On the last day of last year, Chinese President Hu Jintao (胡錦濤) made six proposals on cross-strait relations. Hu kept firmly to Beijing’s “one China” stance as he outlined China’s policies toward Taiwan for the next few years. Using economic benefits, international participation, peace and stability as lures, Hu echoed President Ma Ying-jeou’s (馬英九) policies, using cross-strait talks as a lever to make the “one China” principle a reality and work toward Beijing’s ultimate goal — peaceful unification.
Hu’s statements reflected a shift in China’s policy, incorporating hardline and softline approaches in equal measure, to a predominantly softline framework promoting unification on the basis of the “one China” principle.
In the first of his six points, Hu said that China and Taiwan should scrupulously abide by the “one China” principle. Although he mentioned the so-called “1992 consensus” briefly in his explanation, the phrase that occurred throughout the text was “the one China principle.” Hu said the two sides could only talk on a foundation of political trust if they reached a common understanding on the principle of “one China.”
However, in his response to Hu’s speech, Presidential Office spokesman Wang Yu-chi (王郁琦) said talks between the two sides were based on the “1992 consensus,” “one China with each side having its own interpretation” and “mutual non-denial.”
It is evident that there are still clear differences in policy between the two sides.
Hu echoed the political orientation of the Taiwanese government in seeking to put into effect the “one China” principle. After former president Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) of the Democratic Progressive Party was elected in 2000, China responded with a rigid strategy.
In various documents — the Chinese Communist Party’s 16th Congress report in 2002, the May 17 Statement in 2004, the “Anti-Secession” Law in 2005 and the Communist Party’s 17th Congress report in 2007 — Beijing emphasized ending hostility between the two sides through consultation, allowing Taiwan space for participation in international activities, establishing mechanisms of mutual trust in military matters, developing economic cooperation, signing a peace accord and promoting peaceful development.
In his six points, Hu also responded to Ma’s political goals by including the idea of a general agreement on cross-strait economic cooperation and finding ways for Taiwan to participate in Asia-Pacific regional cooperative structures. However, China made the “one China” principle a precondition for all these points. If Taiwan did not accept this precondition, China would not be willing to talk. Instead, it would use a combination of hardline and softline measures to force Taiwan into compliance.
Recently, there have been two rounds of talks between the semi-official negotiating bodies of both sides — the Straits Exchange Foundation and the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS) — and a third round is planned. At the same time, negotiations are under way for Taiwan’s possible participation in the World Health Assembly. Nevertheless, Ma’s government needs to be cautious in dealing with Hu’s six points.
If Taiwan joins international organizations with China’s approval under the “one China” principle, it may find itself reduced to the status of a subsidiary member attached to China, or it may have to participate under the name “Chinese Taipei,” while agreeing not to join as a member in its own right. Such arrangements would damage Taiwan’s sovereignty and dignity.
The fragile common understanding that forms the basis for interaction between China and Taiwan at present is “the 1992 consensus as interpreted by each side,” not just the “1992 consensus” or even the “one China” principle. Although Ma’s government claims that the “1992 consensus” means “one China, with each side having its own interpretation,” China only agrees that both sides of the Taiwan Strait recognize there is “one China,” and that both sides accept that they have different views of its definition.
China has never agreed that the two sides can express different definitions of what constitutes “one China,” nor has it agreed to the idea of “mutual non-denial.” For example, China criticized Taiwan’s efforts to join UN agencies as efforts to create “one China, one Taiwan.” Even the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) chairman referred to Ma as “Mr Ma” on a visit in China and Chinese foreign affairs officials corrected foreign reporters when they referred to Ma by his official title.
Issues such as Taiwan’s participation in international organizations, a military confidence-building mechanism and a peace accord all touch on Taiwan’s sovereign status and the status of the two sides. Given that differences of opinion on these matters within Taiwan outweigh the lack of consensus between the governments in Taipei and Beijing, Ma’s government has responded that the two sides should first talk about economic and cultural issues.
This stands in contrast with the statement of ARATS Vice Chairman Wang Zaixi (王在希) in October that the next thing for the two sides to do was to negotiate a peace accord. Yu Keli (余克禮), director of China’s Institute of Taiwan Studies (台研所), also said the goal of Hu’s six points was for the two sides to end hostilities and sign a peace accord, as well as recommend negotiations on political and military issues.
In light of the above, the Ma administration needs to respond with caution.
Tung Chen-yuan is an associate professor in the Graduate Institute of Development Studies at National Chengchi University.
TRANSLATED BY JULIAN CLEGG
Saudi Arabian largesse is flooding Egypt’s cultural scene, but the reception is mixed. Some welcome new “cooperation” between two regional powerhouses, while others fear a hostile takeover by Riyadh. In Cairo, historically the cultural capital of the Arab world, Egyptian Minister of Culture Nevine al-Kilany recently hosted Saudi Arabian General Entertainment Authority chairman Turki al-Sheikh. The deep-pocketed al-Sheikh has emerged as a Medici-like patron for Egypt’s cultural elite, courted by Cairo’s top talent to produce a slew of forthcoming films. A new three-way agreement between al-Sheikh, Kilany and United Media Services — a multi-media conglomerate linked to state intelligence that owns much of
The US and other countries should take concrete steps to confront the threats from Beijing to avoid war, US Representative Mario Diaz-Balart said in an interview with Voice of America on March 13. The US should use “every diplomatic economic tool at our disposal to treat China as what it is... to avoid war,” Diaz-Balart said. Giving an example of what the US could do, he said that it has to be more aggressive in its military sales to Taiwan. Actions by cross-party US lawmakers in the past few years such as meeting with Taiwanese officials in Washington and Taipei, and
The Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan has no official diplomatic allies in the EU. With the exception of the Vatican, it has no official allies in Europe at all. This does not prevent the ROC — Taiwan — from having close relations with EU member states and other European countries. The exact nature of the relationship does bear revisiting, if only to clarify what is a very complicated and sensitive idea, the details of which leave considerable room for misunderstanding, misrepresentation and disagreement. Only this week, President Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) received members of the European Parliament’s Delegation for Relations
Denmark’s “one China” policy more and more resembles Beijing’s “one China” principle. At least, this is how things appear. In recent interactions with the Danish state, such as applying for residency permits, a Taiwanese’s nationality would be listed as “China.” That designation occurs for a Taiwanese student coming to Denmark or a Danish citizen arriving in Denmark with, for example, their Taiwanese partner. Details of this were published on Sunday in an article in the Danish daily Berlingske written by Alexander Sjoberg and Tobias Reinwald. The pretext for this new practice is that Denmark does not recognize Taiwan as a state under