There seem to be fewer disputes over nominations for the Chinese Nationalist Party’s (KMT) list of legislators-at-large than for the Democratic Progressive Party’s (DPP) list, and the KMT appears to be slightly ahead of the DPP in terms of popular support, but that will not necessarily translate into a victory for the KMT in January’s legislative election. The outcome will also be influenced by the parties’ policy proposals and their campaign strategies and tactics.
In the past, the DPP’s presidential candidate has always received a larger share of the vote than its legislative candidates, and its candidates for mayor and county commissioner have received more votes than those standing for council seats. In view of this, the party has always followed a strategy of “letting the hen lead the chicks.” This stands in contrast to the KMT’s usual strategy, which is one of “worker ants feeding the queen ant.”
However, not every election has followed this pattern. For example, in the 2005 elections for county commissioners, city mayors and county and city councilors, KMT candidates vied with one another for the chance to bask in the radiance of then-Taipei mayor Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九), while many DPP candidates, in contrast, were doing their best to keep clear of then-president Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁). In the current campaign, it is KMT legislators who are having to be persuaded, gently or otherwise, to have their photos taken with Ma.
Still, the coattails of a presidential candidate only stretch so far. Last year’s elections for mayors and councilors in the five special municipalities marked the DPP’s biggest ever success in transferring its votes, with its city council candidates gaining 5 percent more of the vote than in the past.
Despite this outcome, the DPP’s share of council votes was just 35.34 percent of the total, which was 70.86 percent of the 49.87 percent won by its mayoral candidates. That means that even if the transfer rate were to increase by 90 percent for the upcoming presidential and legislative elections, the fact that legislative candidates need 51 percent of the vote to win a seat means that “the hen” would have to receive 57 percent of the vote for that to happen.
In view of this, the DPP should be able to win nearly all the legislative seats in southern Taiwan, but there are not many places in the north where the party’s presidential candidate is likely to garner 51 percent of the vote, never mind 57 percent. In other words, adopting a strategy whereby “the chicks” rely solely on leadership of the hen in the north will simply not be enough for the DPP’s legislative candidates to win at the polls.
There are five situations in which the hen-and-chicks strategy has differing outcomes:
First, when a presidential candidate and their party both have a clear lead in terms of public opinion, it has an overall uplifting effect on the party’s legislative candidates. For example, in the 2008 presidential election, Ma, standing for the KMT, won 58.45 percent of the vote, and this provided a big boost for KMT candidates running for legislative seats, who scored over and above their already strong support base, taking 53.5 percent of the overall vote.
Second, in the old-style multi-member constituencies, whichever individual candidates could associate themselves most closely with their leader enjoyed an advantage by differentiating themselves from other candidates of the same party and so consolidating their voter base. However, this does not apply under the new single-member constituency system.
Third, when a party’s voter base in a particular area is much stronger than that of its opponents, but its legislative candidates are not well known and do not have much support, the hen-and-chick strategy has quite a strong positive effect. However, when the situation is reversed, it is likely to have a negative effect. For example, unless strong pan-blue legislators in southern Taiwan are standing to help win votes for the KMT’s presidential candidate, they will probably prefer to play down their ties to Ma.
Fourth, in areas where contending parties’ support bases and presidential candidates are more or less equal, even though the hen can lead the chicks to some extent, she can only provide a relatively small boost. In that sort of situation, the chicks have to work hard to secure electoral victory.
Fifth, when a candidate has more than one opponent, so that the election becomes a three-way contest, that is when the involvement of the hen can be decisive in consolidating the various candidates’ support bases.
An important point is that in places where the two sides’ support bases are of similar strength, swing voters are the ones who decide who wins and who loses.
The pan-blue and pan-green camps can bring about a hen-and-chick effect most effectively among their core supporters, because those supporters have a very strong sense of collective identity.
This collective identity is the basis for what people called “voting with tears in one’s eyes,” which means that people vote for a candidate they do not really think much of because that candidate is standing for the party they support.
Swing voters, on the other hand, have strong individualist tendencies. They vote for candidates rather than parties, and they decide who to vote for on a case-by-case basis. The collectivist logic of the hen-and-chick strategy is completely at odds with swing voters’ individualistic tendencies.
