Nothing seems to upset North Korea more than being ignored. Hence Pyongyang’s second nuclear test, punctuated by the separate firing of several short-range missiles.
Although the tests garnered global attention, they have little practical importance. North Korea has long been known to be a nuclear state and the regime’s missile capabilities are also well-known.
Moreover, the tests may be tied to internal political considerations. “Dear Leader” Kim Jong-il suffered a stroke last August. Kim may be attempting to make up for lost time in grooming a successor, flaunting more hardline international commitments to solidify military support for his plans.
In any case, Washington has few options. Even a short war against North Korea would be a humanitarian catastrophe.
The top objective should be to avoid, not trigger, a conflict. Today’s North Korean regime seems bound to disappear eventually.
Which leaves diplomacy. Maybe North Korea is not interested in a negotiated settlement, yet brinkmanship always has been Pyongyang’s favorite modus operandi.
Kim likely hopes the tests will move his nation to the top of US President Barack Obama’s “to do” list, as well as raise the price Kim can charge for his cooperation. A deal may be more unlikely than ever, but it is still possible.
Unfortunately, Obama got off track by overstating the danger when he declared that “North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic-missile programs pose a great threat to the peace and security of the world.”
NO DIFFERENT
In fact, the North’s missiles are no different from those possessed by a number of countries, and Pyongyang does not appear to have mastered the nuclear weaponization process, let alone the miniaturization procedure necessary to marry warhead and missile.
Instead, Washington and its allies should try to reprogram the North’s negotiating formula. North Korea wants to be the center of international attention, so Kim should not be rewarded with a plethora of statements beseeching the regime to cooperate.
The emergency UN Security Council meeting was a mistake for this reason. There was no emergency: The North Korean tests changed nothing and threatened no one.
Moreover, in April it took the Security Council a week to come up with a non-binding statement urging members to enforce previously approved sanctions in response to the North’s long-range missile test. That likely caused more contempt than fear in Pyongyang.
Nor is it obvious that tighter sanctions, assuming that China approved, would do much good. The Kim regime has already allowed at least a half million, and perhaps more, of its citizens to die of starvation.
Which leaves the administration with diplomacy. Through bilateral discussions and multilateral negotiations such as the Six-Party Talks (assuming they can be revived), the Obama administration should explain that the US is interested in forging a more positive relationship with the North.
But no improvement will be possible so long as North Korea flouts international concerns. Washington should encourage South Korea and Japan to take a similar stance.
Further provocations by the North should elicit bored contempt rather than excited concern. There should be no generous new deals proposed while Pyongyang is violating past commitments.
Equally important, the US should step back and suggest that China, Seoul and Tokyo take the lead in dealing with the North. North Korea is years away from possessing missiles capable of accurately targeting the US.
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