Generally speaking, Japanese bureaucrats are not much given to exaggeration, so when a senior government insider in Tokyo — speaking off the record — recently compared the deteriorating security situation in East Asia to Europe in the 1930s amid the rise of fascism, it was time to sit up and take notice.
“Tensions are getting very high in this part of the world,” the official said. “The security position is extremely severe. There are huge arms sales from Russia, the US and Europe. China’s defense spending has seen double-digit growth each year since 1989. They are not a responsible partner. US influence in the region is receding.”
Bad blood between Japan and China runs deep and, in the modern era, dates from the 1931 invasion of Manchuria.
Illustration: Yusha
Following its defeat in 1945 and its adoption of a pacifist constitution, Japan became wholly dependent on the US for its defense.
Some analysts claim it has long been in Tokyo’s interests to play up the China “threat,” but, objectively speaking, the threat is real and it becomes tangibly more worrying by the day.
Extraordinarily rapid economic growth in China in recent decades has seen it overtake Japan as the world’s second-largest economy, and the concomitant expansion of Beijing’s political, diplomatic and military might have set alarm bells clanging across the region as never before.
Today, the talk at embassy cocktail parties is not so much about how to “contain” China — the great, lost conceit of hawkish US geostrategists — as how to appease it.
Tellingly, the Japanese official’s warning came days before China unexpectedly declared a new air defense identification zone in the East China Sea covering the Diaoyutai Islands (釣魚台), which are claimed by Taiwan, China and Japan, which calls them the Senkakus.
The ensuing row saw Japan, the US and South Korea send fighter aircraft into the zone in open, dangerous defiance of Beijing’s strictures. A subsequent mediation mission by the US Vice President Joe Biden failed to resolve the standoff, in effect leaving a powder keg smoldering and untended.
Nobody is talking openly about a third world war, not yet at least. However, there is a growing awareness that the seeds of a possible future superpower collision are being sown around the islands, rocks and shoals, and in the overpopulated sea lanes and airspace beyond China’s historic borders, to which Beijing lays claim with growing political robustness and ever-improving military capacity.
The lack of a regional security organization, the absence of a hotline between Beijing and Tokyo, and the ever-present menace represented by the nuclear-armed, Chinese-backed regime in North Korea all add to the inherent dangers of the current situation.
Like any empire in the past, as China’s power grows, that power is ineluctably projected to encompass Beijing’s immediate neighbors and — in time — geographical regions and even continents.
For Beijing, the final frontier in this reverse engineering of manifest destiny is the Pacific basin. Yet to achieve dominance, it must first displace the US, the world’s most militarily powerful nation. This contest has years to run, but it is now beginning, hence the whispers of war.
Three men currently hold the key to what may happen this year: One is Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平), paramount leader of the Chinese Communist Party and People’s Liberation Army, who succeeded former Chinese president Hu Jintao (胡錦濤) in March last year. In a sharp change of tone, Xi has dropped Hu’s talk of a magnanimous China’s peaceful rise and substituted a tougher, nationalist-sounding message stressing pride in one’s country at home and asserting China’s rights on the international stage with “indomitable will.”
The ideological underpinning for this approach was set out in Xi’s “China dream” inaugural speech, an obvious attempt to provide an alternative to the “American Dream.” As the People’s Daily commented, his idea is “to construct a more open and charismatic communism that makes people excited to be Chinese.”
At a recent party plenum, Xi successfully pushed through an ambitious reform program, while strengthening his grip on power.
“Xi emerged from the plenum as the most powerful Chinese leader since Deng Xiaoping (鄧小平),” analyst William Pesek said. “Xi may be especially willing to risk a confrontation with Japan right now in order to distract opponents of his proposed reforms, as well as ordinary Chinese who are growing restless over pollution, income inequality and official corruption. Nothing brings China’s 1.3 billion people together so easily as hating the Japanese.”
Xi’s rise to power has coincided with the emergence of a similarly hardheaded individual as Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, who took office around the same time as Xi and has his own agenda for dealing with China. It sometimes makes Abe’s US allies and the 10 members of ASEAN — China’s smaller neighbors — wince with anxiety.
An unrepentant nationalist, Abe said it is past time for Japan to drop its pacifist laws, recognize the many threats to its security and stand up boldly for its interests and values.
To this end, he has increased defense spending, created a new national security council, strengthened alliances with countries such as the Philippines (which has its own territorial dispute with China) and plans to buy advanced new US weaponry.
“Japan is back,” Abe said during a visit to Washington last year.
For this and other reasons, Xi has refused to meet him, as has South Korean President Park Geun-hye. Official media denounce Abe as a revisionist and militarist. This chilly impasse has worsened the strains over China’s new air zone.
The third key player in this unfolding drama is US President Barack Obama, who has bigger guns and more ships and planes than the other two combined. Like the rest of the world, the US administration can think of 1,000 reasons why a war in East Asia would be disastrously self-defeating for all concerned, starting with the negative impact on international trade, finance and US debt.
Aware of the perception that US regional influence is receding and that the smallest spark could cause a conflagration, Obama has shifted his approach. His so-called “pivot” to Asia, giving the area a higher foreign policy priority, is principally aimed — despite denials — at countering Chinese blue-water navy ambitions in the Pacific and other unsettling manifestations of Chinese power projection.
Regional observers question how serious Obama is about the China “threat” and whether, for example, he would really come to Japan’s defense if the Diaoyutais dispute degenerated into a shooting war. Perhaps this year will provide the answer.
Congressman Mike Gallagher (R-WI) and Congressman Raja Krishnamoorthi (D-IL) led a bipartisan delegation to Taiwan in late February. During their various meetings with Taiwan’s leaders, this delegation never missed an opportunity to emphasize the strength of their cross-party consensus on issues relating to Taiwan and China. Gallagher and Krishnamoorthi are leaders of the House Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party. Their instruction upon taking the reins of the committee was to preserve China issues as a last bastion of bipartisanship in an otherwise deeply divided Washington. They have largely upheld their pledge. But in doing so, they have performed the
It is well known that Chinese President Xi Jinping’s (習近平) ambition is to rejuvenate the Chinese nation by unification of Taiwan, either peacefully or by force. The peaceful option has virtually gone out of the window with the last presidential elections in Taiwan. Taiwanese, especially the youth, are resolved not to be part of China. With time, this resolve has grown politically stronger. It leaves China with reunification by force as the default option. Everyone tells me how and when mighty China would invade and overpower tiny Taiwan. However, I have rarely been told that Taiwan could be defended to
It should have been Maestro’s night. It is hard to envision a film more Oscar-friendly than Bradley Cooper’s exploration of the life and loves of famed conductor and composer Leonard Bernstein. It was a prestige biopic, a longtime route to acting trophies and more (see Darkest Hour, Lincoln, and Milk). The film was a music biopic, a subgenre with an even richer history of award-winning films such as Ray, Walk the Line and Bohemian Rhapsody. What is more, it was the passion project of cowriter, producer, director and actor Bradley Cooper. That is the kind of multitasking -for-his-art overachievement that Oscar
Chinese villages are being built in the disputed zone between Bhutan and China. Last month, Chinese settlers, holding photographs of Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平), moved into their new homes on land that was not Xi’s to give. These residents are part of the Chinese government’s resettlement program, relocating Tibetan families into the territory China claims. China shares land borders with 15 countries and sea borders with eight, and is involved in many disputes. Land disputes include the ones with Bhutan (Doklam plateau), India (Arunachal Pradesh, Aksai Chin) and Nepal (near Dolakha and Solukhumbu districts). Maritime disputes in the South China