The tense standoff between China and Vietnam continues in the South China Sea. It started when China deployed a giant oil rig in disputed waters.
Vietnam protested it, resulting in skirmishes between their naval vessels. So far there has been no exchange of firepower, with the incidents confined to the ramming of ships and use of water cannons.
According to Hanoi’s account: “On May 4, Chinese ships rammed two Vietnamese Sea Guard vessels. Chinese ships, with air support, sought to intimidate Vietnamese vessels. Water cannon was used.”
The contested islands — the Paracel Islands (Xisha Islands, 西沙群島) and the Spratly Islands (Nansha Islands, 南沙群島), which are also claimed by Taiwan — and the waters around them are said to be rich in oil and fishery. The recent anti-China riots in Vietnam added another dimension to an already-difficult relationship.
China also claims much of the South China Sea as its territorial waters — which makes it an issue that also concerns Washington. The US is involved for two reasons.
First, it has a string of security alliances with countries in the region that are in dispute with Beijing over the question of sovereignty, like Japan in the East China Sea and the Philippines in the South China Sea.
Though the US does not have a security treaty with Vietnam, both Hanoi and Washington are developing close ties, which might also come to encompass military relations.
Who would have thought that Vietnam and the US would start a rapprochement, considering the history of the war that brought so much destruction to Vietnam?
Indeed, the US waged war in Vietnam in the 1960s and 1970s to prevent the spread of communism in the region due to what was called “the domino theory.”
In that long struggle, communist China was Vietnam’s political and strategic ally. However, since the occupation by China of the Paracel Islands in 1974, and their contested sovereignty over the Spratly Islands, their relations have never been the same.
This new bout of tension and skirmishes is bringing the US and Vietnam closer. US Department of State spokeswoman Jen Psaki, for instance, said on May 7 that Washington was “strongly concerned about dangerous conduct and intimidation by vessels [of China] in the disputed area.”
Beijing’s response has been dismissive, with one of its Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokeswomen saying that the deployment of the oil rig had nothing to do with the US or Vietnam. In other words, China was in its own territorial waters.
The second reason for US concern over China’s control over much of the South China Sea is that Beijing might interfere with the freedom of navigation through the busy sea-lanes, thereby adversely affecting world trade and movement of its navy. China and the US have almost collided in the South China Sea recently.
In December last year, for instance, when China’s new aircraft carrier, the Liaoning, was patrolling contested waters, it came close to clashing with a US cruiser shadowing it at a distance. The US ship reportedly saved the situation by taking evasive action.
Earlier, in 2009, there was another incident that might have gotten out of hand.
The possibility of more such incidents and worse cannot be ruled out. While China would like to drive the US out of the Asia-Pacific region, Washington seems equally determined to maintain its naval supremacy.
One puzzling thing, though, about China’s assertion of power in the region is why is Beijing antagonizing virtually all of its regional neighbors — it has maritime boundary disputes with six of its Asia-Pacific neighbors — pushing them to strengthen and/or forge new defense links with the US?
It might be recalled that former Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping (鄧小平), who put China on a new path in the post-Mao Zedong (毛澤東) period, counseled that China should “hide our capabilities and bide our time.”
At that time, Beijing was in the process of modernizing the country by growing its economic and military capabilities.
In the past few years, Beijing has apparently come to the conclusion that it no longer needs to hide its capabilities.
China is the second-largest economy in the world and is now emerging as a superpower with the military capability to match it.
Beijing might not be itching for a fight but, at the same time, it is not squeamish about proclaiming its writ over much of the region by way of asserting sovereignty over the surrounding seas, as the US did in the 19th century in the Western Hemisphere by way of proclaiming the Monroe Doctrine.
Beijing is certainly creating serious tensions with some of its neighbors like Vietnam, the Philippines and Japan. There is a risk of this of starting a conflagration, but Beijing would seem to think that these risks, if they exist at all, are manageable.
There are reasons for this line of thinking: First and foremost, China would like to believe that it has time on its side, considering its long history.
Though the US is still the top power, it might not remain in a league of its own for long. By most accounts, China is likely to overtake the US as an economic power in about a decade.
In the meantime, it is militarily powerful enough to create a significant enough opportunity cost for the US to keep away from any major involvement in a regional conflict.
In other words, while the US might voice support for its allies and provide them some weapons and logistical support, it would most likely stay away from any direct military confrontation with China.
Therefore, for Beijing, the risk of pushing its regional sovereignty is manageable.
Second, even though China has maritime boundary disputes with a number of countries, it is unlikely that they will band together to form a united front against China.
The recent ASEAN meeting in Myanmar failed to produce a joint statement critical of China. The most it did was to caution restraint and peaceful resolution.
At the same time, countries in the region have growing trade ties with China. They would hate to lose its expanding market.
Third, although the US is critical of China, it does not seem keen to get involved militarily.
There is a general feeling that the US has been weakened by its wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and hit hard by the global financial crisis. Therefore, China might be right to think that time is on its side and if it were to persist with its sovereignty agenda, the chips will fall in to place.
The only caveat, though, is that China has many domestic political, social and economic issues to resolve which might pose serious challenges to the Chinese Communist Party’s monopoly on power.
However, the pursuit of national power, against the backdrop of China’s humiliation in the 19th and through to the mid-20th century appears a sufficiently powerful banner to rally people around the party.
It should be remembered though, that things rarely work out smoothly and much can go wrong. In that case, we might be in for dangerous times.
Sushil Seth is a commentator based in Australia.
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