According to a recent survey carried out by Taiwan Thinktank, swing voters account for about 24 percent of the electorate. With regard to this group of voters, if the DPP wants to win control of the legislature as well as the executive, it will be unable to do so by relying on getting a boost among its base supporters from hanging on to the presidential candidate’s apron strings. It will also have to win individual approval for its legislative candidates from as many of those individualistic swing voters as possible.
To put it another way, in addition to pushing what in business parlance is called a “primary brand” for its presidential candidate, the party must also establish “secondary” or “dual brands” for its legislative contenders.
One way of achieving this is to establish a brand image based on a candidate’s individual characteristics. Many candidates are trying to do this, whatever their particular strong points may be, but for a party that has a macro-perspective and wants to bring about reform, it would perhaps be better to try to establish a collective brand for all its legislators.
The issues around which to do this might be hard to pinpoint, but right now there is a heaven-sent opportunity to do so, because society at large is very dissatisfied with the quality of the legislature. For a reform-oriented party, dissatisfaction with the “status quo” provides an ideal opportunity to win votes.
Since the dual-brand strategy is endorsed by the whole party, there is no danger of the subsidiary brand taking away from the primary brand. On the contrary, it can serve to enhance the presidential candidate’s image as a reformer. This approach is also good for winning support from swing voters, so the effect is one of marching separately, but striking together.
The DPP’s presidential candidate currently enjoys a slight lead over her rival. Public support for the two main parties is neck-and-neck, so that with regard to the overall outlook for the legislative election, opinion polls periodically show one party or the other moving slightly ahead of its rival. The best way to break out of the current deadlock is to follow a dual-brand strategy in which the emphasis should be the need to reform the legislature and other branches of government.
Lin Cho-shui is a former Democratic Progressive Party legislator.
Translated by Julian Clegg
Recently, China launched another diplomatic offensive against Taiwan, improperly linking its “one China principle” with UN General Assembly Resolution 2758 to constrain Taiwan’s diplomatic space. After Taiwan’s presidential election on Jan. 13, China persuaded Nauru to sever diplomatic ties with Taiwan. Nauru cited Resolution 2758 in its declaration of the diplomatic break. Subsequently, during the WHO Executive Board meeting that month, Beijing rallied countries including Venezuela, Zimbabwe, Belarus, Egypt, Nicaragua, Sri Lanka, Laos, Russia, Syria and Pakistan to reiterate the “one China principle” in their statements, and assert that “Resolution 2758 has settled the status of Taiwan” to hinder Taiwan’s
Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong’s (李顯龍) decision to step down after 19 years and hand power to his deputy, Lawrence Wong (黃循財), on May 15 was expected — though, perhaps, not so soon. Most political analysts had been eyeing an end-of-year handover, to ensure more time for Wong to study and shadow the role, ahead of general elections that must be called by November next year. Wong — who is currently both deputy prime minister and minister of finance — would need a combination of fresh ideas, wisdom and experience as he writes the nation’s next chapter. The world that
Can US dialogue and cooperation with the communist dictatorship in Beijing help avert a Taiwan Strait crisis? Or is US President Joe Biden playing into Chinese President Xi Jinping’s (習近平) hands? With America preoccupied with the wars in Europe and the Middle East, Biden is seeking better relations with Xi’s regime. The goal is to responsibly manage US-China competition and prevent unintended conflict, thereby hoping to create greater space for the two countries to work together in areas where their interests align. The existing wars have already stretched US military resources thin, and the last thing Biden wants is yet another war.
Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, people have been asking if Taiwan is the next Ukraine. At a G7 meeting of national leaders in January, Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida warned that Taiwan “could be the next Ukraine” if Chinese aggression is not checked. NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg has said that if Russia is not defeated, then “today, it’s Ukraine, tomorrow it can be Taiwan.” China does not like this rhetoric. Its diplomats ask people to stop saying “Ukraine today, Taiwan tomorrow.” However, the rhetoric and stated ambition of Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) on Taiwan shows strong parallels with