Fourth, the financial system — despite the policy backstop — is severely damaged. Most of the shadow banking system has disappeared and traditional commercial banks are saddled with trillions of dollars in expected losses on loans and securities while still being seriously undercapitalized. So the credit crunch will not ease quickly.
Fifth, weak profitability, owing to high debts and default risk, low economic — and thus revenue — growth, and persistent deflationary pressure on companies’ margins, will continue to constrain firms’ willingness to produce, hire workers and invest.
Sixth, rising government debt ratios will eventually lead to increases in real interest rates that may crowd out private spending and even lead to sovereign refinancing risk.
Seventh, monetization of fiscal deficits is not inflationary in the short run, whereas slack product and labor markets imply massive deflationary forces. But if central banks don’t find a clear exit strategy from policies that double or triple the monetary base, eventually either goods-price inflation or another dangerous asset and credit bubble (or both) will ensue. Some recent rises in the prices of equities, commodities and other risky assets is clearly liquidity-driven.
Eighth, some emerging-market economies with weaker economic fundamentals may not be able to avoid a severe financial crisis, despite massive IMF support.
Finally, the reduction of global imbalances implies that the current-account deficits of profligate economies (the US and other Anglo-Saxon countries) will narrow the current-account surpluses of over-saving countries (China and other emerging markets, Germany and Japan). But if domestic demand does not grow fast enough in surplus countries, the resulting lack of global demand relative to supply — or, equivalently, the excess of global savings relative to investment spending — will lead to a weaker recovery in global growth, with most economies growing far more slowly than their potential.
So, green shoots of stabilization may be replaced by yellow weeds of stagnation if several medium-term factors constrain the global economy’s ability to return to sustained growth. Unless these structural weaknesses are resolved, the global economy may grow in from next year to 2011, but at an anemic rate.
Nouriel Roubini is a professor of economics at the Stern School of Business, New York University, and chairman of RGE Monitor (www.rgemonitor.com)
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