The April 3 meeting between President Chen Shui-bian (
To come to a conclusion about the overall success of the meeting, we must begin with the motives of the two parties. Ma took the initiative as a move to preclude criticism often launched against blue camp leaders in the past: many pan-green supporters have felt that pan-blue leaders have been willing to travel far and wide to meet with Chinese and US officials, but avoided meeting with the Taiwanese president just around the corner, thus failing to fulfill the responsibilities of an opposition party. Ma's move is aimed at removing such criticism over the next two years and creating an image of the KMT as a rational opposition party. Chen passively accepted Ma's invitation because he could not refuse it in view of public opinion. He probably also felt that any opportunity to improve his dwindling support is worth a go. As a result the two decided to go on with the "show."
The reason I call it a "show" is because the setting of this meeting differed from past meetings. Focus meetings worldwide between leaders both in the past and the present are mostly preceded by meetings between bureaucrats to reach agreements or conclusions. The meeting itself is simply a media event carried out according to a pre-written script. Unlike ordinary leadership meetings, the Chen-Ma meeting was an exception because of its lack of a set agenda and it being conducted based on immediate reactions. I call it a "show" because its actual functions were greater than simply the practical aspect of building a consensus.
An overall review of their performance in the meeting was that neither of them were solemn enough. Chen had the best opening, by acknowledging Ma's achievements in the US and affirming Ma's love of Taiwan and praising him for taking the lead in opposing China's "Anti-Secession" Law last year. Both Chen and Ma began by stressing that domestic infighting should be avoided. They also affirmed the importance of the meeting and expressed hopes that they would be able to find the areas where they agreed. The second half of the meeting dealing with concrete policies, however, deteriorated significantly. The two started questioning each other, and the verbal attacks sounded more like they were engaged in some kind of speaking contest.
For example, at the end of the meeting, Chen politely invited the KMT, the largest party in the legislature, to participate in future conferences on economic development to join in the fight to improve the economy. Ma, however, responded by saying that Chen has said a dozen times that he will pursue economic revitalization but that the public still does not see any of the benefits. This kind of interaction not only negates the friendly exchanges at the beginning of the meeting, but it could also make the event the last Chen-Ma meeting.
Finding it impossible to reach agreement on anything, it even proved difficult to achieve an environment conducive to amicable exchange. The overall impression one got from the meeting was that the two men were saying, "we should reach a consensus here, but we are going to have to do it my way." They were both obsessed with having the last word in the debate, which was both disappointing and unacceptable. Whether they were talking about the military procurement bill, the 1992 consensus, the four noes and one not, public referendums, or even the scrapping of the National Unification Council (NUC) and the unification guidelines, Chen and Ma stuck to their guns, finding precious little common ground between them.
Nevertheless, two promising things came out of these talks, two issues that will be worth keeping an eye on in the future.
The first of these is the fact that, during the discussion on "one China, with each side having their own interpretation," Chen said that if Chinese President Hu Jintao (胡錦濤) publicly agreed to this interpretation and did not insist on "one China" as defined by China itself, then Chen would also be willing to accept this interpretation. Here, Chen was effectively leaving the ball in China's court. If China does indeed respond positively to this, whether or not this leads to cross-strait talks still depends on China's overall Taiwan policy and degree of flexibility.
The second is the question of the scrapping of the NUC and the unification guidelines. Washington's suspicions of Chen gradually dissipated after the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) government remained low-key about the issue. Chen skirted the issue during the meeting by rhetorically asking whether an agreement still exists once it has ceased to be applied, indirectly saying that the NUC and the guidelines no longer existed. Whether his wording here causes more waves in US-Taiwan relations remains to be seen.
In a normal democratic country meetings between the head of government and the leader of the opposition are quite commonplace, but a meeting like this was big news, commanding the attention of people both at home and abroad, because of the polarized nature of Taiwanese society. The fact that they could sit down together and discuss issues in a rational manner was a positive development irrespective of their motivations or the actual outcome. The Taiwanese people should demand more, however, as they should be able to expect a higher calibre of political leadership and discourse from their political leaders. This meeting was mostly focused on the question of independence or unification and cross straits issues, and virtually ignored the problem of how to deal with Taiwan's political and economic difficulties in facing international competition.
In other words, the meeting was mostly about resolving past political issues and shy on debating how Taiwan is to increase its competitiveness in the future, and this is a great pity. With their political experience and vision, Chen and Ma should be able to cast aside their ideological baggage and take their debates on policy to a higher level. Their attempts at outdoing each other did little for their personal images. It might do them some good to reflect on this quote from Matthew 23:12: "And whosoever shall exalt himself shall be abased, and he that shall humble himself shall be exalted."
Emile Sheng is a professor of political science at Soochow University.
Translated by lin ya-ti and Paul Cooper
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