Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s insistence on overturning his country’s commitment to a pacifist constitution and reinterpreting it to give Japan more latitude to exercise the right to collective self-defense has caused controversy in Japan and been met with mixed responses from the international community.
Mindful of the desirability of enhancing the US-Japan cooperative alliance, Washington has been fully supportive of the Abe administration’s move. By contrast, Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) took the opportunity during a visit to Seoul to express, in unison with South Korean President Park Geun-hye, his concerns at the news. How are we to interpret these differing reactions? And how is Taiwan to respond to the repercussions of this move on the East Asian post-war order?
Following Abe’s lifting of the prohibition on the right to exercise collective self-defense, a Kyodo news agency poll shows that 54.4 percent of respondents are opposed to the decision taken by the Abe Cabinet, compared with only 34.6 percent who approve.
In addition, 82.1 percent of respondents felt that the government had not subjected this issue to sufficient debate prior to making the decision.
In other words, mainstream public opinion in Japan does not support the move, and there is widespread concern about the way in which the government has realized the policy through a reinterpretation of the constitution. There are two major reasons for this sense of unease among Japanese.
First, for the Cabinet to unilaterally change a long-standing interpretation of the constitution in this way is quite unprecedented. The point the Japanese are most concerned about is how Abe circumvented procedure to amend the constitution and, through the determination of the Cabinet alone, simply bulldozed the interpretation of previous governments based on the Japan’s Self-Defense Forces being unable, under Japan’s pacifist constitution, to exercise the right of collective self-defense.
Japanese fear that future administrations could follow suit and disregard how previous governments interpreted the constitution, which would not only be damaging to the spirit of constitutionalism, it would even shake the very foundations of the country’s constitutional government.
The biggest significance of this decision is what it means for post-war Japan’s pacifist policy orientation, by giving up on the previous insistence on using force for self-defense only. Simply put, what it means is that from now on Japan could, even if it is not coming under attack, use military force against another country.
The Kyodo poll also showed that 73.9 percent of the Japanese public is concerned that the Self-Defense Forces will be mobilized for a widening range of operations.
Over the past few days, sections of the Japanese media have already begun debating the possibility that in the future Japan could once more rush into military campaigns. However, the lifting of the ban on Japan’s exercising the right to collective self-defense is also sending ripples beyond Japanese society, and it is only natural that these concerns are being felt in neighboring countries that fell foul of Japanese militarism and imperialism in World War II. With this in mind, few were surprised when Xi and Park objected to the Japanese government’s decision during Xi’s visit to Seoul.
Now that Japan has apparently abandoned the understanding that the Self-Defense Forces will restrict their activities to pure defense, the possibility of Japan’s military intervention in responding to “situations in areas surrounding Japan” involving its allies will increase.
This will be cause for concern for neighboring countries — such as China and South Korea — that still have persisting “historical issues” with Japan as they monitor Abe and his recent spate of what they perceive as strongly militaristic behavior. In other words, Japan still has its work cut out if it is going to convince others that this greater latitude toward its right to exercising collective defense does not risk opening up a Pandora’s box of reappearing Japanese militarism.
The US is coming from a completely different place than China or South Korea. It is widely known that Japan’s post-war system was bequeathed by the US. Its pacifist constitution — largely drafted by US lawyers — has decided the pacifist orientation of post-war Japanese development, while the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the US and Japan welcomed Japan in the Asia-Pacific strategic order in which the US plays a dominant role.
Japan has not deviated from this in the almost 70 years since the end of the World War II, which is why Washington is prepared to tolerate, even welcome, Japan’s move and Abe’s recent raft of measures reinforcing the military.
Taiwan has long relied on US support in national security matters, and it is unlikely that Japan’s exercising its right of collective defense will fall beyond the US’ ability to keep it in check. Because of this, Taiwan needs not be overly concerned about these developments, although the government would be well advised to remain cautious and watch whether the US maintains its ability to keep an increasingly militaristic Japan under control.
In addition, the Abe administration, when debating the right to collective defense, managed to somehow fuse the concept of the “China threat” with general national defense issues.
Japan is already deploying troops and installing a radar system on Yonaguni Island — which is substantially closer to Taiwan than it is to Japan — and has announced further plans to deploy troops on Ishigaki Island and Miyako-jima Island, which are close to the disputed Diaoyutai Islands (釣魚台).
We cannot but be alarmed when Abe is building up Japan’s military presence in these sensitive regions.
Japan’s move changes Taiwan’s national security picture, and it is for this reason that the nation should seek out dialogue with the US, to discuss how to reinforce cooperation with the US and Japan on regional security issues.
This would not only go some way to allaying Taiwanese concerns over Japan’s new stance on collective defense, it will also lessen the impact of changes in the East Asia region on Taiwan.
John Lim is an associate research fellow in the Institute of Modern History at Academia Sinica.
Translated by Paul Cooper
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