Veteran British left-wing politician Tony Benn was fond of saying that in politics it is policies, not personalities, that matter most. But like many of Benn's beliefs, this maxim owed more to wishful thinking than hard fact.
In the modern age of mass media, in countries ruled by democratically elected governments rather than dictatorships, it is often the leader who presents the most appealing, positive and trustworthy image to voters who wins the day. The nitty-gritty of his or her policies can be a secondary consideration.
Thus it may not matter very much in China whether or not Hu Jintao (胡錦濤) is a charismatic and competent fellow. The Chinese people have never been invited to debate his qualities as a president. But in more open societies, subjective perceptions of an individual politician can prove decisive.
This is both a democratic strength and a weakness.
The sudden and probably permanent incapacitation through a stroke of Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon has again dramatically highlighted the way personality can determine and dominate policies.
LACK OF CLARITY
The reason why Sharon leaves such an enormous vacuum is not his specific ideas -- or the lack of them -- about how best to achieve a lasting peace with the Palestinians and Israel's Arab neighbors but the lack of clarity about the next steps. Indeed, even his closest advisers appear not to have known what he ultimately intended to do in terms of further post-Gaza Israeli withdrawals from occupied Palestinian territory or the final status of Jerusalem. Perhaps Sharon did not, either.
This uncertainty over future policy makes the task facing his would-be successor, Ehud Olmert, both daunting and at the same time easier, because it leaves a wide scope for interpretation. But Sharon's refusal to engage with the Palestinian leadership and the divisions within the Palestinian camp and Israel itself all suggest new policy initiatives will be urgently needed.
In contrast, the most persuasive reason why Sharon appears irreplaceable is that, on a personal level, he was uniquely trusted by many Israelis who had confidence in him to do the right thing for their country. The man nicknamed the "bulldozer" was never a political pin-up. Public faith in him was based on an appreciation of his fierce patriotism, his forceful character, his war-fighting record and the grudging respect he elicited even among Israel's enemies and critics.
Perhaps only such a dominant personality could have changed tack, as he did over the past two years, and survived politically. If it had been left to a Likud-run parliamentary committee to decide whether to evacuate the settlements in Gaza, it is unlikely that last year's withdrawal would ever have taken place.
Some commentators, notably Amos Oz of the Israel's Peace Now movement, profess to see a great mystery in Sharon's apparent conversion from implacable hawk to unilateral peacemaker.
"Two years ago, a sudden change occurred," Oz said. "Sharon's rhetoric changed overnight."
But the answer to this perceived conundrum may be more prosaic. Ever the ruthless pragmatist, Sharon reached a point when he knew, like former Israeli prime minister Yitzhak Rabin before him, that the violence and the killing had to stop. Like exhausted boxers in a clinch, the two sides had somehow to be prised apart. And he also knew that only he, in the wake of the second Palestinian intifada that he did much to provoke, had the political strength to enforce the requisite "painful compromises."
NO SECRET
Sharon made no secret of his reasoning. In an emotional speech before the Knesset on Oct. 27, 2004, for example, he argued that Israel had to begin the voluntary evacuation of some occupied Palestinian land (namely Gaza) not out of altruism but in order to retain areas deemed vital to its security.
"I am firmly convinced and truly believe that this disengagement will strengthen Israel's hold over territory which is essential to our existence," Sharon said. "I have repeatedly said that I support the establishment of a Palestinian state alongside the state of Israel. I have repeatedly said that I am willing to make painful compromises to put an end to this ongoing and malignant conflict ... that I would do my utmost in order to bring peace."
"Many years before, in 1988, I said that I believe that if we do not want to be pushed back to the 1967 lines, the territory should be divided ... We have no desire to permanently rule over millions of Palestinians who double their numbers every generation. Israel, which wishes to be an exemplary democracy, will not be able to bear such a reality over time," he said.
In other words, Sharon -- who believed there was no reliable Palestinian partner to negotiate with -- was consistently performing the role of practical, hard-nosed general.
He would unilaterally shape a line of advance and call on the Israeli nation to unite and follow him, almost wherever he led. He would also begin construction of the "security fence" separating the protagonists. And he would persuade a semi-detached Bush administration to tacitly set aside the "road map" and tag along.
But it was not this policy itself that subsequently allowed him to forge ahead. That remains deeply controversial on the Israeli left and right, and among Palestinians, and its future is now deeply uncertain. What gave this dramatic demarche traction for a while was the sheer force of Sharon's personality. Successor politicians will continue to struggle with key unresolved issues that his personal political dominance obscured.
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