When Russian President Vladimir Putin was asked at his annual marathon news conference whether he feared a “palace revolution” at some point in the future, he cracked a smile.
“I can assure you that we don’t have palaces, so a palace coup isn’t really possible,” he said.
Immediately, photographs of the vast mansions of some of Putin’s inner circle, photographed from the air by anti-corruption campaigners, began doing the rounds online.
Illustration: Mountain People
However, the question last week had a more serious substance to it: While a popular revolution against corrupt officials has never looked very likely in Russia, what about a split in the elites?
Falling oil prices have combined with Western sanctions to create the worst economic crisis of Putin’s 15 years in power. With oil revenues tailing off sharply, on the one hand it exposes how little has been done to diversify the economy during the boom years, while on the other the amount of money to share among the billionaires around Putin is set to shrink dramatically.
Part of the rationale behind Western sanctions against people in Putin’s inner circle was to harm them and prompt them to pressure the leader. If the economic situation continues to deteriorate and the political turmoil continues, one school of thought suggests Putin could be in trouble from within his own inner circle.
Most Russian officials feel the West is to blame for apparently “instigating” the Maidan protests in Kiev that parked the Ukraine crisis, but many are privately uneasy at the way Putin responded. For those in the inner circle, sanctions have in some cases meant losing business, property and travel opportunities in the West. Those affected have been falling over themselves to insist publicly that their personal pain is a small price to pay for the revival of a Great Russia, but what they think in private might be another matter. Even among those ideologically in tandem with Putin, if their vast wealth begins to be threatened their loyalty might waver.
However, the “vertical of power” that Putin has built links everyone in the same chain. It is not possible to remove the top link without the whole system coming down and there are no signs anyone in the elite is even thinking yet about the possibility of planning for a post-Putin future. Perhaps most alarming is that it is almost impossible to imagine what a post-Putin future might look like. The president can theoretically stay in power until 2024.
As one Western diplomat said: “You can’t really see him just stepping aside. Any scenarios of a change of power appear to be very messy ones, and for the moment, at least, very unlikely.”
Some opposition figures have looked at Mikhail Khodorkovsky, formerly the nation’s richest man, as a potential unifying force for the anti-Putin movement.
Khodorkovsky, who spent a decade in prison, was released a year ago after Putin pardoned him so he could spend time with his ailing mother. Khodorkovsky promised he would not go into politics, but has now said he would consider being president for a post-Putin “transition period.”
Ordinary Russians have little time for the “robber baron” oligarchs who became fabulously rich in the 1990s while everyone else was starving, but Khodorkovsky’s decade in prison might have served some redemptive purpose and he is perhaps the only figure who even theoretically might be capable of uniting sections of the serving elite and the more radical opposition groups. However, he is in exile in Switzerland and would be arrested again if he returns. Any scenario where he could mount a coherent challenge to Putin, for now, still appears from a parallel universe.
The brief flurry of liberal street protests in 2011 and 2012 was ruthlessly snuffed out by the Kremlin, and many have suggested that, far from a liberal revolution, the most likely revolt is the “senseless and merciless” Russian uprising of which Alexander Pushkin wrote. Nationalist forces, which have always been kept in check by the Kremlin, were let out of the bottle with the uprising in east Ukraine, where a number of the rebel commanders were doing the Kremlin’s bidding, but also harbored fantasies of bringing revolution to Russia.
“I voted for Putin in 2000 and I agitated for him among my men in Chechnya, now I am ashamed,” one high-ranking rebel leader, a former Russian military officer, told the Guardian earlier this year in Donetsk. “I would like to see the same kind of thing that has happened here happen in Russia. A people’s revolution, to get rid of the corruption and put the military in charge.”
This is another scenario that could theoretically gain traction among many of the same sections of the population who support Putin, as well as certain members of the elite, but which appears unthinkable in the current climate. Commanders such as the nationalist Igor Strelkov were removed from east Ukraine as soon as they got too popular, with little fuss. As even those close to the Kremlin admit, the role of state television in forming popular opinion is overwhelming.
A former Kremlin official who knows Putin personally told the Guardian earlier this year: “Whoever has control of television has control of the country. If communists took over, within three months the country would be communist. If fascists took over, within three months it would be fascist. That’s just the country we live in.”
Popular support seems to be sewn up for Putin, though an oil-driven sustained economic downturn could provide a serious test. It was intriguing, though, that Putin dodged the question about any split in the elite.
When a Reuters journalist told him that certain members of his inner circle blame him for the economic and political deterioration this year, he laughed and said: “Give me their names.”
It was a joke, but there was no follow-up insistence that the journalist must be wrong. Putin, who has a visceral dislike of popular revolution and has calibrated policy for years to ensure its impossibility in Russia, might also start to look over his shoulder at those around him.
Recently, China launched another diplomatic offensive against Taiwan, improperly linking its “one China principle” with UN General Assembly Resolution 2758 to constrain Taiwan’s diplomatic space. After Taiwan’s presidential election on Jan. 13, China persuaded Nauru to sever diplomatic ties with Taiwan. Nauru cited Resolution 2758 in its declaration of the diplomatic break. Subsequently, during the WHO Executive Board meeting that month, Beijing rallied countries including Venezuela, Zimbabwe, Belarus, Egypt, Nicaragua, Sri Lanka, Laos, Russia, Syria and Pakistan to reiterate the “one China principle” in their statements, and assert that “Resolution 2758 has settled the status of Taiwan” to hinder Taiwan’s
Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong’s (李顯龍) decision to step down after 19 years and hand power to his deputy, Lawrence Wong (黃循財), on May 15 was expected — though, perhaps, not so soon. Most political analysts had been eyeing an end-of-year handover, to ensure more time for Wong to study and shadow the role, ahead of general elections that must be called by November next year. Wong — who is currently both deputy prime minister and minister of finance — would need a combination of fresh ideas, wisdom and experience as he writes the nation’s next chapter. The world that
The past few months have seen tremendous strides in India’s journey to develop a vibrant semiconductor and electronics ecosystem. The nation’s established prowess in information technology (IT) has earned it much-needed revenue and prestige across the globe. Now, through the convergence of engineering talent, supportive government policies, an expanding market and technologically adaptive entrepreneurship, India is striving to become part of global electronics and semiconductor supply chains. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s Vision of “Make in India” and “Design in India” has been the guiding force behind the government’s incentive schemes that span skilling, design, fabrication, assembly, testing and packaging, and
As former president Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) wrapped up his visit to the People’s Republic of China, he received his share of attention. Certainly, the trip must be seen within the full context of Ma’s life, that is, his eight-year presidency, the Sunflower movement and his failed Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement, as well as his eight years as Taipei mayor with its posturing, accusations of money laundering, and ups and downs. Through all that, basic questions stand out: “What drives Ma? What is his end game?” Having observed and commented on Ma for decades, it is all ironically reminiscent of former US president Harry