Three former Soviet republics — Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine — have now signed association agreements with the EU, despite Russia’s sometimes brutal attempts to obstruct the process. This is certainly a promising development for these countries, all of which have struggled to achieve stability since the Soviet Union’s dissolution. However, it would be naive to think that Russia will give up so easily.
As Ukraine’s ongoing crisis has demonstrated yet again, former Soviet republics that attempt to make geopolitical decisions without the Kremlin’s assent do not remain intact for long. In Georgia, the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia have had de facto independence since receiving Russian recognition in 2008. Today, the prospect of their return seems more distant than ever.
For its part, Moldova has been struggling for two decades to assert control over the breakaway Transnistria region. Moreover, in February, the tiny autonomous region of Gagauzia, with its indigenous Turkic population, announced through a Russia-backed referendum that it has the right to secede if Moldova “loses its statehood.” The danger now is that pro-secession leaders may twist the loss of sovereignty supposedly inherent in association with the EU into precisely such a claim.
Illustration: Mountain People
Beyond discouraging former Soviet republics from pursuing deeper ties with the EU, Russia has created a sort of “EU” of its own: the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU). In May, the leaders of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan established the EEU by signing a treaty that is to enter into effect next year, assuming that all three countries’ parliaments ratify it.
Russian President Vladimir Putin has insisted that the economic union is not intended to function as a “resurrected” Soviet Union, but that any former Soviet republic is free to join. And some are eager to do so. According to a recent poll, about 80 percent of Kazakhs support Putin and about 70 percent back Kazakhstan’s EEU membership.
Though some countries have persevered in the face of Russia’s threats to bring separatist, ethnic or other problems to their doorstep should they choose integration with the EU, others have responded to the pressure. In September, Armenia, which has been locked in a conflict with neighboring Azerbaijan over the breakaway region of Nagorno-Karabakh for more than two decades, suddenly halted its integration talks with the EU and announced its intention to join Russia-led structures.
Kyrgyzstan, one of the poorest post-Soviet countries in Central Asia, has no obvious separatism-related problems, though it struggles with ethnic tensions in its south, where clashes between local Uzbeks and Kyrgyz in 2010 left more than 400 people dead. This month, the country closed the US’ military transit center near Bishkek and declared its intention to join the customs union that preceded the EEU by the end of this year.
The Kremlin is using other mechanisms to exert additional pressure on former Soviet republics. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has just announced that, as of Jan. 1 next year, citizens of post-Soviet countries that are not members of the customs union and the EEU will no longer be allowed to enter Russia without passports. This will likely soon be followed by visa requirements for these countries’ citizens, which for some would pose a major challenge. For example, the remittances that the estimated 1.5 million Tajiks who live and work in Russia send to their families back home are critical to Tajikistan’s economy.
Likewise, in April, Putin signed legislation simplifying the procedure for Russian speakers in former Soviet republics to obtain Russian citizenship. The law, enacted just a month after Russia’s annexation of Crimea, was undoubtedly intended to provide a legal basis for expediting the citizenship-application process for residents of Crimea and the rest of eastern Ukraine. However, it may enable millions of other Russian-speaking citizens of EEU member countries to become Russian citizens, and it could be used to apply pressure on countries like Estonia and Latvia, which have large Russophone populations.
However, the EEU’s development is not proceeding entirely according to Putin’s plan. At a recent Eurasian Economic Commission session in Sochi, Belarus and Kazakhstan rejected the Kremlin’s proposal to introduce customs duties for goods imported from Ukraine if the country signed the EU association agreement. The Belarussian government considers it to be Ukraine’s sovereign right to sign agreements with the EU — a flat contradiction of Russia’s stance — and appears likely to introduce customs fees of its own for electronic goods imported from Russia.
As it stands, the EEU seems to have two major goals: to obstruct the integration of former Soviet republics into the West and to help secure Putin’s power. Economic advancement does not appear to be on the agenda.
Unless it somehow manages to deliver tangible economic benefits anyway, the EEU seems destined to become another failed institutional initiative, like the Commonwealth of Independent States, the Russian-Belarussian Union State or the Central Asian Union. It may even accelerate Russia’s internal decay.
Merkhat Sharipzhan is a senior editor and analyst with Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty.
Copyright: Project Syndicate
Recently, China launched another diplomatic offensive against Taiwan, improperly linking its “one China principle” with UN General Assembly Resolution 2758 to constrain Taiwan’s diplomatic space. After Taiwan’s presidential election on Jan. 13, China persuaded Nauru to sever diplomatic ties with Taiwan. Nauru cited Resolution 2758 in its declaration of the diplomatic break. Subsequently, during the WHO Executive Board meeting that month, Beijing rallied countries including Venezuela, Zimbabwe, Belarus, Egypt, Nicaragua, Sri Lanka, Laos, Russia, Syria and Pakistan to reiterate the “one China principle” in their statements, and assert that “Resolution 2758 has settled the status of Taiwan” to hinder Taiwan’s
Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong’s (李顯龍) decision to step down after 19 years and hand power to his deputy, Lawrence Wong (黃循財), on May 15 was expected — though, perhaps, not so soon. Most political analysts had been eyeing an end-of-year handover, to ensure more time for Wong to study and shadow the role, ahead of general elections that must be called by November next year. Wong — who is currently both deputy prime minister and minister of finance — would need a combination of fresh ideas, wisdom and experience as he writes the nation’s next chapter. The world that
Can US dialogue and cooperation with the communist dictatorship in Beijing help avert a Taiwan Strait crisis? Or is US President Joe Biden playing into Chinese President Xi Jinping’s (習近平) hands? With America preoccupied with the wars in Europe and the Middle East, Biden is seeking better relations with Xi’s regime. The goal is to responsibly manage US-China competition and prevent unintended conflict, thereby hoping to create greater space for the two countries to work together in areas where their interests align. The existing wars have already stretched US military resources thin, and the last thing Biden wants is yet another war.
Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, people have been asking if Taiwan is the next Ukraine. At a G7 meeting of national leaders in January, Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida warned that Taiwan “could be the next Ukraine” if Chinese aggression is not checked. NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg has said that if Russia is not defeated, then “today, it’s Ukraine, tomorrow it can be Taiwan.” China does not like this rhetoric. Its diplomats ask people to stop saying “Ukraine today, Taiwan tomorrow.” However, the rhetoric and stated ambition of Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) on Taiwan shows strong parallels with