In proposing the “one country, two areas (一國兩區)” formula for cross-strait relations less than three months after his re-election, President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) has officially politicized relations with China far faster than anyone had anticipated.
From this point on, the government’s vaunted cross-strait trade activity and cultural exchanges should be viewed within the context of a political framework: No longer will it be able to dress negotiations with China up in phrases such as their being of a “purely economic” nature, having “nothing to do with politics.” The question is, what exactly is the nature of this “one country, two areas” political framework? And for this, the government seems to have two completely different sets of answers, depending on who it is talking to.
To the Taiwanese public, the government is insisting that the “one country, two areas” formula is based upon the Republic of China (ROC) Constitution. For the world outside of Taiwan, in former Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) chairman Wu Poh-hsiung’s (吳伯雄) version voiced in Beijing recently, there was absolutely no mention of the ROC Constitution. Wu’s version of events is that he had conveyed the government’s message exactly as it was given him, “with not a single word added or omitted.” Evidently, the version he gave in Beijing, minus any mention of the ROC Constitution, had been carefully vetted prior to his delivery of it.
The ROC Constitution is the basic law of a democratic republic, concerned not so much with the size of the territory to which it applies as with the core values of democracy and human rights to be applied here. To have a “one country, two areas” framework absent, the Constitution strongly indicates that neither democracy nor human rights have any binding power within cross-strait relations. Does the government imagine that excluding democracy and human rights as requirements would benefit talks on the idea of a single country with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) authorities, who themselves will have no truck with either? If this is really the case, then Ma, who likes to style himself as an honest, trustworthy man, has a responsibility to come clean with Taiwanese about what kind of sacrifices we are to make in taking this big step forward in cross-strait relations, rather than trying to use the ROC Constitution as some kind of smokescreen.
After living through at least two decades of democratization, Taiwanese broadly accept the principles of democracy and human rights as core to the national ethos. The authorities in China restrict freedom of speech, control the press and censor the Internet; they deprive their people of the freedom to form political parties or the right to assembly; they permit the arrest and detention or house arrest of dissidents and deprive detainees of visitation rights or the right to a lawyer as they see fit, in a judicial system in which the courts are subservient to public procurators who are, in turn, subservient to public security; they deprive their citizens of the right to vote and the right to participate in the political process; they restrict freedom of religion and persecute specific religious groups; and they have occupied Tibet and are cracking down on the local populace with the military. Given this, Ma should tell us how he plans to discuss the possibility of being one country with such a regime within a “one country, two areas” framework that omits any mention of democracy and human rights.
The PRC — or the “mainland area,” as Ma would have it — only just recently passed an amendment to its Criminal Procedure Law, allowing the police to arrest and detain people in undisclosed locations for the crime of “rebellion,” a move that has caused serious concerns within the country — or area — as well as universal criticism from abroad.
This development, a serious step back for human rights, is a real threat not only to the residents of that country — or area — but also to Taiwanese living there. This is one aspect of the cross-strait process that must be addressed with urgency, and yet Ma has done nothing, nor appears bothered about it, other than rushing through with this idea of “one country, two areas.”
One feels the need to ask Ma, who has promised to emphasize human rights while in office, if he would be as good as to clarify what his core values actually are and how exactly he envisages this “one country” framework benefiting the people on either side of the Taiwan Strait.
Taiwanese are not as naive as to imagine that the Constitution is the common denominator in cross-strait talks on “one country,” nor are they foolish enough to be willing to sacrifice democracy and human rights as a prerequisite for the success of these politicians’ “one country, two areas.” Neither would a formula that sacrifices Taiwan’s democracy and human rights be any good for the people living in China, for it would serve as a blow to the resolve of those struggling for democracy and human rights.
The best outcome for all concerned is when everyone, on both sides of the Taiwan Strait, is assured of basic human rights and democracy, as outlined in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. If Ma fancies himself as a canny tactician, perhaps he should save it for subsequent talks with China and try to secure human rights assurances for the people of both countries, or areas. There can be no talk of “one country” without human rights.
Hsu Wei-chun is convener of Taiwan Democracy Watch and assistant professor of law in the department of law and economics at Chung Yuan Christian University.
Translated by Paul Cooper
Could Asia be on the verge of a new wave of nuclear proliferation? A look back at the early history of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which recently celebrated its 75th anniversary, illuminates some reasons for concern in the Indo-Pacific today. US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin recently described NATO as “the most powerful and successful alliance in history,” but the organization’s early years were not without challenges. At its inception, the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty marked a sea change in American strategic thinking. The United States had been intent on withdrawing from Europe in the years following
My wife and I spent the week in the interior of Taiwan where Shuyuan spent her childhood. In that town there is a street that functions as an open farmer’s market. Walk along that street, as Shuyuan did yesterday, and it is next to impossible to come home empty-handed. Some mangoes that looked vaguely like others we had seen around here ended up on our table. Shuyuan told how she had bought them from a little old farmer woman from the countryside who said the mangoes were from a very old tree she had on her property. The big surprise
The issue of China’s overcapacity has drawn greater global attention recently, with US Secretary of the Treasury Janet Yellen urging Beijing to address its excess production in key industries during her visit to China last week. Meanwhile in Brussels, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen last week said that Europe must have a tough talk with China on its perceived overcapacity and unfair trade practices. The remarks by Yellen and Von der Leyen come as China’s economy is undergoing a painful transition. Beijing is trying to steer the world’s second-largest economy out of a COVID-19 slump, the property crisis and
Former president Ma Ying-jeou’s (馬英九) trip to China provides a pertinent reminder of why Taiwanese protested so vociferously against attempts to force through the cross-strait service trade agreement in 2014 and why, since Ma’s presidential election win in 2012, they have not voted in another Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) candidate. While the nation narrowly avoided tragedy — the treaty would have put Taiwan on the path toward the demobilization of its democracy, which Courtney Donovan Smith wrote about in the Taipei Times in “With the Sunflower movement Taiwan dodged a bullet” — Ma’s political swansong in China, which included fawning dithyrambs