The visits to China by Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) Chairman Lien Chan (連戰) and People First Party (PFP) Chairman James Soong (宋楚瑜) have now concluded, and the current bout of "China fever" has subsided, for the moment at least.
The visits have revealed three things. First, that China has used the visits to counter international pressure over the "Anti-Secession" Law; second, that Lien and Soong are not in a position to create opportunities initiating cross-strait interaction; and third, that China will not be easily shifted from its hardline position, but that it is showing considerable versatility in the use of economic issues.
China's ultimate aim is to use Lien and Soong's visits to influence President Chen Shui-bian's (陳水扁) May 20 address, forcing him to accept "one China" and abandon opposition to unification.
On the first point, when Xiong Guangkai (
On the second point, it is clear that the "1992 consensus" does not serve as a basis for cross-strait interaction. In September 1996 and April 2000, Tang Shubei (
Therefore, the question of whether China had promised to allow "one China, with each side having its own interpretation" became a key for the blue camp on whether cross-strait talks could be resumed.
In his meeting with Hu, Lien put forward the proposition "one China, with each side having its own interpretation," but received no response. Wang Daohan (
Although the memorandum of the Soong-Hu talks cited the full text of the statement signed by ARATS and the Straits Exchange Foundation in 1992, it also underlined that the "one China" question was really a case of each side stating its own position and that no substantial consensus had been reached. Moreover, Hu never agreed to the proposal that the two sides of the Strait could have their own interpretation of "one China." Therefore, the pan-blue camp's hope that the so-called "1992 consensus" could be used to blur the sovereignty issue and restart cross-strait political dialogue seems to have been in vain.
China's hard line could be seen in every aspect of Soong's visit, and he failed in his bridge-building efforts. During the first stop of his China tour, in Xian, Soong stated his position. He opposed Taiwan's independence, two Chinas, one China and one Taiwan, and the two-states formula. He said he favored "constitutional one China," but his statements in this respect were censored by the media, who only broadcast his support for the "1992 consensus."
It is understandable that Soong should oppose Taiwanese independence, but by opposing two Chinas, he burnt his bridges in the hope that China would give him a suitable reward.
Soong proposed the "one-China umbrella, a seat for each side of the Strait, three links in three phases."
China and Taiwan have separate seats in many international non-governmental organizations, and this in China's eyes is a realization of two Chinas, which contravenes the "one China" principle. But in his statement, it seems that Soong even opposes this state of affairs.
Soong may have believed that his statement would win some concessions from China in the form of an acceptance of "one China, with each side having its own interpretation," or at least a tacit acceptance of the existence of the Republic of China (ROC). But China made no concessions.
During Soong's first speech, Chinese media broadcast his three mentions of the ROC. Subsequently, at Sun Yat-sen's (
So, China was unwilling to raise the issue of "one China, with each side having its own interpretation," nor was it willing to accept Taiwan's de facto independence and that neither side is subordinate to the other. This is the first of the 10 points listed in the consensus reached between Chen and Soong in February.
Finally, on the issue of cross-strait economic exchanges, China showed itself to be very flexible, putting forward numerous unilateral proposals and suggestions for cooperation. Clearly, Beijing has already become adept at manipulating economic issues to pressure Taipei into abandoning its opposition to China.
Following the visits by Lien and Soong, cross-strait relations have returned to a state of "political frigidity and economic fever." It is unlikely that Chen will accept "one China" and the "1992 consensus," and substantial political interaction between the two sides, such as a meeting between Hu and Chen, is unlikely.
We have gradually returned to how things were at the beginning of the year during negotiations for cross-strait Lunar New Year charter flights, in which talks on economic issues were the only way to break the gridlock.
Tong Chen-yuan is an assistant professor at National Chengchi University's Institute of International Relations.
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