There has recently been a lot of hot air blowing back and forth about withdrawing the 1,500 or so missiles China has aimed at Taiwan, but this is nothing but empty talk. China has not and will not renounce the use of force against Taiwan. Without a renunciation of the use of force, nothing Beijing does with its missiles will guarantee Taiwan’s security.
Furthermore, China’s “withdrawal” of the missiles could actually hurt Taiwan’s security. Cutting down the number of missiles while not actually scaling back China’s military buildup vis-a-vis Taiwan would score Beijing a diplomatic victory, creating the illusion that it wants peace while constraining the US’ hand in any future arms sales to Taiwan.
To demonstrate what People’s Liberation Army (PLA) leaders are thinking, let’s take a look at the options available regarding their arsenal of missiles.
First, the PLA could score diplomatic points by freezing its ever-increasing deployments of missiles, missile batteries, missile launchers and missile crews to Fujian Province, just across the Taiwan Strait. A freeze in PLA deployments would be something new. After all, the country has never slowed its military buildup across the Taiwan Strait, despite the so-called warming relations under President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九). Freezing its buildup would earn China praise around the world, although this would still leave a huge arsenal of missiles and related military machinery aimed at Taiwan. There are already enough missiles there to flatten Taiwan, so freezing the buildup would only free up military spending for other means of taking Taiwan by force, like the navy.
Second, the PLA could reduce the number of missiles it has pointed at Taiwan, but what does this mean? With between 1,500 and 2,000 missiles in place, cutting their number in half would not significantly reduce the threat against Taiwan. China has built up such a huge arsenal that it could win a war of unification with only a portion of it.
Third, China could dismantle the missiles and the equipment used to fire them. Does this seem likely without a renunciation of force? Why would China throw away its trump card if Taiwan is not yet firmly back in the “motherland’s” embrace? The PLA won’t do that, because it needs the missiles as a credible threat against Taiwan in case the Democratic Progressive Party returns to power.
A retired PLA general, Li Jijun (李際均), put it succintly on Nov. 13 last year: “Chinese missiles are good instruments to deter Taiwanese independence and to stabilize the Taiwan Strait ... while there is room for negotiation, those instruments should not be given up before negotiations take place.”
In other words, the missiles will be available and ready to use until all negotiations, including peace and reunification negotiations, have been completed.
Finally, the PLA could withdraw the missiles to some far-away place, but what good does this do for Taiwan? China has many mobile missiles, with mobile launch platforms. All it would have to do in case of a conflict is quickly redeploy them back to their original stations, or fire them from further away. China has rockets that could deliver warheads to Taiwan from as far as Sichuan Province. Its cheaper, more expendable missiles would have to be fired from closer, like Fujian Province, but there are any number of places in the country where the PLA could hide long-range ballistic missile launchers and cruise missile silos.
All this leads to the question: What’s the hubbub about missiles really about?
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