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What happens after economics?

Following the two historic agreements signed in Beijing by the Straits Exchange Foundation and the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS), the first batch of Chinese tourists traveling on direct cross-strait charter flight arrived in Taiwan.

It is generally accepted that China’s “fifth generation” of leaders, headed by Chinese President Hu Jintao (胡錦濤), have seized an “historic opportunity” and made a pragmatic choice. The most concrete example of this is that the “one China” framework is no longer imposed on the dispute over Taiwan’s sovereignty. Instead, the concept of a “Chinese nation” has been integrated with the so-called “1992 consensus,” resulting in a “1992 consensus based on the Chinese principle” and bringing an end to the long-standing controversy over sovereignty by providing a reasonable solution.

This new pragmatism shows that Beijing has adjusted its priorities. Both Jia Qinglin (賈慶林), deputy head of China’s Central Leading Group for Taiwan Affairs, and the group’s general-secretary, Dai Bingguo (戴秉國), have emphasized that economics must be placed ahead of politics. However, given the constraints of cross-strait historical and structural factors, relations cannot easily advance for now. How long will the temporary cross-strait consensus on Taiwan’s sovereignty actually last and what challenges may ensue?

First, the policy of placing the economy over politics clearly shows that this temporary consensus appears to be applicable only as long as the economy is the priority. The Chinese government has always insisted that negotiations be based on a major shared ground. So long as the economy is prioritized, the sovereignty discourse will be on the “1992 consensus,” putting opposition to Taiwanese independence in the back seat.

This less aggressive sovereignty discourse, along with Hu’s report to the Chinese Communist Party’s 17th National Congress and remarks by former ARATS chairman Chen Yunlin (陳雲林), is based on the concept of “a community with a shared destiny” and of “a common homeland for people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait,” thus constructing a sovereignty discourse based on an economic perspective.

It is worth pondering, however, when Beijing will bring the political aspect into play. Will it be a unilateral move by Beijing or a decision by both sides? There are some clues in Hu’s report to the 17th National Congress, which called for “a formal end to the state of hostility between the two sides and the signing of a peace agreement” on the basis of the “one China” principle.

If “a formal end to the state of hostility” across the Strait is a political issue for the Chinese government, then it was wishful thinking to expect any mutual understanding on the deployment of Chinese missiles during Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) Chairman Wu Poh-hsiung’s (吳伯雄) visit to Beijing in May. Nor was it strange to learn that the People’s Liberation Army upgraded its missile deployment instead of removing any.

The other constituent of the economic-focus approach — opposition to Taiwanese independence — does not need to be brought into play in the current stage of cross-strait exchanges. The question is, however, how opposition to independence and pro-unification will be coordinated when what China calls “the advanced stage” is approaching. The issue of sovereignty can be vague for now, but what will happen once the advanced stage comes?

Although the “one China” principle can be avoided, it cannot be put off forever. Whether the fifth generation or even the sixth generation of Chinese leaders will continue to be vague on the sovereignty issue during the preliminary stage of cross-strait exchanges and discuss “a formal end to the state of hostility” across the Taiwan Strait based on the “1992 consensus” will inevitably become the best benchmark for judging the development of relations.

In a period when the economy comes before politics, political principles and goals can remain vague. Yet this does not mean that Beijing has discarded these principles; it has just placed less importance on them. The two key concepts in Hu’s policy toward Taiwan — the “four nevers” and the “three whatevers” — both include the goal of “peaceful unification.” In addition to Chen’s remarks on May 22, both Jia and Wang Yi (王毅), director of China’s Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO), reiterated this important goal during talks on June 13. But how will the government deal with this issue when politics replaces the economy as the focus?

Finally, should a domestic truce be considered a political issue or an economic issue? Probably both.

It is generally regarded that Beijing chose Wang to replace Chen at the TAO in response to the new Taiwanese government’s repeated mention of Taiwan’s international space. Hu has mentioned more than once that both sides should “discuss issues of concern to Taiwanese people on the country’s international participation, including giving priority to discussion of participation in the WTO.”

With the recent personnel changes in the Central Leading Group for Taiwan Affairs — including Wang and Dai — it can be expected that Wang’s responsibilities are two-fold: increasing Taiwan’s international exposure, particularly on the WHO issue, and holding onto the bottom line of the “one China” principle. This is something we should watch closely.



Chao Chien-min is a professor at the Graduate Institute of Development Studies at National Chengchi University.

TRANSLATED BY TED YANG
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