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US ambiguity harmful
By Huang Jei-hsuan
Wednesday, Sep 14, 2005, Page 8
Late last year, former US secretary of state Colin Powell declared that Taiwan has no sovereignty. That was obviously then the US State Department's view.
A few days ago, US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld said that Taiwan is a sovereign nation.
In essence, the US government has treated the status of Taiwan with uncertainty, to the point of being schizophrenic.
A similar ambiguity has also been applied to the potential US response to China's aggression if Taiwan declares formal independence. The US government concluded a while back that an opaque response would be the best way to keep those independence-minded Taiwanese off balance without giving an inordinate amount of leverage to the Chinese.
This approach has served the US' interests for years, by helping to keep peace in the Taiwan Strait. But it may have outlived its usefulness.
One reason is that this ambiguity seems to have weakened the Taiwanese people's confidence in the US. This, together with the US' active discouragement of formal Taiwan independence, has managed to dash the hopes of many Taiwanese people for their own nation and instead made them vulnerable to China's "poisoned carrot and heavy stick" tactics. One of the immediate effects has been the difficulty in passing the special arms procurement bill.
It's true that the main culprits are those treacherous pan-blue legislators. But support for the bill among average Taiwanese, although widespread, can only be depicted as shallow and lukewarm. The public finds it hard to be very enthusiastic about spending an enormous amount of tax-payer money on something that's intended to maintain a tenuous status quo, at best.
Furthermore, some might even be led to believe that the days of the status quo may be numbered -- if they're not gone already -- if neither the US nor the Taiwanese people are sufficiently vigilant.
For example, if the outdated US policy described above is left unaddressed and if enough Taiwanese people are slumbering, the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) could be returned to power in 2008 and the status quo could soon crumble.
That's because the alliance established between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the KMT could bring about the absorption of Taiwan into China.
But the process would be conducted in such a way that the US would find the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) nearly toothless. That would be the case even though the likely back-door settlement of "unification" would be without the consent of the Taiwanese people, a clear violation of at least the intent if not the letter of the TRA.
Meanwhile, the US would discover that its ability to meddle in Taiwan's internal affairs had become quite limited in a KMT administration, since Beijing would be the one calling all of the shots -- at least in the context of cross-strait interaction. That means the US window of opportunity to effectively help prevent Taiwan from being stealthily annexed by China could be as short as one year, but no longer than two years, starting now.
The US must make up its mind by then. After that, events might outrun Washington's hesitation. The US could be left in the dust, haplessly watching its strategic interests in Taiwan literally snatched away, not to mention the outrage of witnessing a democracy being devoured by an authoritarian regime.
Therefore, the catalyst for US action would come from the CCP-KMT alliance's relentless push to set the stage for China's takeover of Taiwan. The timing for the US to act would most likely be shortly after the US government concludes that the KMT, even under the new leadership of Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九), is not going to cooperate with the US on procuring arms and that it's time to give up on the pan-blue camp.
The US can justify its about-face on the grounds that the CCP-KMT alliance's underhanded efforts amount to evading or obstructing the application of the TRA, and that action is needed also to reverse a trend that could lead to long-term regional instability. In other words, there will be ample national security imperatives to support this undertaking.
Then there is also the issue of fairness, which can add some moral gravity to US action, on account of the CCP and the KMT ganging up to undermine the administration of President Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁).
By now, it should be clear that carrying out a significant shift in the US' "one China" policy is the most effective approach for the US to regain the initiative and stem the ominous tide in the Taiwan Strait.
At minimum, Washington must declare that Taiwan's status is still undetermined and that there is no provision in the TRA to release the US from its obligation to aid in Taiwan's defense against China's aggression even if Taiwan declares independence.
That would naturally signal a change in the status quo and clear up the ambiguity discussed earlier. This in turn would restore the Taiwanese people's confidence in the US, as well as the future of Taiwan -- a situation that would bode well for them being able to vote to reject Taiwan being sold off, and to forcefully demand that the nation's deterrence capabilities be beefed up.
And, should the US change its "one China" stand, the ensuing crisis might also force China to seek a multilateral peace conference with at least the US, Japan and possibly a couple of other regional powers.
Hopefully, that would provide the opportunity and platform to settle the cross-strait issue once and for all -- presumably in a spirit of justice for the Taiwanese people, as well as long-term regional peace and prosperity.
Huang Jei-hsuan
California
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