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PRC's Hu gains power in substance

On Oct. 21, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) concluded its 17th Party Congress and announced the new nine-member Politburo Standing Committee (PSC), the apex of power in China. To many China watchers, the line-up meant a setback for Chinese President Hu Jintao (胡錦濤), as Liaoning Province Party Secretary Li Keqiang (李克強), his favorite, was outranked by Shanghai Party Secretary Xi Jinping (習近平). However, seven observations to the contrary warrant our attention.

First, Hu has largely completed his personnel reshuffle both in the provinces and at the central government. Back in December 2004, he began appointing provincial chiefs. As of this year, one-third of them, around 60 in total, are from the Communist Youth League -- Hu's primary power base. Hu has consolidated his hold on the heads of provinces and ministries, the latter through corresponding personnel adjustments.

Second, Hu has gained a solid grip over the military. He assumed the chairmanship of the Party Central Military Commission (CMC) in September 2004, but waited two years to make his move.

Last year, he promoted 10 full generals, arrested deputy commander of the Chinese Navy Wang Shouye (王守業) for corruption, launched investigations into 1,000 high-ranking People's Liberation Army (PLA) officers for possible wrongdoing and promoted 28 People's Armed Police officers to the rank of major general, the largest number ever.

In September, he appointed new commanders for all seven military regions. Early last month, he tackled the key CMC personnel arrangement -- just in time for the 17th CCP National Congress. The whole process started slowly but picked up momentum.

Most of his promotions were two ranks above the original positions, proof of Hu's expanding authority over the PLA.

Third, Hu's political philosophy entered the party Constitution ahead of time. Jiang Zemin's (江澤民) theory of the "three represents" was not included until the 16th CCP National Congress in 2002, when he was leaving the post as the head of the Party. Hu's "Scientific Development Concept" was added five years before his term ends.

Fourth, Hu exhibited unexpected confidence over his Taiwan policy. In his keynote speech at the congress, his coverage of Taiwan was less wordy than Jiang's at the previous congress. Neither Taiwan's ongoing campaign to hold a referendum on its bid to join the UN, nor Beijing's conventional mantra -- "we oppose Taiwanese independence, two Chinas, or one China, one Taiwan" appeared in this report.

Instead, Hu proposed to negotiate a "peace agreement" with Taiwan. Although the "one China" framework behind the suggestion is unacceptable to Taiwan, the clouds of China's military actions across the Strait as had enthusiastically been speculated in media suddenly dissipated.

Fifth, Hu was blessed by CCP elders. Fifty retired party heavyweights -- more than ever before -- attended the latest congress. Most, like Zhu Rongji (朱鎔基) and Li Ruihuan (李瑞環), resent Jiang for his attempts to surpass Deng Xiaoping (鄧小平) in status. Although each of them only had one vote at the congress, their younger followers still in power were numerous. This invisible power was behind Hu. Moreover, the congress opened with an unprecedented silent prayer for the unselfish founders of the CCP, such as the then premier Zhou Enlai (周恩來). That clear contrast with Jiang's reluctance to relinquish power further diminished Jiang's already tarnished aura.

Sixth, Hu's innovative approach demonstrated his mettle and resolve. His keynote address at the congress was shorter than that at the previous congress, yet contained two more chapters. Redundant phrases were deleted and subheadings added to facilitate comprehension. The unconventional appearance of star athlete Liu Xiang (劉翔) enlivened the normally stifling and overly formal press conferences, which reinforced Hu's trademark folksy style.

Discussion panels were open to the media for the first time. The application process for journalists to interview officials was simplified. Reporters were provided with free wireless internet access and refreshments. These measures reflected that Hu could now overrule the conservative resistance within the party hierarchy.

Seventh, Hu has been almost consistently underestimated. Before the CCP's 16th congress in 2002, many doubted if he could take over from Jiang as the party's general secretary, but he did. Until Sept. 19, 2004, both domestic and overseas experts believed that he could not take over the CMC chairmanship from Jiang -- again, he did. Many had considered Hu powerless against unruly Shanghai party secretary Chen Liangyu (陳良宇), who publicly criticized Premier Wen Jiabao (溫家寶), indirectly challenging Hu before the end of September last year, when Hu suddenly arrested Chen on corruption charges. Hu's abilities have always been underestimated.

History may shed some light into what developments we can expect to see after last month's congress.

When Jiang was appointed CCP general secretary in late June 1989, he was not Deng's preferred successor, but he came strongly recommended by Deng's rival, Chen Yun (陳雲). Jiang's rise to power did not weaken Deng's predominant influence.

It should also be kept in mind that Xi owes Jiang little, because Jiang, during his reign, did not promote him.

Although He Guoqiang (賀國強) was recommended by Zeng Qinghong (曾慶紅), Zeng has worked closely with Hu since 2002. Jia Qinglin (賈慶林), burdened by the Yuan Hua smuggling scandal (遠華案), has no choice but to cooperate with Hu for self-protection. Therefore, these three people -- despite their purported connections with Jiang -- are partly loyal to Hu.

In addition to the four solid votes Hu received out of nine PSC members, Hu has the partial support of three others. At the 16th party congress, Hu had only three solid votes.

Hu seems to be following a strategy of "besieging the city from the countryside." He has worked from the outside in and from the bottom up. He only gives the appearance of compromising on top leadership. In reality, he has consolidated his influence.

We may expect Beijing to continue emphasizing cooperation with the US and to apply more carrot than stick on Taiwan.

Chong-Pin Lin is a professor in the Graduate Institute of International Affairs and Strategic Studies at Tamkang University.

Translated by Ted Yang
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