Print

Mail

wiki links

Silence over the Control Yuan not in right spirit

The long-delayed approval of the Control Yuan nominees finally appears to have renewed hope, as the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) has recently expressed some goodwill. However, this goodwill is contingent on raising the nominee approval threshold from a simple majority vote to a two-thirds majority vote. Otherwise, even the nominee review process will be grounded, not to mention the actual confirmations.

It is said that this idea was inspired by the "German spirit."

The Taiwanese are always appropriating ideas from foreign constitutional systems, so this is nothing new. Nevertheless, it is also common for people to take things out of context. This interpretation of the German spirit serves as an example.

Moreover, a lawyer friend of mine "poured oil on the fire," as the Chinese saying goes, holding that the Legislative Yuan's "silence" tallies perfectly with "American spirit." That is, freedom of speech actually allows an individual both the right to speak and the right to silence.

So why shouldn't the legislature exercise its right and maintain its silence? The US president also enjoys the power of a "pocket veto," a maneuver that allows him to ignore legislation under certain circumstances. Therefore, the legislature's move of doing nothing about the approval is not unprecedented in light of this example. However, my friend's comments are misguided, whether looking at the matter from either the German or US perspective.

The legislature's right of approval is in fact a public right, which should not be compared to that of freedom of speech. The rights of our legislators should certainly be protected. In addition to their freedom of speech, the Constitution also gives them immunity, they cannot be prosecuted for the opinions they express on the legislative floor. They are nevertheless also under obligation to exercise the powers invested in them. Theoretically, no one can decide how Constitutional judges should interpret the Constitution, but it is difficult to imagine the Judicial Yuan President Weng Yueh-sheng (翁岳生) asking the judges to express their opinions and make an interpretation, only to have all 14 judges exercising the right to remain silent. Hence, the legislature's silence on the Control Yuan nominees, and its right to silence, are completely beside the point.

It is also quite bizarre to compare this silence with the US president's pocket veto.

The US Constitution requires a president to sign or veto any legislation within 10 days. The only exception is that if Congress adjourns before the 10 days are up, then he can effectively veto the bill by putting it in his pocket -- because there is nowhere to return it to. On the contrary, Taiwan's legislature is able but unwilling to approve the nominees. How can these two examples be mentioned together?

The lawmakers' refusal to exercise their right of approval is even farther from the German spirit. In the German Constitutional Court's own interpretation, constitutional agencies are obligated to the Constitution and other government agencies. Apart from maintaining the separation of powers, the legislature should maintain Taiwan's constitutional system, and cooperate with other agencies to keep the government operating normally. Raising the threshold is merely doing things for appearances' sake, and ignoring the real crux of the matter.

Confrontation between governmental branches is nothing new. If lawmakers are dissatisfied with President Chen Shui-bian's (陳水扁) nominees, they should review and veto them. Then, Chen can nominate other candidates until the lawmakers are satisfied. Why are we silent when the legislature is turning the Control Yuan into a mere figurehead?

Thomas Huang is a visiting professor in the School of Law at Shih Hsin University.

TRANSLATED BY EDDY CHANG
This story has been viewed 1658 times.