Anti-Chen protests are a lose-lose deal for Ma

`The anti-Chen campaign won't do Ma any good, regardless of its success or failure.'

Recent reports indicate that Premier Su Tseng-chang (蘇貞昌) has said he is willing to meet with leaders from across the political spectrum to discuss ways to ease current political tensions.

Ministers without portfolio Lin Si-yao (林錫耀) and Lin Wan-i (林萬億) have met with Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) leaders for preliminary talks.

KMT Chairman Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) has also said he is preparing to meet Su, so it seems that the green and blue leaders are gearing up for a new round of discussions.

Su is actually giving a generous political favor to Ma.

Ma has not benefited from the anti-President Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) campaign to this point. The only force that could truly topple Chen is a recall by the legislature.

It doesn't matter how many people the street protest attracts, nor what kind of creative methods they use, because the campaign lacks the legal authority to bring Chen down.

Nor does the campaign help Ma's plans for the 2008 presidential election -- because Chen can't run for a third term.

If Chen isn't recalled, it will be a big boost to the pan-green camp's power and influence, while the anti-Chen campaign will prove to have been a fool's errand.

But if it turns out badly for Chen, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) will still be seen to have acted courageously, and will find itself in a stronger position in 2008.

The anti-Chen campaign won't do Ma any good, regardless of its success or failure.

On the other hand, the turmoil, economic loss, traffic obstruction, green-camp galvanization and ethnic tensions that have been whipped up by the anti-Chen movement could be harmful for Ma.

The sit-in can't attract tens of thousands of protesters every day because people have to go to work and are reluctant to come out in poor weather. Its dwindling numbers have hindered the momentum of the anti-Chen movement, so, as far as Ma is concerned, resolving the conflict is the top priority.

If the DPP wants to reap any political benefit from this situation, the smartest approach would be to sit quietly and watch what happens. While the DPP waits patiently for the results of the investigation into Chen's alleged misbehavior, the pressure from the disorder and the responsibility for outbreaks of violence will fall on Ma's shoulders.

Ma has no choice but to allow the protests to continue, because the public's right to assemble and oppose political leaders is part of the foundation of a democratic society.

Su's actions help Ma get off the hook over a movement that he did not initiate. It helps Ma regain control. It also relieves him of the burden that the protests have placed on him, and will help his chances in the 2008 presidential campaign.

A third advantage is that in an atmosphere in which Ma is talking with the government, any DPP demands for a referendum on reclaiming the KMT's stolen assets and any attacks on Ma for allegedly abusing his mayoral allowance will likely fade, if not disappear altogether.

Bill Chang is a former deputy director of the Chinese Affairs Department of the Democratic Progressive Party.

Translated by Marc Langer