Generally speaking, Japanese bureaucrats are not much given to exaggeration, so when a senior government insider in Tokyo — speaking off the record — recently compared the deteriorating security situation in East Asia to Europe in the 1930s amid the rise of fascism, it was time to sit up and take notice.
“Tensions are getting very high in this part of the world,” the official said. “The security position is extremely severe. There are huge arms sales from Russia, the US and Europe. China’s defense spending has seen double-digit growth each year since 1989. They are not a responsible partner. US influence in the region is receding.”
Bad blood between Japan and China runs deep and, in the modern era, dates from the 1931 invasion of Manchuria.
Illustration: Yusha
Following its defeat in 1945 and its adoption of a pacifist constitution, Japan became wholly dependent on the US for its defense.
Some analysts claim it has long been in Tokyo’s interests to play up the China “threat,” but, objectively speaking, the threat is real and it becomes tangibly more worrying by the day.
Extraordinarily rapid economic growth in China in recent decades has seen it overtake Japan as the world’s second-largest economy, and the concomitant expansion of Beijing’s political, diplomatic and military might have set alarm bells clanging across the region as never before.
Today, the talk at embassy cocktail parties is not so much about how to “contain” China — the great, lost conceit of hawkish US geostrategists — as how to appease it.
Tellingly, the Japanese official’s warning came days before China unexpectedly declared a new air defense identification zone in the East China Sea covering the Diaoyutai Islands (釣魚台), which are claimed by Taiwan, China and Japan, which calls them the Senkakus.
The ensuing row saw Japan, the US and South Korea send fighter aircraft into the zone in open, dangerous defiance of Beijing’s strictures. A subsequent mediation mission by the US Vice President Joe Biden failed to resolve the standoff, in effect leaving a powder keg smoldering and untended.
Nobody is talking openly about a third world war, not yet at least. However, there is a growing awareness that the seeds of a possible future superpower collision are being sown around the islands, rocks and shoals, and in the overpopulated sea lanes and airspace beyond China’s historic borders, to which Beijing lays claim with growing political robustness and ever-improving military capacity.
The lack of a regional security organization, the absence of a hotline between Beijing and Tokyo, and the ever-present menace represented by the nuclear-armed, Chinese-backed regime in North Korea all add to the inherent dangers of the current situation.
Like any empire in the past, as China’s power grows, that power is ineluctably projected to encompass Beijing’s immediate neighbors and — in time — geographical regions and even continents.
For Beijing, the final frontier in this reverse engineering of manifest destiny is the Pacific basin. Yet to achieve dominance, it must first displace the US, the world’s most militarily powerful nation. This contest has years to run, but it is now beginning, hence the whispers of war.
Three men currently hold the key to what may happen this year: One is Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平), paramount leader of the Chinese Communist Party and People’s Liberation Army, who succeeded former Chinese president Hu Jintao (胡錦濤) in March last year. In a sharp change of tone, Xi has dropped Hu’s talk of a magnanimous China’s peaceful rise and substituted a tougher, nationalist-sounding message stressing pride in one’s country at home and asserting China’s rights on the international stage with “indomitable will.”
The ideological underpinning for this approach was set out in Xi’s “China dream” inaugural speech, an obvious attempt to provide an alternative to the “American Dream.” As the People’s Daily commented, his idea is “to construct a more open and charismatic communism that makes people excited to be Chinese.”
At a recent party plenum, Xi successfully pushed through an ambitious reform program, while strengthening his grip on power.
“Xi emerged from the plenum as the most powerful Chinese leader since Deng Xiaoping (鄧小平),” analyst William Pesek said. “Xi may be especially willing to risk a confrontation with Japan right now in order to distract opponents of his proposed reforms, as well as ordinary Chinese who are growing restless over pollution, income inequality and official corruption. Nothing brings China’s 1.3 billion people together so easily as hating the Japanese.”
Xi’s rise to power has coincided with the emergence of a similarly hardheaded individual as Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, who took office around the same time as Xi and has his own agenda for dealing with China. It sometimes makes Abe’s US allies and the 10 members of ASEAN — China’s smaller neighbors — wince with anxiety.
An unrepentant nationalist, Abe said it is past time for Japan to drop its pacifist laws, recognize the many threats to its security and stand up boldly for its interests and values.
To this end, he has increased defense spending, created a new national security council, strengthened alliances with countries such as the Philippines (which has its own territorial dispute with China) and plans to buy advanced new US weaponry.
“Japan is back,” Abe said during a visit to Washington last year.
For this and other reasons, Xi has refused to meet him, as has South Korean President Park Geun-hye. Official media denounce Abe as a revisionist and militarist. This chilly impasse has worsened the strains over China’s new air zone.
The third key player in this unfolding drama is US President Barack Obama, who has bigger guns and more ships and planes than the other two combined. Like the rest of the world, the US administration can think of 1,000 reasons why a war in East Asia would be disastrously self-defeating for all concerned, starting with the negative impact on international trade, finance and US debt.
Aware of the perception that US regional influence is receding and that the smallest spark could cause a conflagration, Obama has shifted his approach. His so-called “pivot” to Asia, giving the area a higher foreign policy priority, is principally aimed — despite denials — at countering Chinese blue-water navy ambitions in the Pacific and other unsettling manifestations of Chinese power projection.
Regional observers question how serious Obama is about the China “threat” and whether, for example, he would really come to Japan’s defense if the Diaoyutais dispute degenerated into a shooting war. Perhaps this year will provide the answer.
Could Asia be on the verge of a new wave of nuclear proliferation? A look back at the early history of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which recently celebrated its 75th anniversary, illuminates some reasons for concern in the Indo-Pacific today. US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin recently described NATO as “the most powerful and successful alliance in history,” but the organization’s early years were not without challenges. At its inception, the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty marked a sea change in American strategic thinking. The United States had been intent on withdrawing from Europe in the years following
My wife and I spent the week in the interior of Taiwan where Shuyuan spent her childhood. In that town there is a street that functions as an open farmer’s market. Walk along that street, as Shuyuan did yesterday, and it is next to impossible to come home empty-handed. Some mangoes that looked vaguely like others we had seen around here ended up on our table. Shuyuan told how she had bought them from a little old farmer woman from the countryside who said the mangoes were from a very old tree she had on her property. The big surprise
The issue of China’s overcapacity has drawn greater global attention recently, with US Secretary of the Treasury Janet Yellen urging Beijing to address its excess production in key industries during her visit to China last week. Meanwhile in Brussels, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen last week said that Europe must have a tough talk with China on its perceived overcapacity and unfair trade practices. The remarks by Yellen and Von der Leyen come as China’s economy is undergoing a painful transition. Beijing is trying to steer the world’s second-largest economy out of a COVID-19 slump, the property crisis and
Former president Ma Ying-jeou’s (馬英九) trip to China provides a pertinent reminder of why Taiwanese protested so vociferously against attempts to force through the cross-strait service trade agreement in 2014 and why, since Ma’s presidential election win in 2012, they have not voted in another Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) candidate. While the nation narrowly avoided tragedy — the treaty would have put Taiwan on the path toward the demobilization of its democracy, which Courtney Donovan Smith wrote about in the Taipei Times in “With the Sunflower movement Taiwan dodged a bullet” — Ma’s political swansong in China, which included fawning dithyrambs