Reforming Japan's Constitution

By Hideaki Kaneda

Thursday, May 05, 2005, Page 9

ILLUSTRATION: MOUNTAIN PEOPLE

"Reform with no sacred cows" was Junichiro Koizumi's slogan when he became Japan's prime minister five years ago, and no cow here is more sacred than our "peace" Constitution. So it should be no surprise that, as Koizumi moves toward the end of his second and final term in office, his efforts to reform the Constitution to allow Japan more effectively to defend world peace are gathering pace.

In the middle of last month, the Constitution Review Committee of the House of Representatives issued a final report on the fundamental problems facing the Constitution and submitted it to the chair of House of the Diet. Soon the House of Councilors will submit its final report. Moreover, concrete discussions on constitutional reform are underway within both the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (with Koizumi himself in charge) and the opposition Democratic Party.

The private sector and media outlets like the influential Yomiuri Shimbun daily have also joined in. The Liberal Democrats aim to have their draft constitutional amendments ready for the 50th anniversary of the party's founding this November.

"Japan needs to be able to back up the Security Council with men"

Although almost everyone concedes that some amendments to the Constitution are necessary, agreement on what needs to be done has been difficult to reach. Indeed, the Liberal Democrats are as divided as everyone else.

In addition to these divisions, there are problems concerning how to amend the Constitution. New legislation will be needed to enable amendments to the Constitution, and this will take time and even more debate. Yet the pressure for fundamental change -- particularly of Article 9, which putatively pledges that Japan will never maintain armed forces -- is such that there is a real chance that these obstacles can and will be overcome. Fundamental change, indeed, is needed as soon as possible, because current interpretations of the Constitution have consistently distorted Japan's security and defense policies.

Across Japan, there is a growing view that some of these policies cannot wait for constitutional amendment. Up to now, issues related to national defense have been regulated by the administrative judgments of the time or by Diet resolutions based on the prevailing interpretation of Article 9. But this ad-hoc approach has been, and remains, a recipe for paralysis.

The myriad rulings that have resulted from this process have left the exercise of national defense without any clear position under the Constitution and impede Japan from exercising its "collective self-defense" rights and treaty obligations with its allies (principally the US).

Tortured about phrases like "use of force" or "exclusively defense-oriented policy" amounts to an open invitation to confusion, both in the military and to countries in the region. And the so-called "three principles on arms exports" have placed absurd limits on what may be sold or supplied abroad, as even flying boats used for sea rescue have been viewed as banned from export.

Given current regional security environment -- international terrorism tied to local, Asian-based terrorists, various challenges to the security of vital sea lanes, North Korea's search for nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, and China's rapid enhancement of its naval power -- Asia today is far less stable and more complex than it was when Japan's Constitution was written.

By the National Defense Program Guideline (conventionally called an outline) last December, Koizumi's government began the process of clarifying some of these debilitating ambiguities. The guideline lifted some of the more foolish limits on arms exports by ending the "all-out prohibition policy" maintained since the Miki administration of 1976.

For example, it clearly determined that the ongoing Japanese-US joint technical research to develop and produce the SM-3 sea-based ballistic missile defense system is an exception. More generally, the government may now review requests for weaponry from friendly governments on a case-by-case basis, according to whether the sale risks instigating or fueling international conflicts.

As a result, the sale or supply of used or new surface combat vessels by the Japan Coast Guard or even Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) to ASEAN countries, say, Malaysia, Indonesia or Singapore, to help them fight maritime terrorism and piracy more effectively will now likely be permitted. Supplying European countries as well ASEAN countries with JMSDF flying boats for sea rescue, patrol and fire fighting will also now likely be approved.

These favorable and appropriate actions will allow Japan, for the first time in its postwar history, to meet the international community's requests in a timely way. Yet, without fundamental constitutional reform, Japan's position in Asia and the world will remain anomalous.

It should be remembered that, after the US, Japan is the largest contributor to the UN, and to its peacekeeping budget. Yet its Constitution severely constrains its ability to send combat units for the UN Security Council's peacekeeping operations. Japan needs to be able to back up the Security Council with men, and hence share the political risk, as well as the cost, of the UN's efforts to maintain world peace.

Hideaki Kaneda, a retired vice admiral of Japan's Self-Defense Forces, is currently director of the Okazaki Institute. Copyright: Project Syndicate