Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao (溫家寶) will pay a visit to Japan this week. Five years after the last Sino-Japanese summit, Wen's visit brings with it high hopes for a thaw in bilateral relations.
Wen will be meeting with Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and other Japanese leaders, give a speech at the joint session of the Japanese Diet and appear on TV with ordinary Japanese.
Wen's visit comes at a critical juncture in east Asian international relations -- never before have China and Japan both achieved prominence at the same time.
Yet this is what is happening now. China, with its phenomenal economic growth over the past two decades and growing political influence, confronts Japan's growing aspiration to reform its Constitution and gain all the trappings of power, prestige and respect that come with being seen as a "normal" nation.
Indeed, for the first time in history, the two countries face each other as equals, instead of the "one strong, one weak" situation found in the 100 years since the Meiji Restoration.
This parity requires Beijing and Tokyo to adapt to and accept the new realities and work toward cooperation to manage potential disputes.
China and Japan have developed extensive ties in the areas of trade, investment and cultural exchange over the three decades since diplomatic relations have been normalized.
China has become Japan's top trading partner, with bilateral trade last year amounting to US$207 billion.
Japanese investments in China are growing and a dynamic Chinese economy has also contributed to Japan's recent economic recovery.
However, a new generation of leaders and politicians in both countries and rising nationalism have prevented a closer relationship from forming.
Add a perceived rivalry for regional primacy and the dynamics of a shifting balance of power to these concerns and it is no wonder that Sino-Japanese relations remain unstable and at times tense.
Relations were seriously strained during the administration of former Japanese prime minister Junichiro Koizumi.
Many of the issues that had for years been concealed or put on the backburner -- issues concerning the interpretation of historic events, territorial disputes and Taiwan -- have resurfaced and seriously strained the bilateral relationship.
In particular, Koizumi's almost religious commitment to going to the Yasukuni shrine stoked anger and fanned anti-Japanese sentiment in China, causing bilateral relations to reach their lowest ebb since 1972.
While serious structural problems remain, a thaw in bilateral relations began with Abe's ice-breaking trip to Beijing in October and looks likely to continue with the resumption of summit meetings and official exchanges, including between the militaries.
This thaw offers both Beijing and Tokyo an opportunity to look for long-term solutions to their disputes.
The next two years could be critical for the Sino-Japanese relationship.
Some Chinese analysts suggest that Japan's path to becoming a normal nation could be bolstered if it continues to pursue economic development, renounce war, ban arms exports, offer economic assistance to neighboring countries and engage in peaceful partnerships with its neighbors.
Indeed, the analysts acknowledge that pacifism is widely accepted by Japanese. They find that opposition to nuclear weapons and support for nuclear disarmament and environmental protection are now deeply rooted in Japan's society.
Abe's ice-breaking trip to China, which came just days after he assumed office, provided a unique opportunity for China and Japan to reverse a five-year decline in relations.
Nevertheless, it would be naive to expect that the resumption of summit meetings, military exchanges and high-level visits will do more than paper over the historical and territorial disputes between the two countries.
One of the most sensitive issues in the relationship -- as Beijing sees it -- is related to the growing ties between Taipei and Tokyo.
While Japan has officially backed a "one China" policy since 1972, its position on Taiwan's legal status has always been ambivalent.
During the so-called "golden age" of bilateral relations (1972 to 1989), Beijing and Tokyo were able to dance around the sensitive issue of Taiwan's status.
For the most part, the Japanese government did so by keeping ties between Tokyo and Taipei unofficial and low profile.
However, three trends have emerged to challenge the stability of the relationship.
First, Taiwan has evolved from a KMT-controlled authoritarian state to an emerging democracy. As a result, there is growing affinity between Taiwan and Japan.
Second, China's 1995 and 1996 missile exercises in the Taiwan Strait raised the specter that Beijing could resort to the use of force to resolve the Taiwan issue.
Because of Taiwan's strategic location along sea routes used by Japan, Tokyo has become more attentive to the cross-strait developments.
Third, economic transformation in eastern Asia and growing economic interdependence has promoted greater economic ties as Japanese companies seek to capitalize on Taiwanese business links to China.
As a result, official interactions between Taipei and Tokyo are growing, although these remain largely between legislators rather than high-level officials in the executive branches.
Beijing has plenty of reasons to be worried about the growing Tokyo-Taipei ties.
Indeed, Chinese analysts suggest that Taiwan is more critical to Japan than it is to the US. For the latter, it is merely a part of Washington's overall strategic design and a useful one for slowing down China's rise.
But for Japan, the future of Taiwan could affect Tokyo's claims to the Diaoyutai islets and other areas of the East China Sea.
Therefore, there are more incentives for Tokyo to obstruct China's attempts to bring Taiwan into its sphere of influence.
But what is encouraging is that at least Beijing and Tokyo can explore ways to best manage these disputes, even if they are unable to resolve them.
This is a qualitative as well as procedural difference from the past five years, when the very vehicles for communication -- summit meetings and regular official exchanges -- were almost completely stopped.
Leaders of both countries should seize the moment and make important progress toward rebuilding trust and friendship to mark upcoming anniversaries, including the 35th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations and the 30th anniversary of the 1978 China-Japan Treaty of Peace and Friendship.
Asia's peace, stability and prosperity hinge on whether the two powers can manage to live together and lead the region into the 21st century.
Wen's visit should keep the momentum going.
Jing-dong Yuan is director of the education program at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies and an associate professor of international policy studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies in California.
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