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Refining the rhythm of democracy

The recent dispute over whether we should hold the three local elections on the same day provides us with an interesting case study of the interplay between ideas and policies. If policy disagreement seems absurd, it is probably because both the arguments for and against the proposed reform come out of a dubious perception of the timing of elections.

Changing the schedule of our various elections at the local and national levels has been pondered for years. But little progress has ever been made in spite of its widespread popularity. It simply never became a priority in the government's reform agenda, and in previous rounds of constitutional reform from the early 1990s onward, we just kept ignoring the issue.

The problem can be attributed to our poor appreciation of the significance of election timing. The cost-benefit analysis advanced by advocates of reform, which seeks to appeal to the pragmatism of Taiwanese people, often sounds either too empty or too technocratic to inspire the passion and vision needed for successful reform.

There were energetic political movements for downsizing the legislature and for changing its electoral system. But one can hardly think of any sit-in or rally that was held in support for reorganizing election times.

To break the inertia and rebuild a more solid reform momentum, we need to revisit the fundamentals.

Echoing the common wisdom that time is money, proponents of the reorganization argue that by holding elections concurrently we can save lots of money. For instance, both the cost of administering elections and the cost of voting can arguably be reduced to a certain extent if we can hold elections for different posts on the same day.

Enhancing the efficiency of electoral democracy itself is certainly a laudable agenda. But assuming the money-saving effect of the proposed reform is real and not trivial, it remains doubtful whether people will pursue the reform passionately simply for their pocket's sake. Democracy is sustained by voters' sense of civic duty rather than by pure utility.

Along the line of the cost-effective justification, we can also find the claims about "social costs" that cannot readily be measured in dollars. Frequent elections, we are told, are a contributing factor to the polarization of the electorate and, for similar reasons, they are also detrimental to the reconciliation between political parties.

The social cost argument gives us a shorthand answer to what is wrong with our electoral calendar. It also explains why there is a strong public sentiment in favor of reform. But regardless of the need for empirical testing, we still have to elaborate on the role of election time to boost our reform commitment.

At least two rationales deserve close consideration. Comparative studies of electoral engineering teach us that the "electoral cycle" might influence the structure of the party system, which in turn has salient impact on the logic and climate of real politics. A divided government, for instance, is arguably less likely to occur in a presidential democracy where presidential and legislative elections are held concurrently or in close proximity to each other.

Admittedly, there are limitations to institutional engineering, and we don't have the crystal ball to foresee the future. But by no means should we neglect the electoral cycle variable when restructuring our electoral system.

Professor Dennis Thompson, a well-known political theorist at Harvard, leads us to reflect on the properties of the electoral process.

"Elections take place at intervals, citizens vote on the same day, and the electoral outcome is irrevocable until the next election," Thompson says.

He also suggests that election time not only marks a unique moment in politics, it also creates the "rhythm of democracy."

In light of the values expressed by the temporal nature of elections, Thompson diagnoses the problems created by "permanent campaigning."

"When campaigns go on indefinitely, the difference between electoral and ordinary politics begins to blur. When representatives are continually running or preparing to run, campaigning and governing begin to merge," he says.

Doesn't this criticism of US politics sound familiar to Taiwan's system?

Thompson's theory, although developed in a different context, helps us illuminate the importance and necessity to redraw the calendar of Taiwan's local and national elections. The all-too-frequent elections in Taiwan are problematic because they create a discordant rhythm of politics that escalates the harm of permanent campaigning.

Once we realize the functions and significance of election timing, the case against reform becomes indefensible. To be sure, the reform is not costless and may have some unintended consequences. But we can never break away from chaotic politics if we are too timid to start the democratic experiment.

We should nonetheless support the "three-in-one" election plan as the first step toward the structural change. In the meantime, we should try to build a strong movement to push forward the needed constitutional and statutory reforms.

Reform of the temporal nature of elections is no less important than the spatial electoral reform waiting to take place in June. Both are too critical to be left in the hands of politicians and bureaucrats.

Su Yen-tu is a S.J.D. Candidate of Harvard Law School.
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