The current discussion surrounding an international force for southern Lebanon has focused almost exclusively on which countries and organizations -- NATO, the EU, the UN -- will provide the troops. This is an important issue, to be sure, but the real question concerns the changes that Israel must make in exchange for this force being put in place and assuming the risk of such a mission.
No international force will simply protect Israel from Hezbollah rockets while Israel continues its current strategy. After all, the recent military escalation in the region is at least partly due to that strategy. If an international force simply allows Ehud Olmert's government to pursue its plans further, the countries that provide troops for the international force will not only be seen as rubber-stamping Israeli policy, but will also be dragged into its failure.
To criticize Israel's strategy as flawed is not to condone the acts of Hamas or Hezbollah or to deny Israel's right to self-defense. It is merely to point out what should be obvious: Israel's efforts to find a unilateral solution to its security problems -- whether occupation, withdrawal, or separation -- have failed.
Unilateral occupation without commitment to a viable Palestinian state has produced only the intifada and suicide bombers. Unilateral withdrawal from Gaza without the prior establishment of a local authority to maintain order has only led to renewed intervention. And the "security fence," which was to allow for unilateral separation, may hold back suicide bombers, but won't protect against modern missiles of the kind currently employed by Hezbollah.
So far, the only lesson Israel seems to have drawn from its failed strategies is that it must extend and intensify the use of unilateral force: re-invade Gaza, devastate Lebanon, and threaten Syria -- and, by implication, Iran, which the Israeli government hints had a hand in orchestrating the recent crisis.
It takes little foresight, however, to predict that more force will not produce more security for Israel. The policy, reminiscent of the terrorist stratagem of bombing civilians in order to force the hands of their leaders, will only strengthen the radicals and boost their popular support. It will not hide the fact that Israel has run out of unilateral options.
Israel has so far been unwilling to accept this fact. Instead, its leaders hope that a robust international force in southern Lebanon will provide protection for northern Israel, leaving them with a free hand to deal unilaterally with Gaza and the West Bank, while committing the international community to Israel's failed unilateralism.
To join such an international force under such conditions would be totally irresponsible. Countries that contribute troops would appear to be siding unequivocally with Israel, thereby losing all of their credibility with Israel's adversaries. They would also risk being drawn into renewed Israeli operations against Hezbollah and its backers. Most important, they would forego what may be the last chance to promote a consensual peace.
The prior condition for setting up and joining an international force for deployment in southern Lebanon must be that Israel renews its commitment to the "road map" and negotiations with the Palestinians for a viable Palestinian state. With this aim in mind, it must enter into talks with democratically elected Palestinian representatives. True, such talks will be difficult, and they may not succeed. But that can no longer be an argument against diplomacy now that Israeli unilateralism has once again proven to be a strategic blind alley.
Only an Israel seriously willing to seek security through agreement, not one that wants to impose her security on her neighborhood by fiat, can be partner to an international effort to bring stability to Lebanon and beyond. Of course, some countries, not least the US, would oppose making such a reversal in Israeli policy a condition of creating an international force, and consensus in NATO, the EU, or the UN may not be found or, if it were to emerge, Israel might simply refuse to abide.
Both prospects would provide reason enough for NATO's members to stay away from the project altogether. Creating an international force for southern Lebanon makes sense only as an investment in regional peace, not as an appendix to Israel's current strategy.
Christoph Bertram is the former Director of the German Institute for International and Security Affairs.
Copyright: Project Syndicate
Recently, China launched another diplomatic offensive against Taiwan, improperly linking its “one China principle” with UN General Assembly Resolution 2758 to constrain Taiwan’s diplomatic space. After Taiwan’s presidential election on Jan. 13, China persuaded Nauru to sever diplomatic ties with Taiwan. Nauru cited Resolution 2758 in its declaration of the diplomatic break. Subsequently, during the WHO Executive Board meeting that month, Beijing rallied countries including Venezuela, Zimbabwe, Belarus, Egypt, Nicaragua, Sri Lanka, Laos, Russia, Syria and Pakistan to reiterate the “one China principle” in their statements, and assert that “Resolution 2758 has settled the status of Taiwan” to hinder Taiwan’s
Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong’s (李顯龍) decision to step down after 19 years and hand power to his deputy, Lawrence Wong (黃循財), on May 15 was expected — though, perhaps, not so soon. Most political analysts had been eyeing an end-of-year handover, to ensure more time for Wong to study and shadow the role, ahead of general elections that must be called by November next year. Wong — who is currently both deputy prime minister and minister of finance — would need a combination of fresh ideas, wisdom and experience as he writes the nation’s next chapter. The world that
Can US dialogue and cooperation with the communist dictatorship in Beijing help avert a Taiwan Strait crisis? Or is US President Joe Biden playing into Chinese President Xi Jinping’s (習近平) hands? With America preoccupied with the wars in Europe and the Middle East, Biden is seeking better relations with Xi’s regime. The goal is to responsibly manage US-China competition and prevent unintended conflict, thereby hoping to create greater space for the two countries to work together in areas where their interests align. The existing wars have already stretched US military resources thin, and the last thing Biden wants is yet another war.
Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, people have been asking if Taiwan is the next Ukraine. At a G7 meeting of national leaders in January, Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida warned that Taiwan “could be the next Ukraine” if Chinese aggression is not checked. NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg has said that if Russia is not defeated, then “today, it’s Ukraine, tomorrow it can be Taiwan.” China does not like this rhetoric. Its diplomats ask people to stop saying “Ukraine today, Taiwan tomorrow.” However, the rhetoric and stated ambition of Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) on Taiwan shows strong parallels with