The submerged reef under turquoise seas about 80km off Malaysia’s Borneo Island state of Sarawak would be easy to miss, but two Chinese naval exercises conducted in less than a year around the James Shoal (Zengmu Shoal, 曾母暗沙) have shocked Kuala Lumpur and led to a significant shift in its approach to China’s claims to the disputed South China Sea, senior diplomats told reporters.
The reef lies outside Malaysia’s territorial waters, but inside its 200 nautical mile (411km) exclusive economic zone, and is claimed by Taipei, Beijing and Kuala Lumpur.
In particular, the latest incident in January prompted Malaysia to quietly step up cooperation with the Philippines and Vietnam — the two Southeast Asian nations which are most outspoken over China’s moves in the region — in trying to tie Beijing to binding rules of conduct in the South China Sea, the diplomats said.
Beijing’s growing naval assertiveness could also push Kuala Lumpur closer to the US, its top security ally, thereby deepening divisions between Southeast Asia and China over the potentially mineral-rich waters.
Malaysia has traditionally played down security concerns in pursuit of closer economic ties with China, its biggest trade partner.
The James Shoal is 1,800km from China. It is closer to Malaysia, Brunei, Singapore, the Philippines, Vietnam and Indonesia — nearly all of Southeast Asia — than it is to China’s coast.
Nevertheless, Beijing regards the waters as its southernmost territory, the bottom of a looping so-called nine-dash line on maps that comprise 90 percent of the 3.5 million square kilometer South China Sea.
Photographs from China’s state media on Jan. 26 showed hundreds of Chinese sailors standing to attention on a warship, backed by two destroyers and a helicopter that was reported to be at James Shoal.
Malaysia’s navy chief denied the Chinese media reports at the time, telling state news agency Bernama that the ships were far from Malaysian waters, which are rich in the oil and gas that power the nation’s economy. He may have been able to deny the incursion because Malaysian forces did not monitor or sight the Chinese flotilla, security analysts said.
However, diplomatic and naval security sources have told reporters that the exercise by three warships, which included an oath-taking ceremony to defend China’s sovereignty, almost certainly took place at or close to James Shoal.
“It’s a wake-up call that it could happen to us and it is happening to us,” Tang Siew Mun (鄧秀岷), a foreign policy specialist at Malaysia’s Institute of Strategic and International Studies who advises the government, said of the recent incidents.
“For some time we believed in this special relationship ... James Shoal has shown to us over and again that when it comes to China protecting its sovereignty and national interest, it’s a different ball game,” Tang said.
Neither the Malaysian Ministry of Foreign Affairs nor Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak’s office responded to requests for comment.
While Kuala Lumpur’s public response to the January incident was typically low-key, senior diplomats from other Southeast Asian nations said their Malaysian counterparts had been far more active since then in pushing for a common stance in talks with China over a code of conduct.
Officials from the 10-member ASEAN and China will resume negotiations in Singapore on March 18 after agreeing to accelerate talks last year that have made little headway so far.
The code is intended to bind China and ASEAN to detailed rules of behavior at sea, reducing the chance of an escalation in tensions that could lead to conflict. China says it is sincere in trying to reach an agreement.
Taiwan, Malaysia, the Philippines, Vietnam and Brunei claim parts of the sea, with all the nations members of ASEAN except Taipei.
Less than a week after the January incident, Malaysian Minister of Foreign Affairs Anifah Aman made a previously unannounced private visit to Manila to meet his Philippine counterpart, the Philippine Ministry of Foreign Affairs said.
The South China Sea issue was discussed, a Philippine ministry spokesman said.
Then, on Feb. 18, officials from the Philippines, Malaysia and Vietnam held a meeting to coordinate policy toward China on the maritime dispute and code of conduct, a diplomat with knowledge of the talks in Manila said.
“In the past, it was only the Philippines and Vietnam that were pushing for this meeting, but now we see Malaysia getting involved,” the diplomat said.
At the unannounced talks, the officials agreed to reject China’s nine-dash line, push for an early conclusion to the code of conduct negotiations and ask Brunei to join a meeting with the three countries in Kuala Lumpur this month, the diplomat said.
Malaysia’s change in tack comes ahead of visits to Kuala Lumpur by Philippine President Benigno Aquino III last week and US President Barack Obama next month.
US officials have also hardened their stance toward Beijing over the South China Sea. On Feb. 13, US Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Jonathan Greenert said Washington would come to Manila’s aid in the event of conflict with Beijing over the disputed waters.
Those sorts of comments could embolden some countries, said Hong Nong (洪農), deputy director of the Research Center for Oceans Law & Policy at the National Institute for South China Sea Studies on China’s Hainan Island.
“That will have an influence on ASEAN. In the past, the US never made it clear [who] it was going to stand by whom [sic],” Hong said.
