New Taipei City Mayor and Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) Chairman Eric Chu (朱立倫) stands a good chance of becoming the vanguard of a healthy development of cross-strait relations through his upcoming meeting with Chinese President and Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary Xi Jinping (習近平).
However, if Chu forgets that cross-strait relations should serve national interests and the general public — as opposed to China’s political agenda concerning Taiwan, and a privileged few on either side of the Taiwan Strait — he might destroy the KMT’s already slim hopes of remaining in power in the combined presidential and legislative elections in January next year.
Following in the footsteps of former KMT chairmen Lien Chan (連戰) and Wu Poh-hsiung (吳伯雄), who met with then-Chinese president Hu Jintao (胡錦濤) at KMT-CCP forums on several occasions since these forums started in 2006, the Chu-Xi meeting is set to take place on Monday after the 10th Cross-Strait Economic and Cultural Forum.
At a time when the KMT is still struggling to get back on its feet after its electoral rout in November last year, the Chu-Xi meeting is not just about formalities, but also about substance.
Even if the meeting cannot prevent a victory for the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in next year’s elections, both sides are likely hoping that it will give the KMT a lift and help the ailing party become a viable force. In other words, to ensure the avoidance of a worst-case scenario in which the KMT not only loses the elections, but again suffers another crushing defeat. After all, the KMT remains the major agent in Taiwan with which the CCP can best advance its interests in cross-strait relations.
From the KMT’s perspective, there is no reason not to use the Chu-Xi meeting to exploit what the party regards as its great advantage over the DPP: the KMT’s support of the so-called “1992 consensus.”
This consensus refers to a tacit understanding between the KMT and the Chinese government that both sides of the Taiwan Strait acknowledge there is “one China,” with each side having its own interpretation of what “China” means. The DPP’s failure to endorse the “1992 consensus” has enabled the KMT to tout itself as the only party that can stabilize cross-strait relations. The KMT regards this as something of a selling point and something that differentiates it from the DPP.
Increasing public dissatisfaction in Taiwan with what many people consider an overbearing China might actually protect Chu from any nasty surprises during his meeting with Xi. Therefore, Chu need not be as desperate as President Ma Ying-jeou’s (馬英九) administration was in 2012 when Ma had Wu go further to define cross-strait relations as “one country, two areas,” in addition to again acknowledging the “1992 consensus.”
When Chu was inaugurated as KMT chairman earlier this year, he said that he had taken note of the “psychological impacts” brought upon Taiwanese people by the fast pace of cross-strait exchanges and the “doubts” over whether benefits generated by cross-strait economic ties had been shared fairly across the whole of Taiwanese society, adding that the problems warranted a review of Ma’s cross-strait policy.
Whether Chu will propose his revisionist line for advancing cross-strait relations at the Chu-Xi meeting should be scrutinized closely.
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