During the meeting between President Chen Shui-bian (
Ma said the KMT does not accept the consensus if it only means "one China," stressing that the party accepts "one China, with each side having its own interpretation." Hence, Chen hopes that former KMT chairman Lien Chan (
This is a serious question that is crucial to whether the cross-strait deadlock can be resolved and whether the ruling and opposition camps can reach a consensus on Taiwan's China policy. It is not as simple as the director of Lien's office, Ting Yuan-chao (
If the consensus really does refer to "one China, with each side having its own interpretation" -- with Taiwan claiming that "one China" refers to the Republic of China (ROC) -- did the KMT work for a Taiwan Republic rather than the ROC during its rule prior to 2000? Were Taiwan's National Unification Guidelines unclear about the meaning of "one China, with each side having its own interpretation?" Did former president Lee Teng-hui (
Ever since 1992, China has always promoted its own "one China." It has never accepted, and has repeatedly opposed "one China, with each side having its own interpretation." On Sept. 19, 1995, former Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS) chairman Wang Daohan (
On Sept. 23, 1996, in response to then Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) chairman Chang King-yuh's (張京育) proposal of "one China, with each side having its own interpretation," former ARATS vice chairman Tang Shubei (唐樹備) said the proposal was an intentional distortion by Taiwanese authorities, and the spoken agreement reached in 1992 was "one China." He stressed that by adding "with each side having its own interpretation" to "one China," Taiwan also changed the original meaning of the 1992 consensus.
On April 25, 2000, then ARATS vice chairman Zhang Jincheng (
Looking back at the SEF-ARATS talks in Hong Kong in 1992, the two parties did not make a written agreement, instead communicating their individual opinions by fax, with the Chinese government stressing "one China" and the Taiwanese government "one China, with each side having its own interpretation."
The so-called consensus does not become apparent even if we put all the faxes together. If there really was a 1992 consensus, it consisted of nothing more than putting aside the dispute over "one China" to "put aside differences in order to seek common ground," as the Chinese saying goes. The two sides have a widely differing understanding of the consensus, leading to one conflict after another when trying to implement it and will eventually lead to its collapse.
The gap between the stances of the ruling and opposition camps on the cross-strait issue is not as wide as people think. Both camps refuse to accept the "one China" principle and are willing to resolve the deadlock using the compromise of "one China, with each side having its own interpretation."
If the opposition camp can agree that this is the domestic consensus, it should first demand that the Chinese government clarify the meaning of the so-called "1992 consensus" before deciding whether to accept it. It should not accept a fuzzy explanation, echo Beijing's attacks on the Taiwanese government and pin all responsibility for the cross-strait deadlock on the government, as this is not the way to find a way out for Taiwan. It will only divide Taiwan's strength.
Tung Chen-yuan is an assistant professor in the Sun Yat-sen Graduate Institute of Social Sciences and Humanities at National Chengchi University.
Translated by Eddy Chang
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