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PRC begins engaging DPP officials

In January 2001, Beijing made an unprecedented gesture of extending a general welcome to "the members of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP)" except for an "extremely small number of stubborn Taiwanese independence advocates." Last March, it went a step further by announcing that it was willing to meet even with "pan-green die-hards."

In reality, Beijing had met only with pan-green members outside of the DPP administration, such as legislators, academics and businesspeople. China has cautiously avoided dealing with officials from President Chen Shui-bian's (陳水扁) administration. However, such behavior has begun to show subtle changes.

On March 7, the Straits Exchange Foundation, a quasi-official organization set up to handle technical or business mat-ters with China, announced that its tourism head, Sun Chi-ming (孫起明), had been invited to attend a conference in China. The invitation was a breakthrough in the cross-strait impasse since Beijing broke off talks with Taiwanese officials in 1999. This change was the result of a three-stage evolution of Beijing's attitude toward Taiwan in the past year and carries three implications.

The first stage, which ended last fall, was the manifestation of China's soft approach toward Taiwan after Beijing's passage of the "Anti-Secession" Law in March 2005. A US academic who participated in a conference at a Beijing university last June was surprised to find that mentioning the "Republic of China" and displaying the national flag in academic events was acceptable. A group of Taiwanese academics who visited Shanghai last July also heard some Chinese researchers from a semi-official institute saying Taiwan should be given more international space. Beginning last fall, however, such relaxations in China toward Taiwan disappeared.

The second stage, which began last fall and ended in late January, saw the slowdown of Beijing's "goodwill measures" toward Taiwanese, reflecting an internal struggle among its ranks. Sources in China said that some Chinese policymakers began questioning the efficacy of the soft offensive. They question whether these measures have won support for China or unwittingly encouraged Taiwan's independence advocates. At the other end of the political spectrum are those who favor a continuation of the soft approach.

Based on my observations, the number of "goodwill measures" China offered Taiwan totaled four in June, four in July, none in August and September, and one each in October, November and December. The last one was to announce a policy allowing Taiwanese architects to practice in China if they pass the Chinese licensing exam.

Aside from the fact that no other goodwill measure has been offered since then, Beijing has also begun to adopt a tougher tone toward Taiwan. Beijing's previous three-part rhetoric on national policy -- social harmony, cross-strait conciliation and world peace -- was reduced to two, ie, "a harmonious society" and a "harmonious world." This appeared in Beijing's white paper on defense issued on Dec. 19, and was the catch-phrase mouthed by a Chinese government think tank visiting Taiwan at the time.

In January, Chen Yunlin (陳雲林), director of the Chinese State Council's Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO), was quoted as saying that maintaining "cross-strait peace is facing grave challenges." In addition, Beijing's New China news agency published TAO's severe criticism of President Chen's New Year address.

Two events that unfolded in Taiwan contributed to the change in Beijing's stance. First, the once powerful campaign of red-clad demonstrators to unseat President Chen ran out of steam much more quickly than expected last October. And second, the DPP's unexpectedly strong showing in the municipal elections in Taipei and Kaohsiung last December shocked many observers.

On Jan. 23 to 24, TAO held a semi-annual work conference to settle the policy debate. New guidelines appear aimed at wooing Taiwanese and beginning engaging the Taipei government.

According to sources in China, the emerging perception among "Taiwan policy" coordinators is: the worst part of the crisis involving President Chen's alleged misuse of the "state affairs fund" is over, the DPP might still win the presidential election next year, the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) is disunited, a win by former KMT chairman Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) would not necessarily improve cross-strait relations, China's effort to cultivate ties with the KMT has largely been completed and it is necessary to broaden the scope of its contacts with the DPP, especially younger members.

The third stage, which began in late January, was a response to the views mentioned above. During the fourth Taipei-Beijing negotiations on cross-strait charter flights and opening Taiwan to Chinese tourism, the Taiwanese delegation was surprised to find that the Chinese team had a draft agreement ready for signing. Such pro-active approach on the Chinese side was extremely rare.

On Jan. 26, Beijing deported Lee Han-yang (李漢揚), who was suspected of stealing NT$56 million (US$1.7 million) in an armored van heist that month. The following day, another 25 Taiwanese criminal suspects were deported, setting a new record for the number of repatriations from China to Taiwan.

On Jan. 17, TAO Deputy Director Sun Yafu (孫亞夫) said during a US visit that resolving the Taiwan issue should ultimately depend on economic development, offering a new insight into Chinese thinking that differs vastly from its usual threat of force.

China's so-far subtle adjustment of its Taiwan policy is significant in three aspects. First, Beijing is beginning to shed its self-imposed taboo of boycotting the DPP administration to prepare for the likelihood of another four -- if not more -- years of DPP rule after President Chen steps down. It has come to realize that avoiding contacts with the DPP administration hinders its efforts to win over Taiwanese and does not help promote its unification cause. With the limited time left in his term as president, Chen Shui-bian could continue to be the target of Beijing's criticism and at the same time be separated from the rest of the DPP officials whom Beijing wishes to engage.

Second, China seems satisfied with its tactic of constraining Taipei through Washington. Last September, Chen Yunlin told his US audience that President Chen would make an announcement that Taiwan would revise its Constitution. When the warning later materialized, Beijing's work on Taiwan in Washington became more effective. Beijing used to react strongly to Taiwan's pro-independence "provocations," but it has learned to remain calm, leaving Washington with the task of admonishing Taipei.

Third, this year may pass without cross-strait tensions. China has learned to refrain from attacking Taiwan's presidential candidates lest they alienate Taiwanese voters. Moreover, it is fully occupied with preparing for the 17th Party Congress this coming fall, which is more vital to the Chinese leaders than Taiwan.

Chong-Pin Lin, a former deputy defense minister, is president of the Foundation on International and Cross-Strait Studies.

Translated by Perry Svensson, Lin Ya-ti and Marc Langer
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