The reason? Because cross-strait relations were “not state-to-state relations,” Ma said.
So, Wang quickly changed his tune, saying that it would be best to “shelve contentious issues,” but the fact of the matter is that Beijing will not allow “two Chinas” or “one China, one Taiwan,” or indeed any proposal associated with the possibility that Taiwan or the ROC does not belong to the PRC.
The latest expression of this was the recent failed sister-city agreement between Greater Kaohsiung and the Maldivian capital, Male.
In the face of consistent attempts by China to eradicate Taiwan’s statehood, government and sovereignty, Ma’s original promise to the electorate to keep to “one China, with each side having its own interpretation” was at least accepted by voters who supported the concept of the ROC.
These voters believed that the “mutual non-denial” approach could be used between Taiwan and the PRC.
Yet, now that Ma has denied the very existence of the ROC by claiming that cross-strait relations are not state-to-state relations, voters can see through Ma’s machinations leaving even the most ardent ROC supporters feeling cheated and let down.
Ma’s deceit has finally been exposed.
His approval ratings currently stand at about 10 percent and he has lost the public’s trust in his ability to govern.
In terms of his ideology, his stance on Taiwan’s national identity is becoming increasingly divorced from that of the majority of the public and instead is increasingly married to that of Beijing.
The signing of the services trade agreement occurred without going through the necessary evaluation, with Ma’s government deciding that it would first discuss the details with the CCP and have it signed by the two parties before it was sent to the legislature for preliminary review.
Worse, with the establishment of the representative offices, the legislature is essentially signing a blank check, giving Beijing free rein to pick and choose as it pleases.
The representative office in Taiwan is likely to be used as a command center in the campaign for unification, or as a base for espionage.
Ma’s seven-point statement to Beijing, conveyed by Wu during his meeting with Xi, was designed purely as a show of loyalty, to allay Beijing’s concerns about Ma’s commitment.
Now in his second term, Ma has eyes only for his historical legacy.
In the few remaining years he has left in power, he is preoccupied with the idea of creating various means by which to set Taiwan on an irreversible course toward “one China.”
It is now even more obvious that the intention is to join forces with the CCP to control Taiwan.
Given Ma’s intention, Taiwan Solidarity Union Chairman Huang Kun-huei (黃昆輝) has made it clear that to prevent the CCP and KMT from realizing their plans, it is not enough for the opposition parties in Taiwan to set out their own stances: They also need to represent the voices of all Taiwanese.
If the governing party has any sense of duty it should not continue to give its chairman, whose popularity ratings hover not far above the 10 percent mark, free rein to do exactly as he pleases.
Translated by Paul Cooper