Now that President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) has again taken the helm of the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT), the question is whether he will use the position to meet Chinese President and Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary Hu Jintao (胡錦濤) at one of the KMT-CCP cross-strait economic, trade and cultural forums.
Signing a peace agreement was one of the goals of the common vision for cross-strait peace and development signed by Hu and then-KMT chairman Lien Chan (連戰) on April 29, 2005. It was written into the KMT’s party platform in 2007 and became one of Ma’s campaign promises for last year’s presidential election. It has been a key policy of the KMT administration.
A Ma-Hu meeting could take place at the start or close of talks on a peace deal.
If Ma intends to push for a cross-strait summit, he must recognize the conditions for a meeting: He is the president of the Republic of China (ROC) and represents 23 million Taiwanese. The KMT chairmanship is only an opportunity to meet Hu, but Ma must not think that because the KMT is the ruling party, it can replace the government and sign a cross-strait peace agreement on behalf of Taiwan without legislative oversight.
If Ma is confused about his position and doesn’t understand the restraints that apply to cross-strait diplomatic protocol and the handling of Taiwan’s domestic politics, then neither a Ma-Hu meeting nor a peace agreement will win the public’s support.
Nor would anyone expect a meeting to bring lasting peace to the Taiwan Strait or each of the two sides domestically.
Taipei and Beijing have formed special “state-to-state” relations, with each side having its own Constitution. A peace agreement would therefore not be a truce agreement between a state and a belligerent neighbor, as was the Summary of Conversations between the Representatives of the Government and the CCP (政府與中共代表會談紀要), also known as the Double Tenth Agreement (雙十協定).
It would certainly not be an agreement between a central government and a local government either, such as the Agreement on Measures for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet (中央人民政府和西藏地方政府關於和平解放西藏辦法的協議), also known as the 17-Article Agreement on the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet (十七條協議).
A cross-strait peace agreement can only be a special “state-to-state” peace agreement. At least it should be more like the Treaty on the Basis of Relations between the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic, so as to lay a foundation in international law for the normalization of cross-strait relations. The PRC’s respect for the ROC and Ma’s self-respect are the premises for peaceful cross-strait development.
Tseng Chien-yuan is an associate professor in the Department of Public Administration at Chung Hua University.
TRANSLATED BY EDDY CHANG
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