Last March, a similar exercise at the James Shoal by a four-ship Chinese amphibious task force rattled Malaysia and prompted it to make a rare private protest to Beijing.
“These two developments are very worrying for Malaysia’s national security establishment,” said Ian Storey, a senior fellow at Singapore’s Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.
“We can anticipate there will be more of this kind of incident in the future. The PLA [People’s Liberation Army] will show the flag in Malaysian waters and this will require Malaysia to recalibrate its policy,” Storey said.
Malaysia already seems to be doing that. In October last year, it announced plans to build a navy base in Sarawak State’s Bintulu — the closest major town to the James Shoal — where a new marine corps modeled on the US’ version will be stationed. Without mentioning China, Malaysian Minister of Defense Hishammuddin Hussein said the aim of the new corps was to protect oil and gas reserves in the region.
In September last year, Najib said in New York in unusually blunt language that China was sending “mixed signals” and could not afford to alienate its neighbors.
Washington is expected to give advice and possibly training to help Kuala Lumpur set up its new marines forces, Malaysian security analysts said.
“This is a very important development,” Tang said, adding that it could significantly deepen US-Malaysia military ties.
Greenert told reporters that he had discussed the formation of the new marines unit with his Malaysian counterparts during a visit to the country this month, but said details on the force were sketchy.
Despite its shifting stance, Malaysia will likely stop short of risking any chill in ties with China, which routinely says that its ships patrol the region to protect the country’s sovereignty.
Sources close to Malaysia’s government said it is not considering joining a legal challenge Manila has lodged against China over South China Sea claims.
Manila has taken its dispute to arbitration under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and its lawyers say the tribunal in The Hague has the power to allow other states to join the action. However, China is refusing to participate in the case.
Malaysia has given the impression of seeing the South China Sea dispute as a hitch in an otherwise thriving and historic relationship.
Najib’s father, former Malaysian prime minister Abdul Razak Hussein, established formal ties with Beijing in 1974, making Malaysia the first ASEAN country to do so.
Malaysia offers a “more sober and highly nuanced way of resolving regional conflicts,” the pro-government New Straits Times said in October last year before Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) visited the country.
Bilateral economic ties have surged, with Najib and Xi setting a goal last year to triple two-way trade to US$160 billion by 2017.
One senior Western diplomat said he expected no major shift in Kuala Lumpur’s overall policy of balancing its alliances with Beijing and Washington.
“In principle, they are committed to the ASEAN position and the code of conduct, but at the same time they worry about a China reaction,” the diplomat said. “They think they can cut a deal. China will not cut a deal. You can see that China is getting — step by step — more aggressive.”
Recently, China launched another diplomatic offensive against Taiwan, improperly linking its “one China principle” with UN General Assembly Resolution 2758 to constrain Taiwan’s diplomatic space. After Taiwan’s presidential election on Jan. 13, China persuaded Nauru to sever diplomatic ties with Taiwan. Nauru cited Resolution 2758 in its declaration of the diplomatic break. Subsequently, during the WHO Executive Board meeting that month, Beijing rallied countries including Venezuela, Zimbabwe, Belarus, Egypt, Nicaragua, Sri Lanka, Laos, Russia, Syria and Pakistan to reiterate the “one China principle” in their statements, and assert that “Resolution 2758 has settled the status of Taiwan” to hinder Taiwan’s
The past few months have seen tremendous strides in India’s journey to develop a vibrant semiconductor and electronics ecosystem. The nation’s established prowess in information technology (IT) has earned it much-needed revenue and prestige across the globe. Now, through the convergence of engineering talent, supportive government policies, an expanding market and technologically adaptive entrepreneurship, India is striving to become part of global electronics and semiconductor supply chains. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s Vision of “Make in India” and “Design in India” has been the guiding force behind the government’s incentive schemes that span skilling, design, fabrication, assembly, testing and packaging, and
Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong’s (李顯龍) decision to step down after 19 years and hand power to his deputy, Lawrence Wong (黃循財), on May 15 was expected — though, perhaps, not so soon. Most political analysts had been eyeing an end-of-year handover, to ensure more time for Wong to study and shadow the role, ahead of general elections that must be called by November next year. Wong — who is currently both deputy prime minister and minister of finance — would need a combination of fresh ideas, wisdom and experience as he writes the nation’s next chapter. The world that
As former president Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) wrapped up his visit to the People’s Republic of China, he received his share of attention. Certainly, the trip must be seen within the full context of Ma’s life, that is, his eight-year presidency, the Sunflower movement and his failed Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement, as well as his eight years as Taipei mayor with its posturing, accusations of money laundering, and ups and downs. Through all that, basic questions stand out: “What drives Ma? What is his end game?” Having observed and commented on Ma for decades, it is all ironically reminiscent of former US president Harry