When US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice paid a visit to Beijing last month, she cautioned the EU not to lift the arms embargo on China because it would "alter the military balance in a place where the US has very strong security interests," a very clear signal for Brussels.
Almost simultaneously, the EU summit (European Council) in Brussels said that the EU would probably postpone lifting the arms embargo despite the fact that the EU had hoped to establish a closer EU-China relationship since Tiananmen Square.
The contentious issue of whether to lift the arms embargo is currently mired in fervent discussion between the EU and the US, but most of it has failed to sufficiently illustrate why the EU intends to construct a more comprehensive framework within a Eurasian context. I wish to discuss the reasons why EU intends to lift the arms embargo on China.
Most observers concentrate their attention on the importance of EU-Sino strategic alliances and commercial interests. This coincides with a realist approach and an institutional explanation: the Franco-German alliance aims for a multi-polar world. In this regard, they share common strategic interests. On the other hand, they also take into account the massive potential of the Chinese market.
With its emergence in Asia as a significant regional entity and rising power, no major corporation in the world can withdraw itself from the vast economic attractions of China. The EU is China's second-largest trade partner and vice versa. This is especially significant because the EU's defense industry faces harsh competition in both the domestic and international spheres.
Unlike standard commercial activities, the defense industry is currently exempted from normal competition rules that apply to the European internal market because it is considered a national security issue.
Nevertheless, when the European defense Agency (EDA) was formed in July, its main goal was to integrate the EU member states' defense industries as efficient and integrated when facing global competition (especially from the US). The decision to open up Europe's 30 billion euro (US$38.7 billion) defense market is likely to emerge as a key part of the member state co-operation within the EDA. A lack of competition would mean that member states would be paying too much for defense equipment from producers, which leaves them with fewer resources for research into new technology.
By prodding the EU into taking into account the Chinese market, the European Aeronautic Defense and Space Co and British Aerospace have better prospects. Indeed, they did a good job for the past several months in persuading the EU to lift the embargo.
Arguably, the EU's defense industry shares in China were marginal until 2002, but its prospects are quite positive. According to a report in The Economist, the volume of China's defense industry will rise to US$150 per year in the near future despite the fact that the EU's share of China's import trade was only 2.7 percent last year.
In this context, it is not difficult to imagine why France, Germany, Great Britain and other EU members want to meet China's vast commercial interests.
What's more, a political alliance between the EU and Russia on this issue is more likely as the arms embargo looms large.
Surprisingly, the EU possesses advanced technologies in the sphere of generators, communications and night-vision telescopes. With the help of the EU's technology, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) could easily promote their all-weather and digital warfare capabilities. It will tilt the balance across the Taiwan Strait and even deter the US from military action in the face of regional crisis or conflict. This is especially crucial as China becomes more and more confident in dealing with Asian affairs and intervening in cross-strait relations.
Consequently, it is crucial to ask the EU not to lift the arms embargo and encourage Brussels to come up with a more comprehensive policy framework that engages China.
First, the EU should revise its code of conduct concerning arms sales. It should lay more emphasis on human rights and democracy in China and other countries.
Until recently, the four countries under the EU's arms embargo were China, Myanmar, Sudan and Zimbabwe -- all notorious for their strict controls on freedom of expression and other abuses of political power.
Second, the arms embargo is important in as much as military modernization will tilt the region's balance in China's favor.
The international community should urge Brussels to construct transparent methods for arms sales, so that EU members and other concerned countries have the opportunity to object to a potential sale to China or other non-democratic countries.
Third, the EU should respect Taiwan's independence and support further democratic development in Taiwan. The EU's announcement on regional stability is a necessary buttress for Taiwan's independence; without a stable environment Taipei may fail in achieving a true democratic process.
Yang San-yi is an assistant research fellow at the Prospect Foundation.
Recently, China launched another diplomatic offensive against Taiwan, improperly linking its “one China principle” with UN General Assembly Resolution 2758 to constrain Taiwan’s diplomatic space. After Taiwan’s presidential election on Jan. 13, China persuaded Nauru to sever diplomatic ties with Taiwan. Nauru cited Resolution 2758 in its declaration of the diplomatic break. Subsequently, during the WHO Executive Board meeting that month, Beijing rallied countries including Venezuela, Zimbabwe, Belarus, Egypt, Nicaragua, Sri Lanka, Laos, Russia, Syria and Pakistan to reiterate the “one China principle” in their statements, and assert that “Resolution 2758 has settled the status of Taiwan” to hinder Taiwan’s
Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong’s (李顯龍) decision to step down after 19 years and hand power to his deputy, Lawrence Wong (黃循財), on May 15 was expected — though, perhaps, not so soon. Most political analysts had been eyeing an end-of-year handover, to ensure more time for Wong to study and shadow the role, ahead of general elections that must be called by November next year. Wong — who is currently both deputy prime minister and minister of finance — would need a combination of fresh ideas, wisdom and experience as he writes the nation’s next chapter. The world that
The past few months have seen tremendous strides in India’s journey to develop a vibrant semiconductor and electronics ecosystem. The nation’s established prowess in information technology (IT) has earned it much-needed revenue and prestige across the globe. Now, through the convergence of engineering talent, supportive government policies, an expanding market and technologically adaptive entrepreneurship, India is striving to become part of global electronics and semiconductor supply chains. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s Vision of “Make in India” and “Design in India” has been the guiding force behind the government’s incentive schemes that span skilling, design, fabrication, assembly, testing and packaging, and
Can US dialogue and cooperation with the communist dictatorship in Beijing help avert a Taiwan Strait crisis? Or is US President Joe Biden playing into Chinese President Xi Jinping’s (習近平) hands? With America preoccupied with the wars in Europe and the Middle East, Biden is seeking better relations with Xi’s regime. The goal is to responsibly manage US-China competition and prevent unintended conflict, thereby hoping to create greater space for the two countries to work together in areas where their interests align. The existing wars have already stretched US military resources thin, and the last thing Biden wants is yet another war.