The gap between Europe's security needs and its military capacities is widening, and most European leaders lack the will to do what is necessary to close it. Forces built to defend the European heartland from a Soviet attack are unsuitable for the kinds of operations that define today's post-Cold War environment.
Today, Europe needs improved capacity to combat terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), deal with failed or failing states, contend with regional conflicts and respond to humanitarian crises. Yet defense spending across Europe remains flat or in decline.
The problem is more than budgetary. The fragmented nature of European defense procurement, the Byzantine rules of the European defense trade and industrial capabilities shaped by the Cold War legacy all sap Europe's ability to meet its military needs.
Given these hurdles, the obvious way to improve European defense capabilities is by coordinating the efforts of individual countries, the EU and NATO to create a set of enhanced collective defense capacities. The overlap in membership between NATO and the EU makes such defense cooperation both possible and logical, if not unavoidable.
Difficult choices
Of course, difficult choices lay ahead. Political leaders must create incentives and financial headroom for their forces to undergo the necessary changes.
First and foremost, savings generated from restructuring must be reinvested in transforming military forces. After all, generals will be more inclined to identify efficiencies if they believe that doing so will ultimately enable them to enhance their capabilities.
Political leaders should also seek to stabilize defense budgets by creating separate funds for unforeseen multilateral peacekeeping operations, like the Balkans and Afghanistan, and by putting defense planning on a multi-year rather than an annual cycle.
Such predictable budgets will better enable European leaders to establish defense planning targets that address the priorities of military transformation.
At a minimum, 25 percent of annual budgets should be allocated toward research, development and procurement, with no more than 40 percent spent on personnel.
This won't be easy, because there is a basic conflict between modernizing an army and the political pressures to maintain military wages and jobs.
But these trade-offs must be made if Europe's military is to meet the Continent's security needs. At the most basic level, governments must take a hard look at conscription and territorial defense forces, which eat up far too much of Europe's military budgets.
Because no European state can afford to "go it alone," military reform demands greater integration and information sharing, as control of information will be key in future conflicts.
Pooling of infrastructure [bases and ports] and logistical assets [transport], including training facilities for common equipment, will generate big savings, as individual countries rationalize the long "logistical tails" of manpower and equipment that support armies in the field.
Nations should forge partnerships across national lines with like-minded allies -- a model exemplified by the new joint Spanish-Italian Amphibious Force.
specialization
Nations that cannot afford to field expeditionary forces capable of performing the full spectrum of 21st-century missions should make greater use of specialization to enhance their contribution to Europe's collective defense.
But states that specialize in such capability should do so as a part of a "country cluster" to minimize the risk of a nation facing a military challenge that its forces are unprepared to meet.
The EU can help by strengthening its defense planning. It should articulate more clearly Europe's future military roles and missions, determine the military capabilities required, identify shortfalls and develop projects and initiatives to address the most critical gaps.
The EU should also take steps to improve its ability to conduct operations. New EU "battlegroups" should be strengthened through regular training and certification, preferably using NATO standards, and the EU Military Committee should hold regular battlegroup conferences to solicit country contributions to future formations.
For the EU to do its part, larger budgets appear unavoidable. Battlegroups should be expanded to include naval and air components for missions such as maritime interdiction and close support for ground troops.
Common funding for operations should be increased, and member states should continue to be encouraged to make civilian and police forces as readily deployable in peacekeeping operations as their military.
All of these reforms demand coordination with NATO. While NATO and the EU have improved their working relations, more steps need to be taken to eliminate mistrust, unhealthy competition and information-sharing blockages.
The two bodies must expand their strategic dialogue beyond their current focus on the Balkans and Afghanistan.
Open dialogues
To do this, the often pre-scripted and stale dialogue between the North Atlantic Council and the EU's Political and Security Committee should be opened up to include topics such as combating terrorism and the proliferation of WMD, or regions such as Ukraine or Moldova. This would enable NATO and the EU to assess future scenarios and find ways to work together to prevent and manage crises.
European industry is also a vital factor in European defense integration, but it suffers from fragmented demand, counterproductive intra-European trade regulations and a mostly outdated Cold-War military infrastructure.
Specialization of military capabilities and industrial efforts by certain member states shows some promise, but needs to be coordinated to avoid redundancy and ensure interoperability.
Moreover, transatlantic defense trade must be used to augment European capabilities at the lowest possible cost. Both NATO and the EU have roles to play in working with industry to enhance Europe's defense capabilities.
Greater military integration in Europe will require sustained leadership by heads of government, military officials and NATO and EU leaders.
This is no small challenge, but there is no viable alternative. Greater defense integration in Europe is not just an appealing or interesting idea; it is an imperative.
General Klaus Naumann is a former chairman of NATO's Military Committee and a former chief of staff of the German Armed Forces.
Copyright: Project Syndicate/Institute for Human Sciences
Saudi Arabian largesse is flooding Egypt’s cultural scene, but the reception is mixed. Some welcome new “cooperation” between two regional powerhouses, while others fear a hostile takeover by Riyadh. In Cairo, historically the cultural capital of the Arab world, Egyptian Minister of Culture Nevine al-Kilany recently hosted Saudi Arabian General Entertainment Authority chairman Turki al-Sheikh. The deep-pocketed al-Sheikh has emerged as a Medici-like patron for Egypt’s cultural elite, courted by Cairo’s top talent to produce a slew of forthcoming films. A new three-way agreement between al-Sheikh, Kilany and United Media Services — a multi-media conglomerate linked to state intelligence that owns much of
The US and other countries should take concrete steps to confront the threats from Beijing to avoid war, US Representative Mario Diaz-Balart said in an interview with Voice of America on March 13. The US should use “every diplomatic economic tool at our disposal to treat China as what it is... to avoid war,” Diaz-Balart said. Giving an example of what the US could do, he said that it has to be more aggressive in its military sales to Taiwan. Actions by cross-party US lawmakers in the past few years such as meeting with Taiwanese officials in Washington and Taipei, and
The Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan has no official diplomatic allies in the EU. With the exception of the Vatican, it has no official allies in Europe at all. This does not prevent the ROC — Taiwan — from having close relations with EU member states and other European countries. The exact nature of the relationship does bear revisiting, if only to clarify what is a very complicated and sensitive idea, the details of which leave considerable room for misunderstanding, misrepresentation and disagreement. Only this week, President Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) received members of the European Parliament’s Delegation for Relations
Denmark’s “one China” policy more and more resembles Beijing’s “one China” principle. At least, this is how things appear. In recent interactions with the Danish state, such as applying for residency permits, a Taiwanese’s nationality would be listed as “China.” That designation occurs for a Taiwanese student coming to Denmark or a Danish citizen arriving in Denmark with, for example, their Taiwanese partner. Details of this were published on Sunday in an article in the Danish daily Berlingske written by Alexander Sjoberg and Tobias Reinwald. The pretext for this new practice is that Denmark does not recognize Taiwan as a state under