The provisional title of this article, “The sensitive issue of China-Hong Kong relations” would not be considered “politically correct” in Hong Kong. After 1997, when the British handed the territory back to China, Beijing decreed that a number of political terms would be used regarding the territory. For example, China-Hong Kong relations were to be known as “relations between Hong Kong and the interior,” because juxtaposing China and Hong Kong smacks of sympathizing with Hong Kong independence. Nor could one talk of the 1997 “transfer of sovereignty,” because in Beijing’s eyes, Hong Kong has always been a part of China: One could only speak of a “return.”
Even if the media in Hong Kong do not have to enforce these rules, such terminology is becoming ever more common. This is how Hong Kong is slowly becoming linguistically “Sinicized.” I beg your pardon — I should perhaps have said “interiorized.” This is one of the deep-seated causes of the tension that has broken out in Hong Kong of late between locals and visitors from the “interior.”
One issue that has recently highlighted these tensions concerns the introduction of the Hong Kong-mainland China driving scheme, allowing drivers registered in China to drive into Hong Kong. Many are concerned that Chinese drivers will not follow traffic rules, and some are also worried that it will lead to the adoption of China’s system of driving on the right. This last fear has led to criticisms that Hong Kongers are relics of British colonialism, though Japanese also drive on the left. Chinese Vice Premier Wang Qishan (王岐山) dismissed these concerns by saying that Chinese motorists would observe traffic regulations when they are in Hong Kong, and the government of the Special Administrative Region dared not refuse to accept them. Some Hong Kongers fear this is the beginning of the end.
Although some suspect these tensions are born of discrimination against Chinese, or even motivated by Hong Kong independence sympathies, politicians in the pan-democracy camp dare not speak out about the subject, and it has been up to the younger generation to broach it. On Feb. 1, a group of young Hong Kongers clubbed together to run the infamous “locust” advert — the insect being used as a metaphor for the mainland Chinese overrunning the territory — accompanied with the phrase “Hong Kongers have had enough.” This opposition to Sinicization and the attempt to preserve Hong Kong’s history and culture is a social movement that originates with the younger generation and has nothing to do with political parties.
On the night of Jan. 14, when the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) lost the presidential election, I was there and I saw all these people who until then had been just names in the newspaper. It was a moving experience. The younger generation in Taiwan today lack an awareness of the importance of autonomy. Surely they will not end up just like the people in Hong Kong today, and only wake up to what is happening after the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has succeeded in taking over?
Online commentators and the press in Hong Kong are keen not to be seen as looking down on people from China, so whenever they need to criticize Chinese they refer to China as “the great power.” For example, a Chinese woman who had a go at a customs official in Hong Kong was reported in the media as being “a woman from the great power” doing such and such. Even though this does make some Chinese a little uneasy, the term recognizes China’s status as a great power, so in another way they are quite happy with it. This has the effect of mitigating their anger toward Hong Kong, and stops the tension becoming any worse than it already is.
A similar thing has happened in Taiwan. Some time ago President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) declared that China was to be referred to as “the mainland” (大陸) in official correspondence. It is difficult to know whether that was done following a directive by the CCP’s Publicity Department or whether they just think the same way. From this we get words like “mainland Chinese tourist” (陸客), “mainland Chinese spouse” (陸配) and “mainland Chinese investment” (陸資). This last term is different from the one used in Hong Kong to mean Chinese investment, which just goes to show how dubious these terms are.
If Taiwan accepts China’s linguistic standardization, and loses the right to determine the names of things, then the loss of sovereignty will be preceded by the loss of our culture. For this reason we need to push harder for a “Taiwan consensus,” the issue being how to flesh it out to make it more substantial, rather than to continue arguing back and forth with the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) over the “1992 consensus.”
Paul Lin is a political commentator.
Translated by Paul Cooper
Recently, China launched another diplomatic offensive against Taiwan, improperly linking its “one China principle” with UN General Assembly Resolution 2758 to constrain Taiwan’s diplomatic space. After Taiwan’s presidential election on Jan. 13, China persuaded Nauru to sever diplomatic ties with Taiwan. Nauru cited Resolution 2758 in its declaration of the diplomatic break. Subsequently, during the WHO Executive Board meeting that month, Beijing rallied countries including Venezuela, Zimbabwe, Belarus, Egypt, Nicaragua, Sri Lanka, Laos, Russia, Syria and Pakistan to reiterate the “one China principle” in their statements, and assert that “Resolution 2758 has settled the status of Taiwan” to hinder Taiwan’s
The past few months have seen tremendous strides in India’s journey to develop a vibrant semiconductor and electronics ecosystem. The nation’s established prowess in information technology (IT) has earned it much-needed revenue and prestige across the globe. Now, through the convergence of engineering talent, supportive government policies, an expanding market and technologically adaptive entrepreneurship, India is striving to become part of global electronics and semiconductor supply chains. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s Vision of “Make in India” and “Design in India” has been the guiding force behind the government’s incentive schemes that span skilling, design, fabrication, assembly, testing and packaging, and
Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong’s (李顯龍) decision to step down after 19 years and hand power to his deputy, Lawrence Wong (黃循財), on May 15 was expected — though, perhaps, not so soon. Most political analysts had been eyeing an end-of-year handover, to ensure more time for Wong to study and shadow the role, ahead of general elections that must be called by November next year. Wong — who is currently both deputy prime minister and minister of finance — would need a combination of fresh ideas, wisdom and experience as he writes the nation’s next chapter. The world that
As former president Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) wrapped up his visit to the People’s Republic of China, he received his share of attention. Certainly, the trip must be seen within the full context of Ma’s life, that is, his eight-year presidency, the Sunflower movement and his failed Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement, as well as his eight years as Taipei mayor with its posturing, accusations of money laundering, and ups and downs. Through all that, basic questions stand out: “What drives Ma? What is his end game?” Having observed and commented on Ma for decades, it is all ironically reminiscent of former US president Harry