After President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) took office in 2008, his administration eagerly began talks with China to a largely favorable response. On Oct. 18, when Ma presented his “golden decade” vision for the nation’s development over the next 10 years, he said Taiwan could negotiate a peace accord with China within 10 years if three preconditions were met: that there was strong domestic support for such a pact, that it met the needs of the country and that there was legislative overview. His announcement was greeted with approval by the pan-blue camp and derision by the pan-green camp.
Ma said he brought up the issue because it was part of his plan for the nation, but he should say what it is really for — his re-election bid. After all, it would be nearly impossible to meet the three prerequisites for such an accord, and Beijing’s definition of “one China” is not the same as Taiwan’s.
Naturally the content of a cross-strait peace agreement must be agreed upon by both parties for it to work, and it must be explained to the public on both sides. Ma’s three preconditions are there to serve as buffers. What does “strong domestic support” mean? The total number of votes the president, the legislature or the ruling party gets in an election? Or is he -talking about a referendum? Even if he got more than half the votes he is seeking, public opinion is very fluid. What could be done if public opinion were to change six months from now?
Furthermore, a nation needs sustainable development, but what Taiwan needs is not necessarily what China needs or vice versa. What would Taiwan do in the event of conflicting interests between the two sides?
It seems unlikely that the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) will win a legislative majority in the foreseeable future, but it is certainly capable of paralyzing the legislature, and without proper supervision, the legislature would be in chaos. Moreover, without the pressure of a deadline, it might be another 100 years before a peace deal gets signed.
As for China, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) believes it inherited the right to rule over “all China,” and that Taiwan is only being temporarily managed by a local government. China always shows how it feels about cross-strait sovereignty when the US sells weapons to Taiwan, or when there is an argument about what Taiwan is called in the international community.
From Beijing’s perspective, all the benign cross-strait interaction at present is China taking care of its domestic affairs. However, seen from Taiwan’s perspective, it is negotiations between two sovereign nations. Thus, every time the topic of sovereignty is broached, it only makes sense that Beijing works to diminish Taiwan’s international space to manifest its right to represent China.
If China agrees to sign a peace accord, it might give the international community a mistaken sense of equality. Take the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA), for example — if Taiwan wanted to sign a free-trade agreement with another nation based on the ECFA, it would still have to be done under the so-called “one China” principle. However, the ECFA is the only free-trade agreement the Ma administration has signed.
Furthermore, the main criteria deciding China’s attitude toward Taiwan is the strength of pro-independence forces in this nation.
Even though the Ma administration and the Chinese government have similar beliefs concerning national identity, Beijing still keeps a close eye on the ideas and strength of independence activists. At the same time, China must make concessions to support Ma and prevent another transfer of power in Taiwan.
Some of the nations that have diplomatic ties with Taiwan at present are willing to establish diplomatic ties with China, and Beijing is currently unwilling to accept them because it suspended the establishment of new diplomatic relations with Taiwan’s allies to improve cross-strait ties.
However, as soon as a pro-independence party comes to power, China can steal Taiwan’s allies. On the other hand, if Taiwan’s relations with other nations improve, that will also increase cross-strait tensions concerning sovereignty.
A nation might last indefinitely, but a government is temporary, and the ability of a government to extend its hold on power is a concrete expression of that nation’s strength. The current smooth developments in cross-strait relations have been based upon an implicit agreement between the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) and the CCP.
Therefore, Ma’s cross-strait proposals are pretty slogans with no real substance, and that will give the DPP more ammunition to criticize and attack Ma.
Ball Chang is an assistant professor at the Chihlee Institute of Technology’s Department of Applied English.
Translated by Kyle Jeffcoat
Could Asia be on the verge of a new wave of nuclear proliferation? A look back at the early history of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which recently celebrated its 75th anniversary, illuminates some reasons for concern in the Indo-Pacific today. US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin recently described NATO as “the most powerful and successful alliance in history,” but the organization’s early years were not without challenges. At its inception, the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty marked a sea change in American strategic thinking. The United States had been intent on withdrawing from Europe in the years following
My wife and I spent the week in the interior of Taiwan where Shuyuan spent her childhood. In that town there is a street that functions as an open farmer’s market. Walk along that street, as Shuyuan did yesterday, and it is next to impossible to come home empty-handed. Some mangoes that looked vaguely like others we had seen around here ended up on our table. Shuyuan told how she had bought them from a little old farmer woman from the countryside who said the mangoes were from a very old tree she had on her property. The big surprise
The issue of China’s overcapacity has drawn greater global attention recently, with US Secretary of the Treasury Janet Yellen urging Beijing to address its excess production in key industries during her visit to China last week. Meanwhile in Brussels, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen last week said that Europe must have a tough talk with China on its perceived overcapacity and unfair trade practices. The remarks by Yellen and Von der Leyen come as China’s economy is undergoing a painful transition. Beijing is trying to steer the world’s second-largest economy out of a COVID-19 slump, the property crisis and
As former president Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) wrapped up his visit to the People’s Republic of China, he received his share of attention. Certainly, the trip must be seen within the full context of Ma’s life, that is, his eight-year presidency, the Sunflower movement and his failed Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement, as well as his eight years as Taipei mayor with its posturing, accusations of money laundering, and ups and downs. Through all that, basic questions stand out: “What drives Ma? What is his end game?” Having observed and commented on Ma for decades, it is all ironically reminiscent of former US president Harry