Bouts over peace
If President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) ever listened to the public, he would not have broken so many promises (Editorial, Oct. 27, page 8). Taiwanese often say “If Ma’s words were reliable, dog shit would be edible” and “If Ma listened to the public, red rain would fall from the sky.”
A peace treaty is usually signed by two hostile countries. Ma does not consider Taiwan a country — only a region of China. If Taiwan were a region of China, how much power would Taiwan have in negotiating with China, which is backed by more than 2,000 [sic] missiles aimed at Taiwan? On the other hand, Ma is too inclined toward China and timid to say no to Beijing. A peace pact under these situations will never be acceptable.
Ma has been trying to convince the public with the so-called “1992 consensus,” which is a “one China” concept. If this were a true consensus, it should not take 19 years or longer to convince people. It’s time for Ma to give up this fruitless effort.
Ma has a personal ambition to obtain a Nobel Peace Prize and to accomplish his father’s wish of gradual unification as well as his own pledge of eventual unification. Taiwan is far more valuable and important than a Nobel Prize or any wishes and pledges.
Taiwanese are a peace-loving people. They would wholeheartedly support the signature of a genuine peace pact with China on a nation-to-nation basis under three prerequisites: one, China removes all missiles pointed at Taiwan and stops its military buildup; two, China recognizes Taiwan (not the “Republic of China” or “Chinese Taipei”) as a sovereign country; and three, Taiwan is admitted to the UN. After these are all satisfied, Taiwanese should have a referendum to authorize the government to negotiate with China for a peace pact.
Charles Hong
Columbus, Ohio
Ma’s shaky peace accord
President Ma’s recent vacillation on the subject of a “cross-strait peace accord” incurred consternation in Beijing and among the Taiwanese public. However, the process might have actually benefited both with what it revealed.
Ma’s disregard for damage to his re-election chances by quickly retracting his referendum pledge must have impressed Beijing with his depth of loyalty to China. Ma’s ineptness, however, must also have exasperated Beijing. It is hard to imagine that Beijing would commit to engaging Ma as its proxy in Taiwan for the long run.
What’s most remarkable in this skirmish is that democracy has a hand in effecting every move Ma made.
It seemed obvious that Ma and company’s anxiety on the tightness of the election dogfight, combined with his desire for more help from Beijing, prompted Ma to wade into the muddy waters of setting a timetable for “unification” via a peace accord.
A promise of referendum was then hastily added to his “golden 10-year plan” amid public outcry of sellout.
This was only to be followed hours later by a series of backslides by Ma and company who appeared eager to reaffirm Ma’s blind belief that his re-election now hinges on Beijing’s being fully aboard his bandwagon.
Through Ma’s flip-flopping, Taiwanese discovered that peace-accord referendums are like kryptonite to Beijing given that it brings great trepidation to its regional hegemony.
And, one doesn’t have to venture far to find the explanation.
Article 8 of China’s “Anti-Secession” Law decrees use of force in case “all venues of peaceful unification have been exhausted.” A referendum’s rejection of a cross-strait peace accord would come close to satisfying that fateful condition.
It must be noted that all other “use of force” conditions outlined in the law have pretty much been ignored or explained away by Beijing’s leadership citing practical difficulty in enforcing against violations that have been taking place for decades.
Being the least defined, incidents listed in Article 8 — once they occur — could quickly escalate into a point of contention among factions vying for China’s leadership at the time. This in turn would have the potential to force the leadership into a tight spot where the decision to use force might be made even if the ensuing acts could interrupt or reverse China’s ongoing prosperity, which marches in lockstep with its stability.
Further complicating the matter for Beijing, factors like the Taiwan Relations Act and the US-Japan Security Alliance could be expected to jump into the fray given the clearly demonstrated element of coercion.
The fact that all parties would have ample time to gear up for the eventuality against a backdrop of international drumbeats could only pile more pressure on Beijing.
It would then be interesting to see if China’s craving for political talks with Taiwan might be somewhat curbed after this latest episode of hand-to-hand combat with democracy.
If Taiwan’s relatively nascent democracy can put a few more bouts like this under its belt, Taiwanese might be able to breathe a tad easier.
Huang Jei-hsuan
Los Angeles, California
Could Asia be on the verge of a new wave of nuclear proliferation? A look back at the early history of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which recently celebrated its 75th anniversary, illuminates some reasons for concern in the Indo-Pacific today. US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin recently described NATO as “the most powerful and successful alliance in history,” but the organization’s early years were not without challenges. At its inception, the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty marked a sea change in American strategic thinking. The United States had been intent on withdrawing from Europe in the years following
My wife and I spent the week in the interior of Taiwan where Shuyuan spent her childhood. In that town there is a street that functions as an open farmer’s market. Walk along that street, as Shuyuan did yesterday, and it is next to impossible to come home empty-handed. Some mangoes that looked vaguely like others we had seen around here ended up on our table. Shuyuan told how she had bought them from a little old farmer woman from the countryside who said the mangoes were from a very old tree she had on her property. The big surprise
The issue of China’s overcapacity has drawn greater global attention recently, with US Secretary of the Treasury Janet Yellen urging Beijing to address its excess production in key industries during her visit to China last week. Meanwhile in Brussels, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen last week said that Europe must have a tough talk with China on its perceived overcapacity and unfair trade practices. The remarks by Yellen and Von der Leyen come as China’s economy is undergoing a painful transition. Beijing is trying to steer the world’s second-largest economy out of a COVID-19 slump, the property crisis and
As former president Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) wrapped up his visit to the People’s Republic of China, he received his share of attention. Certainly, the trip must be seen within the full context of Ma’s life, that is, his eight-year presidency, the Sunflower movement and his failed Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement, as well as his eight years as Taipei mayor with its posturing, accusations of money laundering, and ups and downs. Through all that, basic questions stand out: “What drives Ma? What is his end game?” Having observed and commented on Ma for decades, it is all ironically reminiscent of former US president Harry