The early and middle parts of the past decade witnessed the emergence of an expression which could be heard bouncing off the walls of China-centered policy and academic institutions. This expression, examined at length by some academics (Robert Sutter, for example), was used by Chinese policymakers to calm concerns about China’s growing international profile. The “peaceful rise of China” or “China’s peaceful rise,” whichever way one chooses to translate it, was thrown around so often that it was almost accepted as a given (in his 2005 book China’s Rise in Asia: Promises and Perils, Sutter does not assume the rise to be peaceful).
However, recent events and especially this year (which, incidentally, marks the beginning of a new decade), have forced scholars to revisit the idea of China’s rise being peaceful. Repeated incidents on the Korean Peninsula, the South China Sea, ever more strident Chinese protests regarding US arms sales to Taiwan and the continuous — and by some reports accelerating — military buildup across the Taiwan Strait despite “warming relations” with Taiwan, episodes in the East China Sea with Japan, and the recent debacle regarding Chinese protests which kept a US governor from visiting Taiwan, just to name a few, have, some would say rightfully, brought the “peaceful rise” concept under the microscope.
Some have discounted the idea of a “peaceful rise” as preposterous, citing numerous examples from history in which rising powers have challenged, usually with force, the established order.
Others believe it possible, depending on Chinese dispositions, the international environment and the ability of China’s political system to “reform” (and by reform, these writers, usually Western academics, mean democratic reform).
In this context, few of these academics and writers look beyond the near-to-medium term in order to address the idea of an international environment in which China has already become “top dog.”
Although this may be far in the future (if it occurs at all), responsible professionals, before they begin formulating their conclusions on the immediate future, should first attempt to consider a system in which China would be accepted as the global leader. From a geopolitical perspective, this is difficult to imagine.
First, as an engine of Asian economic growth, China has over the past three decades made a statement internationally. Whether that statement is positive or negative will be left for future historians to analyze. What is clear, however, is that to most democratic nations, China will continue to be considered a developing nation, not a developed nation. Such a situation will forever leave China, global leader or not, with an inferiority complex. The sense from most nations, as China hails another successful space mission or another trip to the bottom of the ocean, of “been there, done that [and long ago]” will always overshadow such Chinese accomplishments.
This brings me to my next point: If China is to be accepted by the global community as not just “a” but “the” leader, it needs to do something new. This does not downplay Chinese accomplishments, it simply begs the question: If China is to follow through on its promises to nations resenting US supremacy, it has to be able to offer them something different to the US.
China may not export poverty, but building a road here and a pipeline there is not wealth, either. Other developing nations will begin to ask the new leader “Where is my share of the pie?” and Beijing will eventually have to do more than throw money and market access at other nations in order to cover up uncomfortable situations. It will also have to do more than sing the “China does not and will not interfere in other nations’ internal affairs” anthem: There is always someone out there who wants to get the leader.
It is even more difficult to imagine a world — or even an Asia — willing to accept a hegemonic China. True, a year or two ago, some nations might have warmed to the idea. With the US bogged down in “unjust” wars and thumbing its nose at the UN and more recently being the source of an economic downturn, the “noninterference” anthem along with impressive if inflated growth numbers coming from the People’s Republic of China (PRC) were far more appealing.
However, appearances can be misleading. To start with, one of Beijing’s closest partners in Asia, Russia, probably would have a hard time accepting a lone Chinese hegemony. Indeed, China’s growing role in Central Asia and influence in the Russian Far East concern Russian policy makers and academics.
India is another problem for Beijing. With the historical baggage these two nations have and continued Indian suspicions regarding China’s tinkering in Pakistan and the rest of South and Central Asia, it is difficult to image a rising India passively accepting Chinese domination.
Let us not forget Japan and South Korea. I think it is safe to say that the Japanese would have issues with a dominant China, US presence or no US presence. South Korea may prove more malleable in the long run, but as long as the Chinese continue to give unabashed support to North Korea, it is difficult to foresee a completely acquiescent Seoul.
The ASEAN nations would also probably have a thing or two to say about a superpower redrawing maritime territorial boundaries at will. Although certain member states might be willing to accept such a construct — albeit with incentives from Beijing — others would more than likely protest. Central Asian states as well, to this day still considered Russia’s backyard, would more than likely look to Russia for support in dealing with Beijing.
This does not mean that nations would never work with China as its economic growth offers huge potential incentives to anyone wishing to accept its rules, but economic growth alone does not a leader make — although it certainly helps. Military might helps as well, but what matters most is international acceptance. The British would not accept a Napoleonic Europe any more than the Russians. The Romans had to sow the soil of Carthage with salt.
The regional and international responses to China’s recent behavior demonstrate that the world is not, for the foreseeable future, prepared to accept a hegemonic China. This may change over time, of course, and there are many factors that play a role, but if the PRC continues down the road it’s currently on, it will more than likely be met with growing resistance, not acceptance.
In such an environment, a China after its rise to pre-eminence would need to force everyone to bend to its will. That is something at which even the military genius Napoleon failed miserably. It will take a lot of salt.
Nathan Novak studies China and the Asia-Pacific region with a particular focus on cross-strait relations at National Sun Yat-sen University.
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