Over the years, the pan-blue populace of Taipei has formed its own discourse regarding the Democratic Progressive Party’s (DPP) cross-strait policies. According to this view, the DPP’s cross-strait policies have reached a dead end because the party advocates independence and refuses to accept the so-called “1992 consensus.” This makes the cross-strait issue a sweet spot for President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) in January’s presidential election, and an Achilles’ heel for the DPP. According to this discourse, a significant number of people in the pan-green camp also follow this view. However, a poll released on Aug. 22 by the Chinese-language magazine Global Views analyzing support for DPP Chairperson Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文), People First Party (PFP) Chairman James Soong (宋楚瑜) and Ma showed that Taipei’s self-complacent discourse is no longer valid.
The poll shows that the public sees both Soong and Ma as far more seasoned politicians than Tsai, but believes she is a much stronger protector of Taiwan’s sovereignty and cares for Taiwan’s interests and peace in the Taiwan Strait.
Not only do the pan-green and pan-blue camps differ in their fundamental values regarding cross-strait policies, they even see the current state of affairs and future trends differently.
The Ma administration sees the rapid rise of China, propelling it to become the largest economy in the world, as an irreversible trend. To have any future whatsoever, according to the Ma camp, Taiwan must depend entirely on China both economically and diplomatically. The idea seems to be that there is nothing to fear with China on Taiwan’s side. Taiwan’s current trade surplus with China is 10 times that with the US — ample proof of how much Taiwan depends on China.
The Ma government is set on steering the nation toward becoming a vassal state of China, and complains that the DPP’s independence-oriented politics and their fight for autonomy are incompatible with this goal. They claim that the radicalism during the later part of Chen Shui-bian’s (陳水扁) presidency simply did not work, and that Tsai’s policies of stability wouldn’t work either because she does not acknowledge the “1992 consensus.” And for that reason alone, they call all of her policies vague and empty. The nickname they have given Tsai — kongxincai (空心蔡) — describes her as empty and vague. This name is on the lips of every pan-blue camp politician and even some pan-green camp politicians.
Since 2008, the Ma administration has had a fear-nothing attitude because it feels having China on its side makes it impervious to insult or injury. The administration’s cross-strait policies have included several “concrete” suggestions such as a diplomatic truce, a peace agreement, a mutual trust mechanism for military matters, advancing the three direct links with China as rapidly as possible and signing the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement. Ma also made more concrete domestic promises during his first presidential campaign — originally known as the “6-3-3” pledge: a promise to keep economic growth above 6 percent and both unemployment and inflation below 3 percent, which has now been followed by the “54321 goal.” That is economic growth of above 5 percent, an unemployment rate of below 4 percent, income growth of above 3 percent, consumer price index growth of less than 2 percent and total private investment of more than NT$1 trillion (US$34.2 billion). Armed with these very specific and pleasant-sounding ideas, those supporting the Taipei discourse eloquently criticize Tsai’s cross-strait policies as being empty and vague.
The DPP’s 10-year policy guidelines recently unveiled by Tsai make it obvious that DPP views about the current situation and the future starkly differ from those of the KMT. Of course, the DPP has not failed to notice the rapid rise of China. However, it does not believe China will rapidly oust the US as supreme global super power. The DPP also believes that it is immature and unwise to claim that the reliance on trade with China has already replaced trade relations with the US, particularly since Taiwan has become embedded in the global production chain and has a well-established trilateral trade relationship with the US and China.
Against this background, the DPP thinks that although Taiwanese industry cannot sever links with China, it should still seek autonomy in its development and not rely entirely on Beijing. The 10-Year Policy Guidelines further show how Taiwan, after it became so heavily reliant on China, has been gradually turning into a Chinese vassal state both economically and diplomatically, how its autonomy has been eroded, how economic and political risk has increased and how this development has become an obstacle to growth and reasonable distribution.
The guidelines also say that this reliance has slowed Taiwan’s industrial upgrading and that the main current industrial production mode is contract manufacturing, which emphasizes low labor cost and therefore causes rapid outflow of industry, which in turn has resulted in the suppression of wages, rising unemployment and a widening wealth gap, which Taiwanese have already been suffering for a long time.
Taiwan’s cross-strait policies must seek to balance three things: protecting Taiwan’s sovereignty, safeguarding Taiwan’s interests and maintaining cross-strait stability. This is no easy task and that is why neither the pan-green nor the pan-blue camp will win overwhelming public support on this issue. However, regardless of what happens, all the political promises the Ma administration has issued and broken as a result of its “fearless reliance on China” have finally allowed the public to escape the domination of the Taipei--dominated discourse. They have now realized that what those pundits called “Tsai’s vague policy guidelines” actually offer a more pragmatic approach to understanding the current situation, trends and policies. Her guidelines are now more highly valued than the views of Ma and Soong.
It appears that it is Ma’s fearless reliance on China that is an immature fantasy. If he thinks his cross-strait policy will decide the outcome of next year’s elections, that is just another of his fantasies.
Lin Cho-shui is a former Democratic Progressive Party legislator.
TRANSLATED BY KYLE JEFFCOAT
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