The turmoil following the Arab Awakening has all but decimated the affected countries’ economies. Political assassinations and polarization in Tunisia, civil unrest and a military takeover in Egypt, terrorist attacks in Yemen, sectarian strife and an institutional vacuum in Libya and civil war in Syria have contributed to a sharp fall in investment, tourism, exports and GDP growth, aggravating macroeconomic imbalances. For example, Egypt’s fiscal deficit now stands at 14 percent of GDP, with public debt approaching 100 percent of GDP. Most of the Arab Awakening countries lack buffers to withstand further economic shocks.
Worse, beyond the removal of individual autocratic leaders, few of the problems that fueled the uprisings have been addressed. Indeed, unemployment is higher today than in 2010. Untargeted fuel subsidies and the public-sector wage bill have increased, crowding out much-needed public investment and relief to poor families, while impeding the development of a dynamic and competitive private sector, and limiting new firms’ access to finance. Meanwhile, public-service delivery has deteriorated.
Moreover, the political situation remains unsettled, with transitional or interim governments, unfinished constitutions and uncertain timetables for future elections. In short, the Arab world’s transition countries are much more vulnerable today than they were at the height of the protests in 2011.
Against this background, an external shock could bring these fragile economies to a sudden stop, leading to devastating poverty and hardship, and imbalance-correcting policies – such as sharp tax increases, spending cuts, or currency devaluation — could backfire, fueling political unrest, delaying elections further and exacerbating the very imbalances that they were meant to rectify.
Even if governments managed to restore macroeconomic balance gradually, the structural problems of high unemployment, poor investment climates and inadequate provision of public services would likely remain unaddressed.
Growth would be insufficient to create jobs for the millions of young people entering the labor market. The Arab Awakening could become little more than a blip in the affected countries’ socioeconomic development.
Until now, the international community’s response has been piecemeal at best. In 2011, the G8 Deauville Partnership — which brought the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) to the region — pledged that international financial institutions (IFIs) would provide US$38 billion to the transition countries over three years.
However, that promise was based more on existing IFI pipelines than on transition countries’ emerging needs. Furthermore, poor macroeconomic fundamentals, slow progress on reform and political turmoil have constrained the use of these resources. From the transition countries’ perspective, bilateral support from the G8 and the EU has been disappointing.
The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries — especially Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar and Kuwait — have contributed roughly US$28 billion to the transition countries. While these resources have helped to finance budget shortfalls, stabilize reserves and calm nervous markets, they have not been sufficiently leveraged to improve the policy framework, strengthen implementation of public investment projects or, more generally, put the transition countries on an inclusive and sustainable growth path.
To give the Arab Awakening countries the needed space to transform their economies alongside their political systems, while avoiding destabilization or collapse, the international community must scale up financial, policy and institutional assistance. This should include new financial assistance linked to long-term reforms, amounting to US$30 billion to US$40 billion annually for about three years; technical support to ensure that these funds are channeled toward productive public investment in short-term public-works programs that create jobs and longer-term infrastructure projects that ease supply bottlenecks; broad frameworks for trade, regulatory reform and investment provided by, for example, deep and comprehensive free-trade agreements with the EU; policy and institutional support to restore trust between governments and their citizens, including by eliminating red tape and nepotism in business transactions, enabling poor people to hold public-
service providers accountable and enhancing social protection for the most vulnerable citizens.
This combination of assistance plays to the strengths of bilateral and multilateral partners like the GCC, the EU, and the US, as well as IFIs like the World Bank, the IMF, the EBRD, the African Development Bank, the Islamic Development Bank and Arab development funds.
These players complement each other in terms of systemic knowledge, implementation capacity and available financial resources.
The upcoming gathering of finance ministers in Washington for the World Bank-IMF Annual Meetings is an ideal opportunity to begin building consensus around this much-needed effort. Without urgent action, there is a good chance that those who took to the streets — indeed, risked their lives — in the struggle for dignity and opportunity will have done so in vain.
Erik Berglof is chief economist at the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Shanta Devarajan is the World Bank’s chief economist for the Middle East and North Africa.
Copyright: Project Syndicate
Recently, China launched another diplomatic offensive against Taiwan, improperly linking its “one China principle” with UN General Assembly Resolution 2758 to constrain Taiwan’s diplomatic space. After Taiwan’s presidential election on Jan. 13, China persuaded Nauru to sever diplomatic ties with Taiwan. Nauru cited Resolution 2758 in its declaration of the diplomatic break. Subsequently, during the WHO Executive Board meeting that month, Beijing rallied countries including Venezuela, Zimbabwe, Belarus, Egypt, Nicaragua, Sri Lanka, Laos, Russia, Syria and Pakistan to reiterate the “one China principle” in their statements, and assert that “Resolution 2758 has settled the status of Taiwan” to hinder Taiwan’s
Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong’s (李顯龍) decision to step down after 19 years and hand power to his deputy, Lawrence Wong (黃循財), on May 15 was expected — though, perhaps, not so soon. Most political analysts had been eyeing an end-of-year handover, to ensure more time for Wong to study and shadow the role, ahead of general elections that must be called by November next year. Wong — who is currently both deputy prime minister and minister of finance — would need a combination of fresh ideas, wisdom and experience as he writes the nation’s next chapter. The world that
The past few months have seen tremendous strides in India’s journey to develop a vibrant semiconductor and electronics ecosystem. The nation’s established prowess in information technology (IT) has earned it much-needed revenue and prestige across the globe. Now, through the convergence of engineering talent, supportive government policies, an expanding market and technologically adaptive entrepreneurship, India is striving to become part of global electronics and semiconductor supply chains. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s Vision of “Make in India” and “Design in India” has been the guiding force behind the government’s incentive schemes that span skilling, design, fabrication, assembly, testing and packaging, and
Can US dialogue and cooperation with the communist dictatorship in Beijing help avert a Taiwan Strait crisis? Or is US President Joe Biden playing into Chinese President Xi Jinping’s (習近平) hands? With America preoccupied with the wars in Europe and the Middle East, Biden is seeking better relations with Xi’s regime. The goal is to responsibly manage US-China competition and prevent unintended conflict, thereby hoping to create greater space for the two countries to work together in areas where their interests align. The existing wars have already stretched US military resources thin, and the last thing Biden wants is yet another war.