The US consumes a quarter of the world's oil, compared to 8 percent for China. Even with high growth in China expected in coming years, the world will not run out of oil anytime soon. Over a trillion barrels of proven reserves exist, and more is likely to be found. But two-thirds of those proven reserves are in the Persian Gulf, and are thus vulnerable to disruption.
In the past, rising prices had a strong effect on US oil consumption. Since the price spikes of the 1970s, US oil consumption per dollar of GDP has fallen by half, which also reflects the general economic shift away from industrial manufacturing to less energy-intensive production. After all, it requires a lot less energy to create a software program than it does to produce a tonne of steel. In the early 1980s, energy costs accounted for 14 percent of the US economy. Today, they account for 7 percent. Adjusted for inflation, oil prices would have to reach US$80 per barrel (or US$3.12 per gallon of gasoline) to reach the real level recorded in March 1981.
According to the US government, if there are no supply disruptions, and the US economy grows at an annual rate of 3 percent, the price of a barrel of oil will decline to US$25 (in 2003 dollars) in 2010 and then rise to US$30 in 2025. The energy intensiveness of the economy will continue to decline at an average annual rate of 1.6 percent, as efficiency gains and structural shifts offset part of the overall growth in demand. Nonetheless, dependency on oil will grow at an annual rate of 1.5 percent, from 20 million barrels per day in 2003 to 27.9 million in 2025.
The US political system has difficulty in agreeing on a coherent energy policy. But over the next decade, the politics of energy in the US may gradually change. Some observers detect a new "Geo-Green" coalition of conservative foreign-policy hawks, who worry about the US' dependence on Persian Gulf oil, and liberal environmentalists.
In the hawks' view, the real energy problem is not the absence of petroleum reserves, but the fact that they are concentrated in a vulnerable area. The answer is to curb the US' thirst for oil rather than increasing imports. Greens argue that even if energy supplies are abundant, the ability of the environment to support current rates of consumption is limited. The middle of the range of scenarios considered by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change projects that atmospheric carbon dioxide concentrations will reach nearly three times their pre-industrial level in 2100.
While the Bush administration remains skeptical about the science behind such projections, some state and local governments are enacting measures to cut carbon dioxide emissions. More importantly, companies such as General Electric are committing to green goals that go well beyond government regulations. A recent report by the bipartisan National Commission on Energy Policy exemplifies the new coalition. While US President George W. Bush argues that technological advances in hydrogen fuels and fuel cells will curb oil imports in the long run, such measures require major changes in transportation infrastructure that will require decades to complete.
The commission suggests policies that could be implemented sooner. For example, in recent testimony before the US Congress, James Woolsey, a commission member and former CIA director, urged the use of hybrid gasoline/electric vehicles that could charge their batteries overnight with cheap off-peak electricity; energy-efficient ethanol made from cellulose; and a 10-mile-per-gallon (4.25km per liter) increase in fuel-efficiency requirements. He argued that this agenda could cut gasoline consumption significantly in a matter of years rather than decades. It would also avoid the need for dramatic increases in gasoline or carbon taxes, which are broadly accepted in Europe and Japan, but remain the kiss of death for US politicians.
But US government policies are unlikely to change the US' energy consumption significantly in the next few years. Even if a new administration were to enact new policies after Bush leaves office in 2008, there would still be a lag prior to any effect on actual consumption. In the next few years, market forces are likely to be more important than government policies in influencing consumption patterns. But over the next decade, the combination of markets and policies could make a big difference. For example, between 1978 and 1987, government regulations produced an improvement of 40 percent in the fuel efficiency of new US-made cars.
In a surprise-free world, the Bush administration is probably right that the US' thirst for oil will grow by 1.5 percent annually over the next two decades. But political disruption in the Persian Gulf or a new terrorist attack in the US would drive up oil prices rapidly, and the political climate in the US might also change quickly.
The probability of such events is not negligible. Energy independence may be impossible for a country that consumes a quarter of the world's oil but has only 3 percent of its reserves. Even so, a major decline in the US' thirst for oil is not out of the question in the longer term.
Joseph S. Nye is Distinguished Service Professor at Harvard and author of The Power Game: A Washington Novel.
Copyright: Project Syndicate
Saudi Arabian largesse is flooding Egypt’s cultural scene, but the reception is mixed. Some welcome new “cooperation” between two regional powerhouses, while others fear a hostile takeover by Riyadh. In Cairo, historically the cultural capital of the Arab world, Egyptian Minister of Culture Nevine al-Kilany recently hosted Saudi Arabian General Entertainment Authority chairman Turki al-Sheikh. The deep-pocketed al-Sheikh has emerged as a Medici-like patron for Egypt’s cultural elite, courted by Cairo’s top talent to produce a slew of forthcoming films. A new three-way agreement between al-Sheikh, Kilany and United Media Services — a multi-media conglomerate linked to state intelligence that owns much of
The US and other countries should take concrete steps to confront the threats from Beijing to avoid war, US Representative Mario Diaz-Balart said in an interview with Voice of America on March 13. The US should use “every diplomatic economic tool at our disposal to treat China as what it is... to avoid war,” Diaz-Balart said. Giving an example of what the US could do, he said that it has to be more aggressive in its military sales to Taiwan. Actions by cross-party US lawmakers in the past few years such as meeting with Taiwanese officials in Washington and Taipei, and
Denmark’s “one China” policy more and more resembles Beijing’s “one China” principle. At least, this is how things appear. In recent interactions with the Danish state, such as applying for residency permits, a Taiwanese’s nationality would be listed as “China.” That designation occurs for a Taiwanese student coming to Denmark or a Danish citizen arriving in Denmark with, for example, their Taiwanese partner. Details of this were published on Sunday in an article in the Danish daily Berlingske written by Alexander Sjoberg and Tobias Reinwald. The pretext for this new practice is that Denmark does not recognize Taiwan as a state under
The Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan has no official diplomatic allies in the EU. With the exception of the Vatican, it has no official allies in Europe at all. This does not prevent the ROC — Taiwan — from having close relations with EU member states and other European countries. The exact nature of the relationship does bear revisiting, if only to clarify what is a very complicated and sensitive idea, the details of which leave considerable room for misunderstanding, misrepresentation and disagreement. Only this week, President Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) received members of the European Parliament’s Delegation for Relations