On May 4, Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) Chairman Eric Chu (朱立倫) met with Chinese Communist Party General Secretary and Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) in Beijing to discuss working together on the basis of the so-called “1992 consensus” to deepen cooperation among future generations and expand Taiwan’s international space. These remarks spurred criticism in Taiwan amid controversy over a “one China” policy and disputes between political parties over the consensus.
Few nations face a future more uncertain than Taiwan. The nation’s history has been, on the whole, one of relative weakness, with many of the fundamental questions of national status decided by outside powers. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) opposes recognition of the Republic of China (ROC) or Taiwan’s independence and seeks unification of Taiwan and China as “one China,” without renouncing the use of force to achieve that objective. US policy and intervention might determine Taiwan’s political future. The ROC assumes that the US would defend Taiwan in the case of a cross-strait military conflict.
From 2000 to 2008, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) administration under then-president Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) espoused a policy of independence that failed. Opinion polls have consistently shown that Taiwanese prefer to maintain the “status quo.” They want separation from China for now, but favor cordial cross-strait relations, closer economic ties and avoidance of war.
While the KMT refers to an ROC legacy that includes a “one China” policy, the DPP pursues Taiwan-centric policies based on a legacy of fighting for freedom. Both the KMT and the DPP have governed using the foundations of the ROC Constitution for legitimacy, and in June last year, both parties stressed that the nation’s future should be decided by its 23 million people, not all Chinese people.
The KMT accepts the “one China” principle under the “1992 consensus.” Since 2008, President Ma Ying-jeou’s (馬英九) administration has upheld the principle of “no unification, no independence, and no use of force” under the framework of the ROC Constitution. Ma interprets cross-strait relations as “special,” but “not one between two states.” The KMT’s view, as Ma insisted in his second inaugural address in 2012, is that the ROC’s sovereign territory also includes “the mainland,” but the ROC governs only Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu.
The DPP’s defeat in the 2012 presidential election might be attributed to candidate and DPP Chairperson Tsai Ing-wen’s (蔡英文) lack of clarity on how she would maintain the “status quo” and a stable cross-strait relationship. For next year’s presidential election, the DPP has reviewed its cross-strait policy. The party intends to continue cross-strait engagement, strengthen national defense, and not declare de jure independence.
On many occasions, including her April 15 nomination acceptance speech, Tsai has reiterated her desire to maintain the “status quo.” Her view of the “status quo” was further explicated in a June 3 speech at the Center on Strategic and International Studies in Washington as “the peaceful and stable development of cross-strait relations in accordance with the will of the Taiwanese people and the existing ROC Constitution order.”
“Let us continue to seek common ground while shelving our differences,” Tsai said of the “1992 consensus” when speaking to media in San Francisco on June 7.
Certainly, both the KMT and the DPP are being ambiguous, but the parties could forge a democratic consensus on reconciling their interpretations of the constitution, clarifying their approaches toward the US and the PRC, and candidly explicating their positions. This would benefit not only voters, but also international stakeholders.
At present, the KMT claims to oppose independence, but does not support unification either. On the other hand, the DPP talks of Taiwan’s de facto independence under the “status quo,” but remains ambiguous on the question of “one China” and whether unification is a possibility when China attains similar living standards and political freedom as Taiwan.
Supporters of unification suggest that in a politically unified Taiwan Strait freed from the constraints of the current military standoff, Taiwan could be a much more significant actor in an integrated region and world. However, such a stress on unity belies, or perhaps attempts to compensate for, true circumstances of division and difference. Rushed unification would be accompanied by social and cultural problems. Perhaps it is the reality of division that reinforces the ideal of unity.
Should China welcome democratic reform, the potential to articulate a new, less ethnically based nationalism could be realized. China could become pluralistic and prosperous, fostering reconciliation and co-existence.
Alfred Tsai is studying economics and political science at Columbia University.
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