) Chairperson Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) pointed out that the DPP’s stance on the issue has been consistent and clear: The Diaoyutais belong to Taiwan.
Amazing! This is the first time that the pan-green and the pan-blue camps almost achieved a general consensus that the Diaoyutais belong to either Taiwan or the ROC. Unfortunately, they are all wrong and their claims are without any legal basis. The Diaoyutais are not an inherent part of ROC territory, nor is Taiwan listed in the Constitution. Taiwan is not even an independent country yet, how could it hold sovereignty over the Diaoyutais?
The Senkakus were listed as Japanese territory in 1871. They were not even mentioned in the Shimonoseki Treaty in 1895 because they were not part of Qing territory. However, the Senkakus were clearly listed in Article 3 of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, which stated that Japan would concur with any proposal the US made to the UN to place them under its trusteeship, with the US as the sole administering authority, and that the US would have the right to exercise all and any powers of administration, legislation and jurisdiction over the territory and inhabitants of the islands, including their territorial waters. The US administrated the Ryukyu Islands until June 11, 1971, and returned them — including the Diaoyutais — to Japan under the 1971 Okinawa Reversion Agreement.
So, Taiwanese politicians from either the pan-green or the pan-blue camps should study more and refrain from making comments on matters they do not understand — as Lee said when rebutting Ma’s critique.
On Nov. 29, 2012, Stanford University’s Taiwan Project held a seminar to discuss the impact of the Diaoyutais dispute. One of the issues discussed was: Where does Taiwan stand in the dispute? Taiwan would be excluded from international multilateral talks, Taiwan can only join tract II or III bilateral talks with Japan, Ma under his “one China” policy hands negotiation rights to China, the new triangular relationship of the East China Sea: US-China-Japan. Taiwan is not worthy of admission: Ma is the biggest loser in this outcome.
The Diaoyutais dispute is a serious wake-up for all Taiwanese to re-examine the international political status of Taiwan. Is Taiwan an independent and sovereign nation? Who holds sovereignty over Taiwan? How can sovereignty be claimed over Taiwan? Do not be naive; before Taiwan becomes an independent and sovereign nation, we should not enlarge our prospective borders to contain something that is not really ours. Do not allow Taiwan to become a pawn played by China in its challenges to the US and Japan — for they are the nations that hold the key to our legal recognition.
John Hsieh
Hayward, California
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