Russia's decision to spend an extra 157 billion rubles (over US$5 billion) to fight terrorism is a more impressive response than all the Kremlin's recent tough talk, including President Vladimir Putin's demand that more power be centralized in his hands. Indeed, after the hostage crisis in the Dubrovka Theater in Moscow in 2002, the same sort of harsh words flowed, but no extra money was spent.
These new billions do seem to demonstrate renewed government resolve, but is throwing money at the war on terror enough?
The Kremlin refuses to publicly admit that today's terrorism has its roots predominantly in the Chechen war, which is now metastasizing throughout the Northern Caucasus. Chechen fighters and their supporters demonstrate almost daily that the war continues, and countless bold pronouncements, like newly elected Chechen president Alu Alkhanov's recent assertion that "effective measures" have been found to combat terror, look like mere bloviation.
According to Finance Minister Aleksei Kudrin, huge amounts of money are needed to resolve the Chechen problem. But financial inflows into Chechnya are often more destabilizing than helpful. President Akhmat Kadyrov, the murdered Chechen president, was right to suggest that 80 percent of this money ends up in the pockets of Moscow and regional firms who benefit from the Chechen conflict continuing.
So neither money nor military power alone can end the bloodshed, and diplomacy with the less militant Chechen leader Aslan Maskhadov seems unlikely, for three reasons. First, contacts between Maskhadov and a few Russian politicians haven't -- at least as of yet -- influenced the Kremlin's position. Second, the subject for negotiations is unclear, because Putin has ruled out Chechen independence, and surrender by the separatists is just as unlikely. Third, even if negotiations with less militant Chechens occur and succeed, terrorism will continue under the leadership of the religious fanatic Shamil Basaev.
The result of all this is spreading hopelessness. The thirst for vengeance after the Beslan school massacre makes confrontation between Chechens and Ingushis increasingly possible. Chechnya's neighboring republic, Dagestan, is witnessing increasing confrontations between radical and traditional Islamic groups, something now also seen in Kabardino-Balkaria.
Unless the Russian state develops a viable policy, fast, all of these areas threaten to become safe havens for terrorists. What Russia needs is a political response to terror that takes into account its international dimension.
In the last four years, radical Islam has established itself in the Northern Caucasus. This doesn't mean that all local Muslims have become jihadis. In fact, the latter are a tiny minority. But they are energetic, mobilized, and experienced fighters. These people increasingly identify themselves with the global jihad, and have forged firm links with Muslim radicals in the Middle East, Southern Asia and Europe.
Russia must now follow the US lead in how to fight terror. Since the attacks of September 2001, the US has managed to avoid further attacks on its land. True, the news coming from Iraq is horrible, but the US is fighting a full-blown war in Iraq; it is not engaged in a counterterrorist operation.
Russia's power structures, like those of the US, must now be readied to conduct a very long struggle, entirely different from the old Soviet KGB way of suppressing dissent. Russia's security forces need to learn to be pro-active, because the terrorists consistently seek to perfect their deadly methods. The fight against terror turns on who will strike first; so far, the terrorists have been faster and more professional than the Russian state.
To conduct this struggle effectively, Russia must abandon two hoary stereotypes: that all terrorists are bandits, and that they somehow are acting under some Western intelligence supervision to weaken Russia. The base of world terrorism consists of daring fanatics who believe in a sacred, fiery destiny. Osama bin Laden doesn't work for money and wants to destroy the entire West, not weaken Russia in particular.
But the greatest obstacle that must be confronted if Russia is to wage war on terror effectively is the rampant corruption in the security forces. It is well known, for example, that Basaev's fanatical killers paid off Russian militia to enter Budeonovsk in 1995 and kill hospital patients. Yet nothing has been done to root out this tool of terror.
It is all too easy to reduce the fight against terrorism to tightening the political screws, to a strengthening of Putin's power, to restricting the movement of people within the country. But none of these measures will frighten extremists in the Northern Caucasus or their al-Qaeda allies.
The Kremlin must know this already. Even Putin's predictable presidential rhetoric reveals a desire to initiate a real fight against terrorism. But waging a serious war requires a serious reorganization of Russia's power structures, which will be very painful. Despite Putin's so far unsuccessful fight against terrorism, his popularity remains high, so he has the political capital to make tough internal reforms. But he must act now, for public support can be no substitute for resolute and effective action.
Aleksey Malashenko is an Islam expert with the Carnegie Center in Moscow. Copyright: Project Syndicate
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